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Abstract 
This project explores how authoritarian regimes can meet the demands of both the ruling 
coalition and the public from a perspective of distributional politics. This challenge is 
particularly severe since authoritarian regimes face increasing pressure to expand public 
goods and welfare. This project proposes a theory of authoritarian distribution that addresses 
this challenge in the case of China. First, autocrats adopted a differentiated strategy of 
distribution. They allocate universalistic benefits that target the large group of people to the 
public while distributing the particularistic benefits, which is exclusively for a small and 
specific group of people, to the regime allies. Second, autocrats should offer compensation to 
the regime allies for their loss in the expansion of public welfare, at the expense of other 
public interests. Third, autocrats would create new benefits to the regime allies to compensate 
for their relative loss because their old privilege is no longer exclusives during the expansion 
of public welfare. This project utilized an original dataset of the People’s Congress, the 
budgeting and anti-corruption data at provincial level, and a qualitative case study of 
membership recruitment of the Communist Party of China to test the proposed theory. In 
general, this project explains how authoritarian regimes maintain balances between different 
demands of distribution for regime survival. It also contributes to the study of authoritarian 
politics by bridging the gap between the literature on cooptation and the literature on the 
loyalty of the ruling coalition, both of which are necessary and critical explanations on the 
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No. 28 Fuxing Road in Beijing’s Haidian District is the address of the People's 
Liberation Army General Hospital, commonly known as the 301 Hospital and arguably the 
most famous hospital in China. Much of this fame comes from its South Building, a medical 
building reserved for the provision of healthcare service to political and social elites of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Indeed, the most senior members of the CCP, from Mao 
Zedong to Xi Jinping, have been treated in this building, along with other senior officials, 
prominent public figures, scholars, and other such elites. Even within the South Building, 
patients receive medical treatments according to their rank, with senior officials usually 
receiving the highest standard of treatment from top medical staff.1 
This kind of healthcare service privilege for cadres (ganbu bingfang,干部病房) is 
widely seen across China.2 However, healthcare represents only a tiny portion of the many 
privileges associated with elite membership of the CCP. From the special provision of foods 
or access to exclusive recreational facilities to complimentary housing or reserved spots in 
top primary and middle schools, the perks and private benefits of being a member of the 
ruling coalition of the Chinese regime are manifold. Comparatively speaking, among 
authoritarian regimes around the world, these kinds of privileges provide important 
 
1 For example, see the regulation on healthcare for cadres in the Ministry of Natural Resources: 
http://www.mnr.gov.cn/zt/zh/qrsy/rd/201807/t20180716_2094304.html. 
2 For example, see the following article: http://www.sohu.com/a/135037566_746509 (accessed on January 4, 2019). 
 2 
incentives for members of the ruling coalition to stay loyal to the regime (Gandhi, 2008; 
Svolik, 2012, p. 163). 
In the pre-reform era of the People’s Republic of China, when there were shortages of 
many resources, these kinds of benefits seemed to be very attractive. However, it seems 
increasingly challenging for the regime to maintain a balance between offering valuable 
private incentives and providing necessary public goods in the context of the dramatic 
socioeconomic development of China. This dissertation, therefore, tries to provide an 
empirical explanation of how authoritarian regimes such as that of China develop their 
distributional strategies to balance private benefits and public interests. It explains a) how the 
Chinese authoritarian regime tries to differentiate what it offers to members of the regime 
coalition from what it offers to members of the public and b) how the Chinese regime 
maintains the attractiveness of private benefits when their value is inevitably eroded by the 
increasing level of public goods provisions under resource constraints. Overall, this study 
provides theoretical and empirical evidence of how authoritarian regimes formulate their 
distributional policies to serve their political needs of regime survival and what 
socioeconomic impacts those policies have. 
1.1 The Puzzle: The Conflict between Private Benefits and 
Public Interests 
Studies of authoritarian politics have identified two major tasks for authoritarian regime 
survival: to maintain the cohesion of the ruling coalition and to keep control of the masses 
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(Svolik, 2012). Two major groups of literature deal with these two tasks separately and 
provide insights into understanding autocrats' strategies to ensure the survival of authoritarian 
regimes as political organizations. From the perspective of distributional politics, many 
studies have provided numerous findings on both objectives. For the first one, scholars have 
identified the importance of distributing spoils and benefits to form a stable ruling coalition 
(Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003) and establishing various 
forms of political institutions to guarantee the credibility and functioning of the rent-sharing 
mechanism (Blaydes, 2010; Magaloni, 2006, 2008; Myerson, 2008). For the second 
objective, cooptation theory dominates the discussion and argues that authoritarian regimes 
have to offer benefits and concessions to the public in exchange for their political obedience 
and cooperation (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006). This simple “buying support” 
strategy has been effective in allowing the state to solicit cooperation from social elites 
outside of the regime in China (Yan, 2011). Autocrats have to be (somewhat) accountable to 
the public by offering public goods to address public pressure. 
The puzzle that inspires this study, however, lies in how regimes develop strategies that 
can bridge the objectives addressed in these two strands of literature. The distributional 
requirements of the objectives inevitably present two dilemmas to dictators. The first 
involves direct and imminent resource constraints. Since no one has unlimited resources to 
satisfy all demands for benefits, all dictators have to make choices between satisfying elites 
or the public. In many cases, resource allocations to one group erode the ability to offer 
benefits to the other group. There must be a comprehensive mechanism for autocrats to 
 4 
balance the distribution of benefits to the two groups; otherwise, unbalanced favorable 
treatment of one side may lead to the defection of the other group and thus threaten the 
stability and survival of the regime. This danger is recognized in Reuter and Szakonyi (2019), 
but as these authors admit, their study does “not [provide] a solution to it”. 
The second and perhaps longer-run dilemma is the erosion of the value of private 
benefits with an increasing level of public good and service provision. Pressures for 
accountability and the need for cooptation both force authoritarian regimes to provide public 
goods and services to the public, and general improvements in socioeconomic development 
usually provide the resources to do so. As a result, many private benefits lose their value and 
become nonexclusive. Take the hospital case at the beginning as an example. High-quality 
healthcare used to be exclusive to senior officials and elites in China, and it was difficult for 
ordinary people to access care of the same quality. The socioeconomic development and 
reform of China, however, has increasingly enhanced the medical resources available to 
ordinary people in the postreform era. The 301 Hospital itself, for example, receives almost 
five million patients annually, and the physicians who accept ordinary patients are the same 
ones who treat senior party officials. Top medical treatments are generally commercialized: 
ordinary people can also enjoy the luxury patient ward and top-quality healthcare if they pay 
enough. With the help of private service providers, ordinary citizens can even go to more 
advanced Western medical institutions, such as Massachusetts General Hospital or the Mayo 
Clinic, for healthcare services. Although there are still differences between the public and 
elites in China, those differences are far less salient than they were 30 years ago. 
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The value of nonmaterial benefits available to political elites also seems to be 
diminishing. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, CCP membership guaranteed exclusive 
access to rewarding and reputable careers, almost all of which were state-affiliated. The 
development of the market economy and private sector, however, has provided abundant 
opportunities for bright career prospects even for those who are not party members. Although 
there are still many young people trying to join the CCP and start their careers in state-owned 
enterprises or government sectors, many more are hoping to work in private and 
multinational companies in the financial, commercial or IT sectors, where party membership 
carries little weight for career advancement. 
Furthermore, pressures on the regime to respond to public demands and be accountable 
also reduce the privileges that members of the ruling coalition in China can enjoy; many such 
demands stem from the pressure to sustain the country’s economic development (Y. Wang, 
2015). The establishment of the rule of law in China has severely limited the discretionary 
power of political elites to extract private rents, and public critiques of the spoils system and 
the privileges associated therewith make the Chinese government reluctant to offer these 
benefits. For example, the anticorruption campaign conducted in Xi-era China, although quite 
popular among the public, has generated complaints from bureaucrats regarding the decrease 
in their welfare and benefits (Zhu, Zhang, & Liu, 2017). 
The examples regarding healthcare, career advantages, and bureaucratic welfare all 
reflect the same question: What are the incentives for political elites to remain in the ruling 
coalition and stay loyal to autocrats? It is true that political elites, like other members of 
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society, have access to expanded public welfare, but they will be indifferent over whether to 
remain in the regime coalition if all benefits come from nonexclusive public welfare. 
Authoritarian regimes need to provide unique and exclusive benefits that perfectly meet the 
demands of political elites. Of course, political elites may still be incentivized by ideological 
arguments, but any authoritarian regime is in quite a vulnerable position if it fails to provide 
unique material incentives for its members to remain loyal. China has to find a new way to 
offer innovative benefits to preserve the regime’s attractiveness to political and social elites. 
All these considerations combined result in a fundamental challenge for the Chinese 
regime—similar, perhaps, to other autocracies—in crafting its distributional politics. How 
does the regime maintain the value of staying in the ruling coalition while satisfying the 
increasing demands of the public? What are the distributional strategies deployed by an 
autocrat to strike a balance between allocations to the public and allocations to political elites 
from the ruling coalition, both of which are critical to the survival of the regime? 
1.2 China: a case of authoritarian distributional politics 
This study is inspired by the aforementioned puzzles observed in China, though the aim 
is to make a general argument about authoritarian distributional politics that can travel 
beyond China. The approach of exploring these puzzles in the context of China provides 
several advantages. 
First, as a prominent authoritarian regime experiencing rapid social and economic 
development, China, as demonstrated above, presents scenarios where allocations to the 
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public and to political elites are directly in contradiction. Although this dilemma likely exists 
in all authoritarian systems, they are very salient in Chinese society and, therefore, provide a 
good case to test any theory of distribution in the authoritarian context. China faces 
significant pressures from both regime allies and the public regarding the distribution of 
benefits. Unlike many other authoritarian regimes, where the public has relatively little 
influence on distributional decisions, China has established several political institutions and 
mechanisms, albeit in limited forms, to allow public participation in decision-making 
processes (Stromseth, Malesky, & Gueorguiev, 2017; Teets, 2014; Truex, 2016). An ideal 
case in which to observe strategies for resolving distributional dilemmas is one in which 
autocrats have to deal with conflicting demands simultaneously, and China certainly provides 
such a setting. 
Second, China provides good access to data that can reflect the distribution of rents. The 
nature of authoritarian politics dictates that the whole resource allocation process is generally 
secretive and difficult for scholars to observe; this is especially true of private allocations to 
regime allies. One feasible option is to use budgetary data to indirectly capture the 
distributional level, as Gandhi (2008) does in her cross-national study, but even budgetary 
data of good quality is quite difficult to obtain. Furthermore, the lack of state capacity in 
many underdeveloped authoritarian regimes makes it almost impossible to secure a complete 
dataset of any meaningful indicators. China, on the other hand, has enough state capacity to 
collect different types of data that can be used to explore distributional questions. It also 
offers relatively better data accessibility than many other authoritarian regimes. Thus, in spite 
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of many difficulties, China is still a good case with appropriate opportunities for this study. 
Last, as a large country with substantial variation, China provides enormous 
opportunities for researchers to conduct both large-N quantitative analysis and in-depth 
qualitative studies. The unitary political system and uniform social and cultural background 
of China makes possible a within-nation study that can control for many factors that cross-
national studies cannot address, while subnational variation can still provide enough leverage 
to study the pattern and strategies of distributional politics. This ensures that the findings of 
this study, although based on a single country, can still be generalized to other authoritarian 
regimes to some extent. 
1.3 My Argument 
My theory of distributional strategies in authoritarian regimes involves three sets of 
actors: political and social elites from the ruling coalition, the general public, and the 
autocrat. For the sake of argument, I call the first “regime allies”, referring to those elites who 
are members of the ruling coalition and have influence on the functioning of the regime and 
the selection of the regime leader.3 The second group of actors refers to members of the 
public, who have no access to the private spoils offered by the regime and are outsiders to 
regime institutions. Both regime allies and the public are recipients of allocations in the 
distributional process. The autocrat refers to the paramount leader of the regime’s ruling 
coalition and is the distributor in the distributional process. For the remainder of this 
 
3 This definition can be viewed as similar to the selectorate of an authoritarian regime discussed in Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2003). See a more detailed discussion in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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dissertation, the term “authoritarian regime(s)” is, for the sake of discussion, usually used to 
refer to the distributor as well. Thus, it usually includes the autocrat but excludes other 
political elites who are recipients of allocations. 
In this dissertation, I argue that the authoritarian regime in China adopts a differentiated 
strategy of distribution in balancing the needs of the public and regime allies. First, autocrats 
determine what they offer based on the type of demands made and who makes them. By 
selectively satisfying demands made by both groups, autocrats can maintain a balance 
between two sides under resource constraints. Second, autocrats should make “side 
payments” to offset the increased provision of public goods that address public demands and 
pressure. Such side payments, usually made at the expense of the public interest due to 
resource constraints, can be used to compensate regime allies who may suffer because of the 
additional provision of public goods. By making such side payments, autocrats can maintain 
the value of benefits to regime allies while increasing the provision of public benefits. 
Finally, autocrats should selectively create new incentives to attract regime allies. I argue that 
autocrats can achieve these goals by reemphasizing the importance of politics in certain 
aspects of career development, increasing the material returns of the ruling coalition, and 
reducing the costs associated with being a regime ally. In doing so, autocrats can successfully 
maintain the attractiveness of the regime during new phases of socioeconomic development. 
To apply this theory to China, I expect to test the following three arguments with respect 
to distributional politics in the authoritarian system of China. 
The Distributional Hub. The differentiated strategy of distribution implies that there 
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must be some mechanism whereby the Chinese regime can receive and process all demands 
from different sides and sectors and then distribute benefits and spoils selectively and 
accordingly. The hub should serve as a node in the whole distributional process and network, 
and inside the hub, we should observe a clear pattern of differentiated distribution consistent 
with my theory. In this study, I argue that the People’s Congress system in China should work 
as one such distributional hub. This is consistent with many other studies of authoritarian 
regimes that view the legislature as a vehicle or institution for benefit distribution (Blaydes, 
2010; Gandhi, 2008). 
Side Payments of Public Benefits. As indicated, we should observe new types of private 
side payments along with the expansion of public benefits provision in China. Such side 
payments are made to compensate regime allies and thus may end up being a net loss for the 
public interest in general, despite the expanded public benefits. We should observe such 
changes in budgetary data, which reflect the general level of public good and welfare 
expenditure. 
New Incentives in Coalition Membership. In China, and perhaps in many other 
authoritarian regimes as well, defining “regime allies” is usually a challenging task for the 
researcher. In this study, I consider several different definitions and use one of the most 
common for the sake of this specific argument: membership in the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP).4 Although China’s political power is still strictly monopolized by members of the 
 
4 Later, in Chapter 5, I will also discuss how membership in the eight “democratic parties” in China can be regarded as 
a lesser form of being a regime ally, perhaps analogous to an affiliate membership status. 
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CCP, party membership no longer seems to produce significant advantages in many other 
spheres of life for ordinary people. My argument, however, implies that the Chinese regime 
should try to invent new incentives to attract ordinary people to join the party. This study 
demonstrates how the CCP does so by creating institutionalized material rewards, 
emphasizing the importance of political loyalty tied with membership even in nonpolitical 
sectors, and reducing the costs associated with party membership. 
1.4 Contributions 
This dissertation aims to contribute to the following major perspectives in the literature. 
First, this study tries to explore the survival strategies of authoritarian regimes from a 
distributional perspective and bridge the gap between the two major groups of literature that 
address the need to control the masses, on the one hand, and the members of ruling coalitions, 
on the other. This study explains how autocrats can balance these two objectives under 
resource constraints and how such strategies can work. 
Second, this study explains how the Chinese regime maintains its attractiveness to 
political and social elites when many of their old privileges are no longer exclusive. By 
arguing that the regime makes side payments to compensate elites for the expansion of public 
benefits and creates new incentives for party membership, this study explains how these 
creative new strategies work and evaluates their effectiveness in maintaining the loyalty of 
regime allies. 
Third, this study provides a new theoretical understanding of how politics affects the 
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allocation of resources. This study explains “who gets what, when and how” in authoritarian 
regimes broadly and in China specifically. This study indicates that members of society, 
including both political elites from the ruling coalition and the general public, are allocated 
resources and benefits based on who they are and what they ask for. It also indicates that the 
provision of public welfare always comes with private side payments and additional 
incentives provided to regime allies as compensation. The findings of this study, therefore, 
can also engage with the existing literature discussing the provision of public goods in China 
and in other authoritarian regimes (Hong, 2018; Lizzeri & Persico, 2001; Luo, Zhang, Huang, 
& Rozelle, 2007; Olson, 1993; L. L. Tsai, 2007). 
Last, the empirical findings of this study provide new insights into some of the critical 
questions in the study of Chinese politics. The study of the People’s Congress system in 
Chapter 3 explains how local governments in China respond to different demands for 
benefits. Although many studies have shown that the Chinese public can participate in the 
policy process in general and the People’s Congress in particular, relatively less evidence has 
been offered on how such participation is processed by the government. Does it have a 
substantial effect on government decisions, and how does the government respond? This 
study provides empirical evidence on these questions. Similarly, the empirical findings in 
Chapter 4 reveal the socioeconomic impact of the anticorruption campaign in China, arguably 
one of the most salient political events in the Xi era. In addition to studies that confirm the 
effects of curbing corruption (T. Chen & Kung, 2018), this study, consistent with some other 
works (Erik Wang, 2019), emphasizes the adverse effect of anticorruption initiatives on 
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public welfare in China with respect to the mechanism of the distributional theory proposed. 
All these empirical findings will contribute to scholarly understanding of some of the most 
important issues in China. 
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of an introductory chapter, a theory chapter, three empirical 
chapters, and one concluding chapter. The dissertation is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 elaborates the theory of authoritarian distributional strategies and explains 
how it links and extends the current literature. Specifically, I argue that autocrats adopt a 
differentiated strategy of distribution by offering particularistic allocations to regime allies 
and universal allocations to the public and adjust the dynamic balance between the two types 
of allocations by creating new benefits for one type alongside the expansion of benefits for 
the other type of recipient. Applying this theory to the Chinese context, I develop the three 
major components of the theoretical mechanism proposed in this study. 
1) The distributional hub component, which explains how local government in China 
selectively distributes benefits and spoils to regime allies and the public through China’s 
People’s Congress system; 
2) The side payment component, which explains how the Chinese regime compensates 
bureaucrats for their losses in the anticorruption campaign, itself viewed as an important type 
of public good, by reducing public spending and increasing private bureaucratic welfare in 
the budgetary process; and 
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3) The new incentives for coalition membership component, which explains how the 
CCP recruits new members by creating new advantages of CCP membership, including 
institutionalized material rewards, demonstration of political loyalty and reliability, and a 
reduced cost of party membership. 
Chapter 2 also reviews the existing literature on authoritarian distribution strategies and 
discusses several important questions in the research on distributional politics in authoritarian 
regimes. 
Chapters 3 to 5 provide empirical evidence to support the main arguments made in 
Chapter 2. Specifically, Chapter 3 utilizes a unique dataset from Anhui Provincial People’s 
Congress to demonstrate how the Anhui provincial government responds to different 
delegates’ proposals requesting different types of benefits, a process reflecting how the 
government allocates resources and distributes benefits selectively to different groups. 
Chapter 4 analyzes data on anticorruption investigations in different provinces in China and 
evaluates how the investigations affect provincial spending on public welfare and 
bureaucratic welfare, as well as the fiscal assistance each province receives from the central 
government. The chapter documents the side payments created to compensate local officials 
in tandem with the expansions of the anticorruption campaign. Chapter 5 presents a 
qualitative study on the incentives and advantages associated with CCP membership based on 
extensive reviews of documents, fieldwork and interviews. The study summarizes the 
evolution of the privileges associated with party membership, compares the current 
incentives with the incentives in the past, and explains how the CCP creatively invents new 
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incentives for recruiting new elites as members of the ruling coalition. The three empirical 
chapters together support the main theoretical arguments proposed in the theoretical chapter. 
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the major findings, addressing the 
major theoretical implications and the major weaknesses, and discussing how this study 
contributes to research on China as well as other authoritarian regimes. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Authoritarian Distributional Theories in 
China 
2.1 Introduction 
This study is inspired by the fundamental political task of any authoritarian regime, i.e., 
survival. The authoritarian regime, as a form of political organization, adopts different 
strategies to ensure its survival and stability, and contemporary literature has already 
identified several important strategies. However, these strategies, although all are very useful 
and may even be necessary for authoritarian survival, may not be compatible with each other 
at all times. This study, therefore, is motivated by the scenarios where survival strategies are 
in conflict with each other. What scenario will autocrats choose? 
Specifically, I explore this puzzle from the perspective of distributional politics. The 
allocation of resources, as Lasswell (2018) argues, is perhaps one of the core topics in any 
type of politics. The existing literature on authoritarian regimes also indicates the important 
role of the distributions of benefits and spoils in soliciting loyalty, support and cooperation 
for the survival of regimes. Inevitably, any kind of distribution would involve trade-offs and 
incompatibilities regarding who can get what and who cannot. The theory proposed in this 
study, therefore, tries to bridge the gap in the existing literature regarding how distributional 
politics is affected by the needs of authoritarian survival. 
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This chapter presents the main theory of authoritarian distributions and is organized as 
follows. The second section will present a major literature review on authoritarian survival 
and the role of distributional strategies. The third section will present the theory of this 
dissertation, together with major theoretical expectations and hypotheses derived from the 
theory that can be tested empirically in China. The fourth section briefly discusses the 
research design of this dissertation and some important issues related to studying 
distributions in authoritarian regimes that are addressed in the research design. 
2.2 Authoritarian Survival and Distributional Politics 
Authoritarian regimes have various challenges related to survival and stability. As 
Svolik (2012) summarizes, those challenges can be categorized into two major groups: 
keeping the social masses from revolution and keeping the members of the ruling coalition 
from defecting and splitting. The existing literature of authoritarian regimes provides 
numerous explanations on how autocrats fulfill these two tasks, and some of the explanations 
involve the allocation and distribution of benefits. These studies form the basis of this 
dissertation. 
2.2.1 Control over the Masses: The Cooperation of the Public 
One prominent argument for how autocrats control the public and avoid mass revolution 
is cooptation theory, which argues that representative institutions coopt oppositions by 
providing rents and policy concessions to them (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006, 
2007; Malesky & Schuler, 2010). In this argument, dictators deliver both rents and seats in 
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legislatures to solve serious external threats from oppositions. It is noted, however, that 
legislative seats are not only significant for policy influence. Sometimes a seat in the 
legislature also provides material rewards or other benefits, such as legal protection and 
preferable treatment (Blaydes, 2010; Truex, 2014). Empirical evidence has shown that by 
providing legislative access to the opposition, authoritarian regimes can demobilize 
opposition supporters and thereby reduce anti-regime protests (Reuter & Robertson, 2014). 
Many scholars have adopted the cooptation framework to explain the inclusion of social 
elites in authoritarian regimes such as China (Yan, 2011), Russia (Reuter & Robertson, 2012), 
Singapore (Rodan, 2009), Vietnam (Malesky & Schuler, 2010) and Arab countries (Lust-
Okar, 2005). 
The core of the cooptation argument is that the governments of authoritarian regimes 
provide benefits desired by the public, regardless of whether these benefits are material 
rewards or non-material rewards (e.g., policy concessions or policy influences), in exchange 
for their loyalty, cooperation or political obedience. This logic is also shown clearly in a 
series of studies exploring the responsiveness of the government in China. Responding to the 
demands from the public is certainly a very direct form of providing desired benefits to the 
public, and it should demonstrate the logic of cooptation consistently. For example, J. Chen, 
Pan, and Xu (2016) find that “threats of the collective actions” cause local government 
responses, which is a clear signal of offering promises of benefits in exchange for stability. 
Meng, Pan, and Yang (2017) find that officials respond to citizens’ suggestions obtained from 
both formal and informal institutions equally if the suggestions are not antagonistic, which 
 19 
suggests the importance of cooperative attitudes from the public in such cooptation relations. 
In fact, in his famous argument of authoritarian resilience, Nathan (2003) proposes the 
establishment of “input institutions” as one of the four reasons why the Chinese regime is 
resilient. Such institutions, including various forms of participatory institutions identified by 
scholars in China (Manion, 1996, 2016a; Stromseth et al., 2017; Teets, 2014; Truex, 2016), 
may increase the external efficacy of Chinese citizens to increase the regime legitimacy 
(Nathan, 2003) and address the so-called “information dilemma” of dictators (Malesky & 
Schuler, 2011; Manion, 2016a; Wallace, 2016; Wintrobe, 1998). However, the functioning of 
such input institutions may inevitably require a certain level of accountability to the public 
demands to maintain voluntary information input (Distelhorst & Hou, 2016). Citizens will 
only participate in these institutions if they believe there is an acceptable chance that they can 
obtain responses. This constitutes another type of pressure for authoritarian regimes to deliver 
certain benefits to fulfill public demands. 
Therefore, it seems clear that for many tactics identified in the existing literature, 
distributions to the public play a central role in ensuring the survival of authoritarian regimes. 
From the needs of cooptation to the functioning of input institutions, from time to time, 
authoritarian regimes do have strong incentives to deliver spoils or benefits, regardless of 
being material or non-material, to fulfill the demands of the public. This seems to be an 
implicit yet clear contract of survival and stability between the public and the autocrats that is 
seen in China as well as many other authoritarian regimes. 
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2.2.2 Cohesion of the Ruling Coalition: The Loyalty of Regime Allies 
Another group of studies focuses on the cohesion of the ruling coalition as a crucial 
factor for authoritarian survival. This group of arguments believes that, for the followers 
inside the ruling coalition, the key is to provide incentives to keep followers loyal to the 
regime. Autocrats cannot run a regime by themselves; they have to share power and resources 
with key followers (Haber, 2008; Svolik, 2012; Wintrobe, 1998). Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. (2003) present the selectorate theory and argue that the dictator should deliver a certain 
amount of spoils and rents to his or her winning coalition to maintain its rule. The amount of 
rent a dictator has to deliver is dependent on the size of the selectorate and the winning 
coalition, both of which are determined by political institutions. 
However, as Boix and Svolik (2013) and Magaloni (2008) argue, the dictator has to 
build up a credible commitment so that the supporters can trust that the dictator will 
continuously provide the benefits to them. To address this problem, scholars present the 
power-sharing mechanism, which argues that the dictator should set up institutions that allow 
followers to monitor the rulers and maintain credible threats to overthrow the dictator (Boix 
& Svolik, 2013; Magaloni, 2008; Myerson, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Many such institutions are 
costly and put additional restraints on the autocrats and the regime. The fact that autocrats 
usually need to invest hugely in such institutions to ensure the credible delivery of resources 
clearly demonstrates the importance of benefit distribution for authoritarian survival. 
Ideally, the incentives should be some benefits that can only be achieved within the 
existing regime and thereby enhance the followers’ loyalty. The exclusive access to political 
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power is certainly one of the largest incentives for ruling coalition members since 
authoritarian regimes monopolized political powers. Additionally, material benefits can also 
be seen widely in historical and contemporary authoritarian regimes, including the special 
provisions of food, healthcare, luxury houses, cars, and planes. All these benefits require a 
significant portion of resources being allocated and distributed to the regime allies, i.e., the 
key followers and members of the ruling coalition of an authoritarian regime. 
2.2.3 The Dilemma of Authoritarian Distributions and the Gap in the Literature 
Both groups of literature on authoritarian survival apparently have an important and 
common element of distribution. However, they also propose the dilemma of authoritarian 
distribution. What would happen if the two needs of distributions are incompatible and in 
conflict with each other? Studies have shown that the distributions to regime allies and the 
general public are sometimes incompatible. Satisfying the demands from one side can 
inevitably hurt the ability to distribute benefits to the other side when the total resources are 
finite. As cases in Russia show, the distribution to one side may lead to the defection of the 
other side and thus threaten regime survival and stability (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2019). 
In general, incompatibility lies in both short-term and long-term perspectives. In the 
short-term perspective, autocrats face a dilemma of trade-offs under resource constraints. 
Since autocrats have to distribute to both sides while the total resources are finite, distributing 
to one side would inevitably constrain the ability to satisfy the other side. For example, 
Gandhi (2008) provides a detailed analysis of how the needs of coopting the public would 
result in an increase in public welfare spending but a decrease in spending on military forces, 
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an important ally of dictators. This is the immediate problem that autocrats have to think 
about in regard to the everyday distribution of spoils, i.e., whose demands should be fulfilled 
and whose should not, given the limited resources on hand. 
The long-term perspective of this challenge, however, reflects a more fundamental 
dilemma that any autocrat has, i.e., the incompatibility between the autocrat’s role as the 
leader of an authoritarian ruling coalition and their role as the ruler of a society who seeks to 
remain in power. The former role, as many studies of authoritarian regimes have suggested, 
requires autocrats to act to maximize the interests of the members of the ruling coalition, i.e., 
the small group of elites who support the autocratic rule of the country. The latter role, 
however, requires autocrats to improve the welfare of the public so that the public will 
support the ruler and not seek to overthrow the ruler by revolution or protests. The interests 
of the ruling coalition and the interests of the public, by definition, are incompatible because 
otherwise, the ruling coalition can adopt democratic institutions and still remain in power by 
winning the votes from the majority of the public in an election.5 
Therefore, many strategies that have been identified in the existing literature for the 
satisfaction of public demands by authoritarian regimes are theoretically damaging to their 
goal of maximizing the benefits for a cohesive ruling coalition of elites, even though the 
ultimate purpose of satisfying the public is still the survival of the regime itself. For example, 
 
5 It is true that by satisfying the public demands, members of the ruling coalition also get benefits through being in 
power. However, this study will assume that members of the ruling coalition demand more exclusive benefits for themselves 
than just being in power. In other words, I admit that it is possible for the members of the ruling coalition to agree on some 
compromise with the public in exchange for the survival of the regime, so that they can remain in power; however, they 
would still demand some exclusive benefits as coalition members and are not willing to give up all benefits to the public. 
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when authoritarian regimes have to adopt the rule of law in response to the demands from the 
public, they inevitably “tie their hands” regarding protecting some of the benefits of the 
regime allies (Y. Wang, 2015) and pursuing self-interests for regime allies (Liu, 2019b). 
When authoritarian regimes have to be accountable and responsive, although in a limited 
manner, to the public, it also constrains them from taking care of the interests of elites in 
small circles. The expansion of public goods and welfare, as a result of economic 
development, may be the core element for the logic of performance legitimacy (Zhao, 2009) 
and/or authoritarian cooptation (Gandhi, 2008), but it would erode the value of being regime 
allies inexorably because the welfare and benefits that used to be reserved for a small group 
of elites are now openly accessible to the public. Similarly, to take care of the private 
interests of the ruling coalition members, autocrats have to adopt policies that hurt public 
interests from time to time. From the nepotism that hurts the quality of governance to the 
crony capitalism that undermines the efficiency of the market economy, autocrats have to 
protect the benefits of their allies at the expense of public interests. 
The existing literature on authoritarian regimes, however, has a gap in bridging the 
boundaries of the strategies for the two roles of autocrats. The literature focuses on either 
how autocrats can maintain an acceptable level and allocation of benefits within the circle of 
their allies as the leader of the regime coalition or how autocrats can solicit support and 
cooperation from the public as the leader of the country trying to remain in power. There is 
relatively little evidence on how these two tasks affect each other and how autocrats can 
balance them. As Reuter and Szakonyi (2019) argue, this tension is exposed, but they “have 
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not provided a solution to it” (p. 566). 
One group of studies trying to bridge the gap seems to focus on the theory of winning 
coalition initiated by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). This theory argues that the size 
of the winning coalition would decide the provision of private goods or public goods and the 
strategy of reward distribution. Selectorate theory is very insightful in connecting the 
distributions of the two groups by indicating the importance of group size. It also indicates 
the importance of spoils distributions in maintaining the stability of autocratic rule and the 
cohesion of the ruling coalition, as well as emphasizing a very rational logic of establishing 
regime loyalty by calculating the material benefits allocated to each political elite. All these 
aspects are critical in developing the distribution theory of authoritarian regimes. 
However, I believe there are two major problems regarding selectorate theory fully 
bridging the gap between the needs of coopting the public and the needs of retaining regime 
allies. 
First, selectorate theory does not talk much about the general mass public, since it fails 
to consider those who are “unenfranchised” (Gallagher & Hanson, 2013). Even in the 
updated model (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009), in which revolutionary threats 
from citizens are included, the rewards received by the general population seem similar to the 
byproduct determined by the dynamics between the leader and the winning coalition. The 
changes in the benefits that citizens receive are determined by the provision of public goods, 
which is solely determined by the size of the winning coalition. Therefore, the regime and the 
leader do not design any specific strategy for rewarding general citizens. In fact, since Bruce 
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Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) argue that the leader would reduce the provision of 
public goods in response to the revolutionary threat when the size of the winning coalition is 
small enough, one should expect that public goods provision would be reduced in most 
authoritarian regimes where the size of the winning coalition is small. This seems to be 
problematic in authoritarian cases since numerous studies have shown that elites or dictators 
do provide benefits or policies that specifically meet the needs of general populations 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Gandhi, 2008). 
Second, selectorate theory assumes that the leader only needs to provide benefits to the 
member of the winning coalition, although the provision of public goods brings benefits to 
the other selectorates and the public as a byproduct. Under this assumption, a selectorate 
would get nothing if he or she was not included in the winning coalition. Again, this seems 
more valid in the democratic system, which has a large amount of selectorates, than in 
authoritarian systems in which the number of selectorates is limited. Apparently, one should 
become a political elite to be qualified as a selectorate in an authoritarian system. It is true 
that the dictator does not need to get support from every political elite to become the leader, 
but it is difficult to argue that a dictator does not need the support of those elites who are 
outside of the winning coalition to govern. For example, in Mubarak’s Egypt, it is certain that 
not every elite is a member of the winning coalition, but Mubarak and his regime still need to 
have elections to distribute the spoils to many of them (Blaydes, 2010). 
Therefore, I believe that it is more appropriate to treat the selectorate theory as one 
theory that explains the dynamics of the ruling coalition in authoritarian regimes. It seems 
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better to regard the regime allies or the political elites as the selectorates in the authoritarian 
regimes and to regard the sub-group of the selectorates who supports the incumbent dictator 
as the winning coalition of that dictator. This approach provides a very good explanation of 
how one can become a dictator and maintain power within the ruling coalition of the regime, 
i.e., the group of selectorates. The mechanism of selectorate theory is very well organized in 
predicting the autocrat’s strategies for dealing with other political elites in the ruling 
coalition, but it has less explanatory power in explaining how the dictator and the regime deal 
with the outside masses. 
My innovation in this study, therefore, is to propose a theory of authoritarian 
distributions that can bridge the boundary between the two perspectives of authoritarian 
survival strategies and suggests that distributional politics is generalized. The theory 
developed in this study addresses the need for distributions to two sides at the same time and 
explains how autocrats can balance these two sides in China. More fundamentally, the theory 
addresses the dilemma of autocrats moving between their role as regime coalition leaders and 
the role of society leaders in authoritarian countries. 
2.3 Authoritarian Distributional Theory 
2.3.1 The Purpose of Distributive Politics 
It is not surprising to see politicians use different distributive policies to gain political 
advantages. Literature on the U.S. and other democracies contains extensive discussions on 
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how politicians distribute benefits strategically to enhance their electoral returns.6 One 
significant debate in this perspective is the “swing voters vs. core voters” issue built on the 
ideas of Cox and McCubbins (1986) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). This issue basically 
argues that parties will distribute benefits to swing voters if the effectiveness of their 
distributions is similar across different groups of voters. However, when one party has 
information advantages regarding its constituencies, it will allocate goods to its core voters 
because the party knows what the core voters need and therefore knows how to satisfy them 
effectively. Instead, if the party has less knowledge about the swing voters, it may 
dramatically decrease the effectiveness of allocating goods to the swing voters because the 
party may not know whether the goods it delivers are large enough to buy the swing votes. 
Susan C Stokes (2005) extends this argument by pointing out the commitment problem. 
Parties may renege on their promises to voters after getting elected, and voters may also 
renege when they are voting even if they receive benefits from a specific party. She brings 
forth the dynamics model to solve these problems and finds that the Peronist party in 
Argentina does not reward its most loyal voters. To further extend this line of argument, 
Nichter (2008) argues that it is important if the voters have the option of abstaining. In this 
way, a party will reward the swing voters if no abstaining is allowed but target its loyal 
supporters if abstaining is possible. 
Most studies on distributive policies have focused on democracies, but it is also not 
uncommon to see autocrats adopting strategic distributions for their political needs. Policy 
 
6 A comprehensive review of this literature can be seen in M. Golden and Min (2013) 
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concessions in legislature, which may involve distributive policies, is a core concept in the 
cooptation theory of Gandhi (2008). Numerous studies have also found distributive policies 
and disproportional spending in nondemocratic systems that serve specific political needs 
(Blaydes, 2010; Jiang & Zhang, 2015; Treisman, 1996). In this dissertation, I argue that the 
key political need that authoritarian distributional strategies serve is the political survival of 
the regime and the autocrat. To achieve such goals, autocrats have to make appropriate 
strategies of distributions between the regime allies and the general public.7 
2.3.2 The Benefits to be Distributed8 
The authoritarian distributional strategy for fulfilling the demands of both the public and 
the regime allies is about a choice between universalistic distribution and particularistic 
distribution. I follow the definitions of particularistic and universalistic benefits in the 
literature. Particularistic distribution provides spoils that benefit a specific and narrow group 
of people, while universalistic distribution offers interests that broadly increase social welfare 
and benefits society as a whole. Private goods such as rents and local public goods such as 
infrastructure projects are typical examples of particularistic distribution. General policies, 
legislation, social welfare, and other public goods are typical examples of universalistic 
distribution. A key assumption of my theory is that regime allies and the outside public 
masses have no preference between particularistic and universalistic benefits in terms of 
 
7 For the remaining part of the dissertation, the “two sides” of the distribution will always mean the public and the 
allies, and “one side” will refer to either of the two, unless stated otherwise.   
8 In this dissertation, “benefit” is defined broadly here as any kind of privilege, such as economic gains, material 
resources, favorable policies for accessing the decision-making process, to name a few. Some existing literature on 
distribution uses the term “spoils” to refer to a similar concept, and this dissertation use “benefit” and “spoils” 
interchangeably.  
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utilities. They demand all kinds of benefits in all forms. Universalistic goods and 
particularistic goods are different types of rewards, but they both produce utilities to the 
recipients. The two types are quantitatively but not qualitatively different. This assumption is 
consistent with the current literature (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gandhi, 2008; 
Olson, 1993). 
The concept of universalistic and particularistic distribution is widely seen in the 
literature of distributional politics regarding both democracies and non-democracies. For 
example, many studies have argued that legislators, who are elected by a specific local 
constituency, tend to be particularistic in allocating resources by conducting the so-called 
pork-barrel politics.9 Leaders of the whole society, such as the executive leaders elected by 
the whole national directly, are usually believed to be more universalistic than constituency-
based legislators. Kriner and Reeves (2015), however, demonstrate that the president of the 
United States, although elected by the whole nation, is particularistic in the distribution of 
resources to maximize his political advantages. Similarly, scholars of authoritarian politics 
have also evaluated the distributional strategies of dictators in this regard. A large group of 
studies has explored how different social and political situations may affect dictators’ choice 
in offering public (universalistic to the whole society) or private (particularistic to a narrow 
group of recipients) goods (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gandhi, 2008; Luo et al., 
2007; Olson, 1993; S. Wang & Yao, 2007). Manion (2014) finds that members of the People’s 
 
9 Some examples can be seen in Barry (1990); Evans (2011); Lancaster and Patterson (1990); Shepsle and Weingast 
(1981, 1984); Stratmann and Baur (2002) 
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Congress in China are usually fighting for local public goods for their local constituencies, 
which is a typical particularistic kind of “parochial pork-barrel politics” that is very similar to 
what their counterparts do in democracies. 
Based on this definition, this paper further argues that the choice between universalistic 
and particularistic distribution is a trade-off between broadness and fitness. Broadness 
reflects how largely and broadly the distributed spoils cover the recipients, while fitness 
reflects how well and accurately the distributed spoils can satisfy individual recipients’ needs. 
I argue that these two characteristics are critical for any distributional decisions because they 
affect the ultimate effect of spoils distribution. A distribution with broad coverage can satisfy 
a large group of people efficiently and in a cost-effective way, which is an important 
consideration behind the distributional patterns identified by Olson (1993) and Bruce Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. (2003). A distribution that specifically fits individuals’ needs can be more 
effective in soliciting the loyalty and cooperation from those individuals than a general 
distribution that does not target individual needs. Ideally, a dictator hopes to have 
distributions that achieve both broadness and fitness so that he or she can maximize the effect 
of the distributions on each individual while minimizing the resources invested. 
However, broadness and fitness are usually incompatible. A distribution with broad 
coverage, by definition, provides a one-for-all type of spoil to a large group of people at the 
same time. It is impossible to offer individually tailored spoils to fit the needs of each 
recipient. A distribution that fits individual needs well, however, has to be tailored for and 
targeted at that individual specifically and, therefore, is very unlikely to apply to other 
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recipients. Thus, it seems clear that particularistic distributions can offer individually targeted 
benefits that achieve a high level of fitness while having a narrow coverage of recipients. The 
universalistic distributions, however, cover a broad range of recipients, but the individual 
recipient cannot obtain tailored benefits that fit their needs perfectly. Therefore, the choice 
between particularistic distribution or universalistic distribution is actually about whether the 
dictator hopes to achieve broadness or fitness in the distribution of spoils. 
2.3.3 The Choice 
For the dictator, the gain from the distributional strategies is the support and loyalty 
from the general public and the regime allies. A reasonable dictator should design 
distributional strategies that maximize the overall net gain. 
Achieving fitness by particularistic distribution is a high-return/high-cost option. Fitness 
certainly can increase the return of the distribution. Apparently, one would be happier if the 
benefits received fit one’s needs better. Autocrats can solicit more support and loyalty from 
the public and allies if the distribution can satisfy their needs precisely. The fitness of 
particularistic distribution, on the other hand, also requires a higher level of transaction cost 
compared to the broadness of universalistic distribution because of the principal-agent 
problem. Since high fitness means individually designed and targeted benefits, it needs to 
rely on a large network of agents to distribute to a large number of individual recipients. 
Agents, however, may not work in the way in which dictators expect.10 Therefore, the 
 
10 Similar problems are identified in the literature of clientelism, which argues that the politicians who rely on brokers 
to distribute individual spoils for vote-buying may also have the principal-agent problem because the brokers may pursue 
their interests instead of the politician’s. See Susan C. Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco (2013) for example. 
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transaction cost of distributing particularistic benefits with high fitness would be high. 
Universalistic distribution with high broadness, however, is a low-return/low-cost 
option. Since such distribution may not serve the needs of the recipient very precisely, the 
return of loyalty and support from the recipients would be relatively low compared to the 
particularistic distribution with high fitness. However, the distribution’s high broadness is 
very effective in reducing the transaction cost because of its one-size-fits-all nature. The 
distribution can be directly enjoyed by a great number of recipients at the same time and 
therefore does not need a large agent network for distribution. To some extent, it bypasses the 
principal-agent problem and reduces the transaction cost. 
The choice of distributional strategy is, therefore, very similar to making other choices 
in the real world: the high return comes with high costs while the low return comes with low 
costs. When autocrats design distributional strategies, they need to maximize the net utility 
they gain from the distribution. Based on this idea, this study argues that particularistic 
distribution is more effective for regime allies, while universalistic distribution is more 
effective for the general public. 
Regime allies 
I argue that particularistic distribution would be more appropriate in fulfilling the needs 
of autocrats for three reasons. 
First, particularistic distribution is more effective for managing coalition allies. 
Achieving a high return from high fitness requires a good knowledge of what people need.11 
 
11 There is a similar argument in democracies regarding swing votes and core votes. See: Cox and McCubbins (1986) 
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Apparently, this condition can be met when autocrats are allocating benefits to their allies. 
Given the relatively close connection between coalition allies and dictators, it is not difficult 
for dictators to understand what their allies truly need and to evaluate whether the allocated 
benefits work as well as expected. This is particularly true for authoritarian regimes with a 
well-organized party system because the ruling party is usually a very effective tool for 
understanding allies’ needs. 
On the other hand, the private good is effective in ensuring the loyalty of allies to the 
individual dictator. As discussed earlier, dictators need to maintain their leadership positions 
in the ruling coalitions. Particularistic distribution is effective in ensuring the loyalty of allies. 
It is usually more discretionary and, by definition, exclusive. Therefore, particularistic 
distribution is more likely to create a dependence on the incumbent dictator. It is uncertain 
that the investment in the incumbent dictator can be transferred to the new dictator to 
maintain a similar level of gains. In addition, since particularistic distributions are 
individually distributed to each political elite, the likelihood of the collective actions of ruling 
allies is reduced. The separate and individual distribution method ensures the information 
advantages the dictator has over any individual elite and reduces the needs of cooperation 
between different allies. 
Second, autocrats may reduce the high transaction cost of particularistic distribution by 
utilizing the existing patronal network. As many studies have argued, the existing institution 
can work as an effective patronal network for spoils distribution (Magaloni, 2006). Similarly, 
 
and Dixit and Londregan (1996).  
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existing institutions, such as the ruling party for an authoritarian regime, are also effective in 
monitoring the members of the regime. Therefore, the authoritarian regime can reduce agency 
costs by utilizing the effective patronal network for distribution and the party institution for 
monitoring the agents. 
In general, particularistic distribution to the regime allies can achieve a high return while 
reducing some of the costs. 
The general public 
Authoritarian regimes need to coopt the masses, or at least they need to coopt the elites 
among the general public to ensure the cooperation of the society and the stability of the 
regime. I argue that autocrats would be more likely to distribute universalistic benefits to the 
public for two reasons. 
First, the universalistic distribution is cost-effective for coopting outside of the social 
elites and the masses. Numerous studies have shown that authoritarian regimes have a so-
called information dilemma regarding the public (Malesky & Schuler, 2011; Manion, 2016a; 
Stromseth et al., 2017; Wallace, 2016). Therefore, it is very difficult for autocrats to know the 
preferences of the public accurately. This makes a particularistic distribution to the public 
inefficient because it is very difficult for dictators to know whether the particularistic 
distributions are large enough and good enough to buy support from the public. Furthermore, 
unlike the party mechanism that can effectively allocate benefits and track their progress, 
authoritarian regimes usually lack a very effective network among the ordinary public. The 
transaction cost, therefore, would be very high if autocrats distributed particularistic benefits 
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to the public. 
Universalistic distribution, therefore, serves as a good choice. Since universalistic 
distribution may reduce the transaction costs effectively, it may not require a very high level 
of return. Although this approach does not provide well-fit spoils (and thus cannot boost 
regime support as high as that of particularistic spoils), it is still appropriate for the public 
because it does not cost that much, although autocrats have huge difficulties in achieving a 
high return from the public due to the related information problem. 
Second, public goods may be enough to create a commitment to the regime. Outsiders, 
by definition, are less powerful in determining who are the regime leaders. Their powers 
come from the fact that they can threaten the regime as a whole. Universalistic benefits, 
however, serve better in coopting the public and outside social elites to maintain their loyalty 
to the regime. The delivery, maintenance, and functioning of many universalistic benefits rely 
heavily on formal institutions, the legal system, and the governing system of the current 
regime. This approach, therefore, creates a very strong incentive for the public to keep 
investing in the current regime for its survival and stability, which significantly increases the 
opportunity cost of regime change. As Albertus (2013) suggested, goods that yield future 
payoffs can create long-term incentives for support from the recipients without additional 
investment in it. Many of the universalistic benefits will be popular with public masses, but 
its continuous value is contingent on the provision of a suitable environment and appropriate 
technical assistance from the regime. The public, therefore, suffers from any regime 
instability, and it is uncertain that such a loss can be compensated in the new regime. All 
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these factors, therefore, create a very strong and long-term status quo bias, which ensures the 
stability of the current regime. 
I do not argue that dictators only want regime-level loyalty from the outside masses. It is 
perfectly true that they would demand personal loyalty from the masses, if possible. 
However, under normal resource constraints, it may be too costly to do so. Since, in most 
cases, the outside masses can only threaten regime stability, it seems enough to require only 
regime-level loyalty from the masses so that the regime can save its resources for other tasks. 
It is noted that when universalistic benefits to distributed, everyone in society, including 
the regime allies, have access to it. This dissertation, however, assume that the access to the 
universalistic benefits will not brings significant value to the regime allies if it is not the type 
of universalistic benefits they expect. Since the universalistic benefits is distributed to the 
public, it is reasonable to assume that such distribution meet the demands of the public, and, 
therefore, may not provide values to the regime allies as many as it does for the public. The 
distribution of universalistic benefits, therefore, can still be regarded as a distribution of 
benefits to the public.  
In general, autocrats differentiate the distributional strategies used to maximize the 
utility they gain from the distribution. For regime allies, particularistic distribution can 
provide very high utility returns, while the transaction cost of the distribution can be 
controlled. For the general public, however, particularistic distribution will be ineffective, 
since it cannot yield high returns because of the lack of information yet it incurs high 
transaction costs. It seems a better choice for dictators to use universalistic distribution in 
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regard to the public because this approach incurs relatively low cost so that the ultimate net 
utility gain is still acceptable, although it also cannot yield a high return. 
2.3.4 The trade-off 
Next, I will develop a theory to explain how autocrats make trade-offs when the two 
types of distribution are incompatible. Although the differentiated distributions can, to some 
extent, solve the problem of competing demands by offering different spoils to different 
sides, the problem may still exist in many cases when the universalistic distribution and the 
particularistic distribution are competing for the same resource or are directly contradictory 
to each other. 
Direct conflict is common when fiscal policy is involved. For example, military 
spending and social welfare spending, as Gandhi (2008) indicates, are typical examples of 
how autocrats have to make a trade-off between the particularistic distribution and the 
universalistic distribution. When the total amount of money is finite, the autocrats have to 
choose one side over the other, regardless of how differentiated the distribution can be. As 
shown in many cases in the human history of dictatorship, an increase in military spending 
would inevitably reduce the provision of social welfare, while the removal of military 
privilege to promote social welfare would be very likely to cause military disloyalty that 
threatens regime stability. 
The problem of trade-offs between the public and the small group of allies also occurs in 
cases where some non-monetary favorable treatments are involved. For example, Suharto, the 
dictator of Indonesia between 1967 and 1998, was widely reported to set favorable policies to 
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a small group of Sino-Indonesian businessmen inside his small nepotism circle, which gave 
those businessmen exclusive access to monopolized market and government contracts to 
make huge profits. These policies, however, were certainly against the public interest of 
having a fair and efficient market. In this case, the particularistic distribution of exclusive 
business profits to the small group of businessmen is in direct conflict with the universalistic 
distribution of a fair and efficient market to the public, and the two types of distribution 
cannot be both performed. 
Apparently, the differentiated distribution of particularistic benefits and universalistic 
benefits are sometimes not enough to create a balance between the public and the regime 
allies in authoritarian regimes. This study, therefore, proposes a distributional strategy for 
autocrats when the demands from the public and regime allies collide. First, the autocrat 
should decide which group to reward. This group will be the receiving group, i.e., the group 
that receives benefits at the expense of the other group (the losing group). The autocrat will 
then distribute the corresponding benefits to the receiving group. Simultaneously, the autocrat 
should reduce the benefits of the receiving group in other areas to provide additional benefits 
to the losing group to compensate for when the total resources for distribution are limited. 
For example, if the public demands some kind of universalistic benefit and the autocrat 
decides to fulfill such a demand, then some other universalistic distribution currently enjoyed 
by the public would be removed to save resources to compensate for the potential losses of 
the regime allies by increasing their particularistic distributions, and vice versa. 
In short, this theory argues that the autocrat should provide the desired benefits to the 
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receiving group but simultaneously reduce other benefits to provide compensation to the 
losing group, which follows the direct logic of materialistic exchange: when people suffer in 
one channel, they should be compensated through other channels. This implies that the 
autocrats would not increase the overall distribution of benefits to either side when the total 
resource is not increased. Any increase in distribution to one side would inevitably come with 
a decrease in other distributions to the same side. 
This theory of trade-off is based on several assumptions. First, there is an equilibrium 
regarding how autocrats favor the public and the regime allies, and the distribution of benefits 
is not going to change that equilibrium. The equilibrium is formed based on the unique 
situation of each autocracy regarding the power balance between the public and the allies, 
and the purpose of distributional strategies is to maintain rather than change this equilibrium. 
This assumption implies that any distribution of benefits to one side is, in fact, a 
redistribution of the current benefits enjoyed by this side among different areas, rather than a 
net increase of benefits. Autocrats should only increase (or decrease) the net benefit to a 
specific side when the equilibrium changes, i.e., the specific side becomes more (or less) 
powerful in determining the regime survival than it used to be. 
Second, this theory assumes that for different types of universalistic benefits and 
particularistic benefits, recipients should prefer certain types over the others. This assumption 
ensures that the redistribution of benefits on one side would generate a net positive effect. 
Since the increase (decrease) in one type of benefit comes with the decrease (increase) in 
another type of benefit, it only makes sense for autocrats to do so when the recipients prefer 
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the type of increased benefit over the type of decreased benefit.12 This implies that any given 
distributional strategy must have an equilibrium point; the law of diminishing returns 
indicates that, for each of the two sides, there must be a point when the marginal benefits of 
an additional unit of increase in one type of spoil would become less than the marginal cost 
of an additional unit of decrease in the other type of spoil. That point will be the equilibrium. 
2.3.5 A Dynamic Model of Authoritarian Distribution Theory 
Up to now, the theory of authoritarian distribution is presented statically. It assumes an 
almost zero-sum approach in evaluating the distribution of resources: the total amount of 
resources is unchanged, and the gain on one side would be the loss on the other side. This 
assumption is valid in many cases, especially for the cases in which the total resources for 
distribution are difficult to change in a short time and/or the distribution to both sides are 
fairly independent with each other. The distribution of seats in Legislatures, a measure that 
many studies of cooptation theory use, is a typical example since the total seats are difficult 
to change, and each seat is exclusive. The budgeting process in any specific year is also 
mostly static since the total budget is fixed.  
However, a dynamic process of distribution may apply to many other scenarios. In those 
cases, the zero-sum approach may not be applicable. For example, economic growth may 
increase the total resources available for distribution, and therefore solves the conflicts in the 
distributions. Notably, the increase in public goods provision may facilitate a stable economic 
 
12 In other words, the utility gain from the type of increased benefits is larger than the utility loss from the type of 
decreased benefits.  
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growth so that the autocrats will have more resources to also distribute to the regime allies, a 
process similar to what indicated in Olson (1993). Similarly, regime allies may also get 
benefit from the universalistic distributions even though those distributions do not fit their 
needs perfectly. It also means that the regime allies can also gain while the public benefits are 
increased.  
Therefore, I will offer a dynamic version of the authoritarian distribution theory by 
relaxing on the assumption of zero-sum relations in this section. The majority parts of the 
theory in the static version will remain quite similar in a dynamic process, while the 
following paragraph in this section will focus on the differences in the dynamic model and 
discuss how it may affect the theory in general. 
The most significant change in the dynamic model of the theory is that the absolute loss 
is no longer the most significant concern in the trade-off. Since we accept the premise that the 
total resources can be increased and/or one side can also get benefits from the distributions to 
the other side, it is likely the case that both sides are gaining instead of losing in the 
distributional process. Therefore, the autocrats face little risk of disloyalty or rebellion due to 
any actual loss of any side. 
The centerpiece in the trade-off, however, becomes the relative loss one side may incur 
because of the distribution to the other side. In the dynamic model of authoritarian 
distribution, the utility one side can gain from the distribution is not only dependent on the 
absolute amount of benefits it receives but also dependent on the relative scarcity of such 
benefits comparing with others in society. The utility gain from a given type of benefit 
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becomes lower if more people enjoy the same benefit. This kind of decrease of utility is a 
relative loss: the absolute amount of benefit is increasing, but the relative advantage of the 
recipients over other people is decreasing because the benefit itself is no longer scarce or 
exclusive.  
Take the antidote at the beginning of Chapter 1 as an example. The expansion of the 
healthcare system in China does not reduce the healthcare benefits that party elites can enjoy. 
Instead, the expanded healthcare system in China may provide better services to those elites 
compared to three decades ago. However, since the general public also has wide access to the 
healthcare system now, the party elites no longer have their relative privilege. Regime allies 
in the 1970s had privilege to access to healthcare service that the public could not enjoy, 
while they receive nothing special or additional nowadays since many ordinary citizens can 
enjoy the same quality of healthcare (if they pay). Even for a tiny group of political elites 
who can still receive extra benefits, the diminishing of return indicates that their marginal 
benefits received when the overall level of benefits is high is far less than that when the 
benefit is in scarcity.  
Therefore, in the dynamic model of authoritarian distribution, the dilemma is mainly 
about the relative loss of the regime allies when the public welfare is expanded. Even though 
the share received by the regime allies may still increase, they lose their previous privileges 
of exclusive access to scarce resources. As long as the increase in the regime allies is not as 
fast as the increase in the general public, there will be a devaluation of the allies’ benefits 
because their relative advantages over the public are narrowing. This problem is fundamental 
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to the authoritarian survival. The public accountability and pressure require autocrats to offer 
more public goods to narrow the inequality in distributions between the public and the 
political elites. The logic of the ruling coalition, however, is that the such inequality should 
be significant enough so that political elites have incentives to remain in the ruling coalition 
instead of opting out. That is, the economic and political development of society inevitably 
creates opportunities to enjoy similar types of benefits outside of the ruling coalition, which 
makes the benefits of being regime allies significantly devalued. 
Thus, the dynamic model of distribution still requires a trade-off. The autocrats have to 
make sure that the increase of utility for regime allies is not lower than that for the public. 
This trade-off may need reallocation of resources from the public to the regime allies or some 
innovative ways of incentives. My theory predicts that the strategies will be similar for both 
the static model and the dynamic model of authoritarian distribution; the only difference is 
that the former deals with the absolute loss while the latter works with the relative loss. 
2.3.6 Overview of the Authoritarian Distributional Theory 
The theory of authoritarian distribution unpacked above provides an overview regarding 
how autocrats distribute benefits and spoils to regime allies and the public in a dynamically 
balanced manner. By selectively offering these items to the regime allies and the public, 
autocrats try to differentiate the distributions to the two sides to avoid direct competition for 
resources. This theory also allows autocrats to reallocate resources among the provisions of 
the two types of benefits so that the expansion of one type will come with the increase of the 
other type as well, although at the expense of the former type in other areas. 
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This theory should imply a multistep action plan for autocrats to make distributional 
decisions to address any potential conflicts regarding the regime allies and the public. First, 
autocrats should try to implement selective responses to the demands from both sides to 
differentiate what is distributed. Second, autocrats may try to increase the provision of one 
type at the expense of the other type if they have to expand the program for the other type of 
benefit at first. This may be the strategy when the differentiated distributions are still 
competing for the same resources. Finally, the autocrats may have to create new benefits for 
one type to offset the impact of the expansion of the other type. In the next section, I will 
apply the theory to China to generate three testable hypotheses based on the context of China. 
2.4 Testable Hypotheses in the Authoritarian Regime of 
China 
2.4.1 Why China? 
This study conducts empirical tests of authoritarian distributional theory in China for 
three major reasons. 
First, although the distribution of benefits should exist in almost all authoritarian 
regimes, the pattern of distribution seems to be most institutionalized and observable in those 
authoritarian regimes with strong capacity and stable institutions because the distribution of 
benefits itself requires many resources and capacities that a relatively weak regime may not 
be able to perform in an institutional and systematic way. As one of the most prominent and 
stable authoritarian regimes in the contemporary world, China has invested significantly in 
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various institutions that can address the challenges related to distributions. On the one hand, 
the party institution provides a robust mechanism for distributing benefits among core 
political elites. The Chinese regime also adopts various ways of incorporating other elites 
into the regime and becoming their political allies by offering a wide range of spoils and 
benefits (Yan, 2012). On the other hand, China has a long history of gathering and responding 
to public demands. From the early scholarly research on the Xinfang system (Paik, 2012) to 
the more recent studies on responsiveness and public participation in policies (Jiang, Meng, 
& Zhang, 2019; Meng et al., 2017), scholars have known for a long time that China has 
relatively institutionalized channels for delivering at least some benefits desired by the 
public. Therefore, China should provide good examples of distributions for testing the theory 
in this study. 
Second, the theory proposed in this study requires a scenario consisting of both 
distributions to regime allies and the public simultaneously to test the selective distributions 
of different benefits. This is a challenging requirement since in most authoritarian regimes, 
the distributions to the elites and the regime allies are very secretive and usually do not take 
place at the same venue as the distributions to the public. China, however, provides a good 
case to fulfill this requirement. As recent literature has suggested, public participation in 
policies and political decisions exists from many perspectives in China. In particular, the 
People’s Congress system in China provides an effective institution in which the public and 
regime allies both participate in the decision-making process and make demands for the 
government (Manion, 2014; Stromseth et al., 2017; Truex, 2016). Although public 
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participation in the People’s Congress still functions in a limited manner, it is still a 
significant and effective channel for evaluating how the Chinese regime processes competing 
demands from both sides, and it is therefore ideal for testing how the Chinese regime 
distributes benefits selectively. This use is also consistent with studies in some other 
authoritarian regimes that have focused on legislature to evaluate the distributions of spoils 
and benefits to both regime allies and the public (Blaydes, 2010; Gandhi, 2008). 
Third, evaluating the distributional pattern of a regime usually requires a relatively 
complete set of data with good quality. Many authoritarian regimes either keep such data 
confidential or fail to collect such data in an organized way. Although China also suffers 
these problems to some extent, the publicly available data collected by various government 
agencies in China still make it feasible to analyze certain kinds of distributional behaviors. 
For example, China has collected and published a relatively reliable and complete set of 
public finance data at both the local level and the central level, and public spending data are 
usually an important source for analyzing distributional strategies and patterns. 
In general, I believe China is a theoretically representative and empirically feasible case 
to test authoritarian distributional theory. I will apply the theory to China and generate the 
following testable hypotheses. 
2.4.2 Testable Hypotheses in the Chinese case 
The following three testable hypotheses are generated based on the theory. 
Distributional Hub Hypothesis 
The theory of authoritarian distribution implies that autocrats should deliver 
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differentiated benefits to regime allies and the general public. This study assumes that both 
sides have no preference over particularistic distributions and universalistic distributions. 
Therefore, they will make demands of both types of benefits, while autocrats would only 
selectively meet their demands. 
Although many such distributions to meet the demands happen privately and 
individually, there is still a legitimate need for authoritarian regimes to have institutions for 
distributing spoils and benefits (Gandhi, 2008). Following this logic, I expect that there will 
be an institutionalized venue for both the regime allies and the public to make requests to the 
autocrats and for the autocrats to process those requests and satisfy them selectively, based on 
my theory of authoritarian distribution. 
Thus, I call such a venue a distributional hub. Basically, I expect that the demands for 
benefits are submitted to the hub by both sides, and autocrats process those demands 
appropriately following certain rules and principles; i.e., the demands for the universalistic 
benefits from the public and the demands for the particularistic benefits from the regime 
allies will be satisfied first, while other demands are rejected directly or indirectly. To make a 
metaphor, it is similar to a train station where different trains (demands of benefits) are 
approaching and competing for a limited number of tracks (resources) and the conductor (the 
autocrat) has to decide which train can enter and which cannot. 
To apply this method to China, I expect the People’s Congress to work as an effective 
distributional hub for benefit allocation. Legislatures are usually an effective venue for 
benefit distributions to both regime allies and the public (Gandhi, 2008), and China’s 
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People’s Congress system involves both regime allies and the public submitting their requests 
and demands for benefits. The delegates in the People’s Congress, representing either regime 
allies or the public, make formal requests to the government, and the corresponding 
government agencies have to reply. Recently, studies have shown that those delegates, 
although not elected directly by their constituencies, still try to make requests that represent 
the interests of their local constituencies (Manion, 2014; Truex, 2016). Therefore, I believe 
the actions of the delegates in China can represent, although in a limited manner, the interests 
of either regime allies or the public. Therefore, the following hypothesis is generated: 
Hypothesis 1: The Chinese regime tends to satisfy the demands of universalistic benefits 
from the delegates representing the public and the demands of particularistic benefits from 
the delegates representing the regime allies more than other types of demands in China’s 
People’s Congress system. 
In chapter 3, I will offer more details to justify the selection of the People’s Congress in 
China as a distributional hub and explain how I test this hypothesis empirically. 
Private Side Payment Hypothesis 
The second hypothesis addresses how autocrats compensate for one side when the 
benefits of the other side are expanding at the expense of the first side. Although result this 
can happen to both the regime allies and the public, this study focuses on the compensation to 
the regime allies alongside the expansion of public welfare. As discussed previously, 
authoritarian regimes are facing increasing pressures regarding offering more universalistic 
benefits, including public goods and welfare, to the public because of the increasing demands 
 49 
of accountability and the fast growth of the economy. The most robust and stable 
authoritarian regimes in the contemporary world are conducting an expansive scale of public 
goods and welfare programs to satisfy the demands of their citizens and buy their support. 
China is not an exception. The reform era since 1978 has seen a gradual yet significant 
expansion of universalistic benefits and welfare that the public can enjoy as the result of 
dramatic economic development and the increasingly salient needs of social cooptation. 
Such expansion of public welfare would inevitably erode the particularistic benefits and 
welfare that the regime allies enjoy. As a consequence, I expect the Chinese regime to 
increase private side payments as compensation to the regime allies to maintain the 
attractiveness of the regime to the political elites and allies. Given that the total amount of 
resources is finite and that the universalistic and particularistic benefits are, in many cases, 
mutually exclusive, the increase of those private side payments (almost all in the form of 
particularistic benefits) should be provided at the expenses of public interests. Therefore, I 
generate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: In China, the expansion of universalistic benefits to the public will occur 
with an increase in particularistic benefits as side payments to the regime allies, which is at 
the expense of public interests. 
In chapter 4, I will test this hypothesis empirically by using the anti-corruption 
campaign, arguably a significant type of public good and benefit, and the budgetary data in 
China. 
New Incentives Hypothesis 
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The first two hypotheses are about the distribution dilemma in a given time or in a short 
time period. Under such conditions, it is likely a static model of distribution since the total 
resources is unlikely to change dramatically in a short time. The last hypothesis,however, is 
about how autocrats can maintain the loyalty of regime allies in a long-term perspective. It 
deals with the relative loss of regime allies. The expansions of public welfare and other 
universalistic benefits seem to continue with the economic development of authoritarian 
regimes; thus, regime allies will keep having such relative loss because an increasing amount 
of their old privilges will disappear since the public goods is expanding and scarcity is 
broken. Some new incentives have to be created to maintain the attractiveness of coalition 
membership in the new era of socioeconomic development. 
The forms of new incentives can vary from society to society, but the core idea is the 
same: to increase the value of the coalition membership while minimizing the additional 
resources required for such increases. There are several possible ways of accomplishing this. 
First, autocrats can make rewards to the regime allies more credible. This would increase the 
mathematical expectation of incentives while still keeping the number of resources needed at 
the same level. Second, autocrats may choose to offer some non-materialistic incentives to 
regime allies, such as reputational and ideological rewards. Although many such incentives 
may still be indirectly linked to material rewards (e.g., a good reputation may lead to higher 
salaries or income), such incentives do not directly require extra investment and thus are 
feasible for autocrats. Finally, autocrats may reduce the costs associated with membership so 
that the net value is increased even though the resources required are not. 
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This is perhaps very similar to many marketing strategies adopted in the commercial 
world. First, businesses try to make their products more reliable so that the customers are 
more confident in getting satisfactory goods for their purchase. Second, businesses may 
create some non-material brand values associated with the products. This is very similar to 
the marketing strategies for luxury goods: although a normal handbag can perfectly perform 
almost the same functions, a handbag from Hermes still maintains its market value at a much 
higher price because of the prestigious status and reputational values associated with the 
brand. Third, businesses may simply cut prices for their products. Simply speaking, 
authoritarian regimes may adopt quite similar strategies to “sell” membership in the ruling 
coalition to the elites they hope to recruit. 
In the context of China, I will focus on the membership of the Chinese Communist Party 
and explore how the CCP can keep recruiting new elites into the party.13 The idea behind this 
approach is that many old privileges associated with CCP members no longer exist or are 
exclusive, thus making membership in CCP look less valuable and attractive than it used to 
be. Recent political campaigns, including anti-corruption campaigns and those that strengthen 
the regulations of party members, also lead to difficulties in recruiting new regime allies 
(Jiang, Shao, & Zhang, 2019). One approach that CCP used to adopt in recruiting new regime 
allies was to provide material rewards (Truex, 2014), but this manner seems to be 
increasingly difficult because of the dilemma of distributions faced by authoritarian regimes, 
 
13 The memberships of the eight democratic parties in China are included in the analysis in some cases. Although they 
are technically not CCP members, these eight democratic parties work very closely with the CCP and basically support all 
CCP policies. Their members, according to the definition of this study, can still be regarded as regime allies, although they 
may not be as close to the regime as CCP members.  
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as discussed above. Therefore, the following hypothesis should be expected: 
Hypothesis 3: Increasing the credibility of the existing incentives, creating new non-
materialistic incentives and reducing the associated costs of membership make it more likely 
for the Chinese regime to recruit new members to the CCP and the ruling coalition. 
In chapter 5, I will review the development of the incentives associated with CCP 
membership, discuss its new developments in the reform era, and explain how the CCP 
maintains its attractiveness to new elites in contemporary China based on qualitative studies, 
interviews and fieldwork. 
In general, the theory of authoritarian distributions yields three testable hypotheses in 
the context of China. I will test all of these hypotheses with both quantitative and qualitative 
analyses to generate empirical evidence to support the theory and demonstrate how autocrats 
can address the dilemma of authoritarian distributions in one of the largest authoritarian 






3 Selective Distributions in People’s Congress in 
China 
3.1 Introduction 
Most Authoritarian regimes receive demands from its allies in the ruling coalition and 
the general public frequently, and those demands needs to be fulfilled in exchange of the 
loyalty and cooperation from the public and the regime allies. Autocrats, however, cannot 
meet all demands from both sides simultaneously under the resource constraints, because 
distributing to one side would inevitably hurt the regime’s ability to distribute to the other 
side. How can Authoritarian regimes distribute benefits strategically to maximize the loyalty 
and supports from both regime allies and regime outsiders under the resource constraints? 
In this chapter, I argue that authoritarian regimes make a differentiated distributional 
strategy between offering particularistic benefits and universalistic benefits. Particularistic 
benefits refer to those interests that benefits a specific and narrow group of people, while 
universalistic benefits refer to those interests that increase the social welfare broadly and 
benefits society as a whole. Literature of distributional politics in democracies have used 
these two concepts widely to discuss the parochial pork barrel politics in legislative and 
executive branches of government, as well as electoral behavior (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 
1987; Fenno, 2002; M. A. Golden & Picci, 2008; Grossman & Helpman, 1996; Kriner & 
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Reeves, 2015; Lancaster & Patterson, 1990; Susan C. Stokes et al., 2013).  
This chapter adopts the similar concept in authoritarian distributional politics and argues 
that the autocrats and the regimes tend to allocate particularistic benefits to regime allies and 
provide universalistic benefits to regime outsiders. In the other words, autocrats satisfy the 
request of benefits strategically by looking at who is making it: the requests of particularistic 
benefits from allies and the requests of universalistic benefits from outsiders are more likely 
to be satisfied than all other requests.  
This paper tests the argument by looking at the legislative activities in China. 
Legislature has been shown to be a critical venue for autocrats to offer spoils and policy 
concessions to various stakeholders (Blaydes, 2010; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008). By 
looking at the People’s Congress in China, the legislature in Chinese regime, this study finds 
that the requests of particularistic goods from delegates who are closer to the regime, i.e. 
allies, usually get stronger promises from government. Similarly, requests of universalistic 
goods from delegates who are further away from the regime, i.e. the outsiders, get stronger 
promises. This finding supports the first hypothesis of authoritarian distributional politics put 
in the theory chapter and explains how autocrats can satisfy the requests of different 
stakeholders strategically by distributing differentiated kinds of benefits. 
The primary purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to test the theory of differentiated 
distribution in the setting of authoritarian legislature, with data from China. Next section 
provides a discussion on why and how the theory can be tested on legislature in China, the 
advantages and disadvantages of test on China’s People’s Congress system, and a literature 
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review of current finding on China’s People’ Congress System. The third section discusses 
the research design, including the case selection, the data, the coding strategies for 
quantitative analysis. The fifth section provides the quantitative results and some robustness 
checks. The last section will be discussions and conclusions of the key findings and possible 
implications of this paper. 
3.2 Testing Authoritarian Distribution in China’s People’s 
Congress System 
3.2.1 Why Legislature? 
Analyzing the distributional strategies of authoritarian regimes is difficult. The most 
obvious reason is the lack of transparency in allocating resources. It is very difficult to find a 
reliable data source where scholars can observe a large picture of how autocrats distribute 
resources; in most times, only some specific cases can be observed. It is also very ambiguous 
to identify the distribution of resources in authoritarian regimes because there are a lot of 
informal rule, practices and norms. This dissertation also has a particular challenge that has to 
be overcome. Since this dissertation asks questions on autocrats’ choices between the public 
and the allies, it is necessary to find a venue where two groups are demanding resources 
together. Needless to say, it is difficult since regime allies and the public usually have 
different channels to communicate with the autocrats about their demands of benefits and 
resources.    
This chapter, therefore, choose to test the authoritarian distribution argument in 
 56 
legislature for two reasons. First, legislature has been the focus of distributional politics in 
most literature. In democracies, legislative bills and budgets are the core targets in evaluating 
the distributional politics (Evans, 2011). In authoritarian regimes, legislature is also a critical 
venue for benefits distributions between different stakeholders and the regime (Blaydes, 
2010; Gandhi, 2008). Pork barrel politics is also common in authoritarian legislature 
(Manion, 2014). Although it is still not as transparent as it ideally should be, legislatures in 
authoritarian regimes usually provide some types of information scholars can use to evaluate 
the pattern of distributions. The legislative system also provides a formal institution for the 
distribution so that the scholars can clearly identify distributions existed.  
Second, legislature is perhaps the only venue where public can participate in the 
political process. Studies have revealed that legislature in authoritarian regimes usually 
consist of both regime allies and the representatives of the general public, and all of them are 
allowed to make direct request to the regime, although in some limited forms.14 Therefore, 
legislature is one of the few venues where regime faces request from both allies and outsiders 
at the same place. This would be an ideal setting to test the theory of this dissertation as the 
autocrats face direct trade-off between demands of benefits from both sides.  
3.2.2 Why People’s Congress in China? 
This chapter focuses on the People’s Congress system in China. The People’s Congress 
system is China’s official legislative system in the Party-State structures. Although it does not 
allow authentic multi-party structures and does not have a real opposition force, as Gandhi 
 
14 For some examples, see: Malesky and Schuler (2010), Manion (2014), and Truex (2016). 
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(2008) suggests, recent studies have repeatedly shown that the People’s Congress system has 
provided representation with limits (Truex, 2016), channels for public participation in the 
policy process (Stromseth et al., 2017), and opportunities for constituency-based parochial 
politics (Manion, 2016a). Chinese regimes seem to provide a limited but still significant 
spaces in its People’s Congress systems to accommodate requests from different sectors of 
the society, incorporate opinions from different sides, and provide benefits to different actors. 
In this sense, the People’s Congress in China is still an effective venue for studying 
distributional politics despite the absence of strong opposition parties. 
The delegates in China National People’s Congress (NPC) or Local People’s Congress 
(LPC) at various levels usually have a five-year term. They meet annually to discuss and 
decide relevant issues. As delegates, they usually have multiple methods of making requests 
to the regime. The most common, and perhaps also the most effective, method is the 
delegate’s proposals and motions. A motion is a proposal with at least ten delegates as 
coauthors and included in the official agenda of each annual congress meeting. The 
proposals, however, can be made by a single delegate or be co-authored by multiple 
delegates. The proposals are usually sent to corresponding government agencies to be 
processed, and the government officials are required to provide an official response to the 
leading delegate of the proposal. The delegate usually has to right to “rate” the response they 
receive, and an “unsatisfactory” rating would affect the relevant government agency’s annual 
performance evaluation negatively.  
In this chapter, I would use the proposal-response as the measurements of interest 
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requests and government delivery of spoils. Although delegates in NPC and LPS are not 
directly representing outsiders and allies, studies have found that they still have some 
connections with and representativeness of their “constituencies” (Stromseth et al., 2017; 
Truex, 2016). The proposals, therefore, can reflect the requests they made on behalf of the 
groups of people they represent or belong to. As Manion (2016a) indicates, many proposals 
in LPN are about asking benefits for local issues, or pork-barrel politics. It again confirms 
that the proposals made by delegates are effective in measuring the requests of benefits that a 
specific group of people makes. 
The measurement of the distribution of benefits is the one of the challenging parts in 
research design. Because of the data availability, the information of benefits distribution in 
China, as well as most other authoritarian regimes, are very difficult to examine. One solution 
is to measure it roughly by the budgeting information (Gandhi, 2008). However, the budget 
information can only provide a very general picture of particularistic and universalistic 
goods. It cannot provide specific details of a specific kind of requests.  
Under current data availability, I believe that the response to delegate’s proposal is one 
of the most effective way of observing and evaluating the delivery of benefits for three 
reasons. First, government response indicates the attitudes of government agency that is 
directly responsible for the requested issues. It is both the key players in the decision-making 
process about the request and the key implementor of the decisions on distributions. Their 
attitudes would be very insightful in estimating what government would like to delivery. 
Second, since the delegate can rate the response, it provides a limited but still effective 
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accountability mechanism. The government agencies usually have to negotiate with the 
delegates about the responses before sending out the final response, and they can be held 
responsible if the delegates are not happy with the response. Therefore, the response can be 
seen as a negotiated result between the delegates and the government and it should carry 
some seriousness. Third, although response is not the delivery itself, it usually contains 
promises. If the promises are strong and credible, it should be more likely that the 
government would satisfy the delegate’s requests, comparing to the situation in which the 
promises in response is weak, ambiguous or even a clear rejection. Therefore, the level of 
promises in response can be used to proximate the likelihood of distribution.  
One concern regarding evaluating the government responses as the distributions is that 
the response is made by corresponding government agency, and therefore it may reflect not 
only the considerations of authoritarian distributions but also many other factors in the 
bureaucratic system. I admit that this is true, but I would offer to reasons why I believe the 
government response is still appropriate. First, I never intend to argue that the distribution 
strategy is the only reason that determines how government respond to the demands made by 
the public and the allies; the need of distribution is one among many other factors that matter. 
However, we can still observe the pattern of distribution once we manage to control all other 
potential cofounders. Second, the bureaucratic system indeed has its own considerations in 
deciding how to respond to the requests, but an effective autocrat should be able to manage 
and control the bureaucratic system in a way that the bureaucracies work as the autocrat 
expected. Since no autocrat can conduct distributions all by himself, he or she has to rely on 
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the bureaucratic system to implement the distributional strategies desired. Thus, the 
measuring of how bureaucratic agency respond to the request of allocating resources would 
be appropriate to understand how autocrats distribute benefits in reality.   
3.2.3 Who is actor? 
The most important one is the definition and operationalization of “regime allies” and 
“regime outsiders” in authoritarian legislature. Current literature tends to separate these 
concepts binomially. For example, many studies in China use CCP membership as the 
indicator for regime allies.15 However, I feel these approaches to operationalization 
problematic. The CCP has almost 90 million members in China. It is hard to argue that all of 
them are followers of the ruling coalition that the regime cares to reward equally. Similarly, 
scholars have found that offering CCP membership becomes one of the cooptation strategies 
for social elites and people in business (Yan, 2012). Thus, I feel CCP membership does not 
match this concept quite well.   
Instead, I would rather treat the allies/outsider dichotomy as a continuous concept. I 
argue that this approach and one’s occupation will be a better proxy to reflect the relations 
between one delegate and the regime. I have two reasons to support my argument. First, 
political factors are certainly important for some occupations in authoritarian regimes. It is 
natural to expect that key officials are usually close allies of the regime. Beyond that, it may 
also be reasonable to expect that certain positions in key industries may also be occupied by 
regime allies. This situation  aligns with China, where CCP has a nomenclature system to 
 
15 For example, see Meng et al. (2017), J. Chen et al. (2016); Su and Meng (2016).  
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control all sorts of important positions in society, from government officials to university 
presidents to hospital directors (Burns, 1994; Chan, 2004). One key feature of the 
nomenclature system is that people are managed by different levels of governments based on 
their occupation and position It indicates that the people’s relations with regimes vary 
because of their different occupations.  
Second, occupation may reflect the economic relations with regimes, which may reflect 
individuals’ status as allies or outsiders. Similar concepts have been adopted by scholars like 
McMann (2006) to evaluate people’s relations with the regime. It is natural to expect that a 
CEO in a state-owned company will be much closer to the regime than a first-line worker in a 
private company. After all, people are not regime allies by default; they become regime allies 
because of who they are and what kind of resources they obtain. The occupations of people, 
therefore, should be effective in reflecting such relations. 
Therefore, I define regime allies and outsiders in one continuous dimension. The one 
who is closer to the regime will be more like a “regime allies” and they will be treated more 
like a regime ally. The one who is further away from the regime will be more like an 
“outsider” and are therefore treated as an outsider to a larger extent. Thus, the delegates in the 
legislature would be examined based on these criteria to determines what groups they 
represent and belongs to. 
3.2.4 What are Spoils? 
As discussed above, the distributional politics in democratic legislatures usually involve 
a balance between providing universalistic goods and particularistic goods and through pork 
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barrel politics (M. A. Golden & Picci, 2008; Kriner & Reeves, 2015; Lancaster & Patterson, 
1990). In authoritarian legislatures, Manion (2016a) finds a similar phenomenon of parochial 
politics in the LPC in China. I will follow these studies in defining requests and spoils in the 
legislature. Thus, anyone’s request that is specifically benefiting the narrow constituencies he 
or she represents, no matter geographically or occupationally, is regarded as a request for 
particularistic spoils, and particularistic distributions are cases when the autocrats and the 
regime meet such requests. On the contrary, universalistic goods are defined as those policies 
delivering benefits to a larger group of the citizenry, and universalistic distributions should 
offer benefits for groups of people that are larger than the group the delegate represents. In 
other words, the policy concessions for universalistic goods offer policy access to and the 
influence on the decision over distributing resources to large social welfare beyond the 
benefits of any specific sub-group of the society. On the contrary, the policy concession for 
particularistic goods and spoils offer influences on the decisions that distribute resources to 
those parochial projects or provide privileges to a specific group of people.  
3.2.5 What to expect 
In general, this chapter test the differentiated distributional strategy by using the 
delegates proposal and the corresponding government responses in China’s People’s 
Congress system. Chinese government tends to respond to the particularistic demands from 
the regime allies and the universalistic demands from the public. The following hypotheses 
are, therefore, made: 
H1a: Delegates from the public get stronger response from the government than 
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delegates from the regime allies regarding the proposals requesting the universalistic benefits 
in China’s people’s congress system. 
H1b: Delegates from the regime allies get stronger response from the government than 
delegates from the public regarding the proposals requesting the particularistic benefits in 
China’s people’s congress system. 
3.3. The Role of People’s Congress System in China 
Numerous studies have been made to understand the role of China’s people’s congress 
system and how politically influential it is. Traditional view believes that the People’s 
Congress system in China is largely window-dressing, or so-called “rubber stamp”. However, 
recent studies start to find a more substantial political influences of the Peoples’ Congress in 
China. 
One group of literature, largely followed the cooptation theory proposed by Gandhi 
(2008), argue that the People’s Congress system may be an effective tool to incorporate social 
elites to the regime.16 In this argument, government allows the delegates in the People’ 
Congress to be influential (although limited) in decision-making to incorporate them into the 
establishment and make sure that they will support the regime. This represents a typical 
cooptation argument that argued by many scholars in different authoritarian states (Gandhi & 
Przeworski, 2006). 
Another group of literature suggest that the People’s Congress in China can solve the 
 
16 For example, see: Yan (2011) and Dimitrov (2013).  
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information dilemma of the dictator. In this argument, the People’s Congress is a channel for 
autocrats in China to collect information regarding their governance and policies so that the 
government can make appropriate decisions (Manion, 2016a; Stromseth et al., 2017; Truex, 
2016). In this sense, the authoritarian regimes adopts specifically designed institutional 
mechanism to encourage delegates to make input on information (Manion, 2014; Truex, 
2016). As consequences, the government has to allows some political influences as incentives 
to the continuous information input from the delegates (Distelhorst & Hou, 2016). Similar 
study in Vietnam finds that delegates would, indeed, provide information as autocrats expect 
(Malesky & Schuler, 2010). 
Beyond these studies, some other theories, although lacks the direct empirical evidence 
in China, may also be insightful. One example is the power-sharing theory that emphasize 
that the legislature is a venue for power-sharing among regime allies to create credible 
commitment and mechanism for spoils distribution among coalition (Blaydes, 2010; 
Magaloni, 2008; Myerson, 2008). Although China does have other institutions for credible 
power-sharing (e.g. the party institution), it is also expected that the regime allies in the 
People’s Congress should be treated favorably in order to maintain their loyalty to the 
autocrats and the regime. Studies in other authoritarian legislature indicates that the defection 
of political elites are likely when the benefits distributed to them is not satisfying (Reuter & 
Szakonyi, 2019). 
To sum up, current literature has indicated that the delegates in China’s People’s 
Congresses seem to be more than just rubber stamp. They do have some influences over the 
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policies, and Chinese government has incentives to fulfill their demands. This chapter, 
therefore, take this opportunity to see how Chinese regime would do when it faces demands 
from both the public and the regime allies that they cannot all meet.  
3.4 Data and Coding Strategy 
3.4.1 Data 
This chapter uses proposals and the corresponding government responses of the 12th 
Provincial People’s Congress in Anhui for a quantitative analysis. Anhui province is largely a 
part of Eastern China. It has a land area of around 140000 km2 and a population of 66 
million. It ranks 13th place in all 31 provinces of Mainland China in terms of GDP, while its 
per capita GDP ranks at 25th place. Comparing with other provinces, Anhui has a moderate 
economic growth rate, and it has larger shares of agricultural industry in its economy. The 
eastern part of Anhui province is adjacent to the Yangtze River Delta Region, one of the 
wealthiest regions in China. The western part of Anhui, however, is a part of the Central 
China region that has significant poverty problems. Culturally speaking, Anhui Province is 
diverse. Its northern part belongs to the so-called Central Plain culture in China, while its 
southern part demonstrates clear characteristics of Southern China cultures. Anhui has Han 
Chinese and another 52 out of the 55 minority ethnicities in China. Politically, Anhui has a 
moderate level of importance. Its provincial leaders are usually at other provincial positions 
before being transferred to Anhui, but most of them also end up remaining at the provincial 
level until retirement. For a few of them who are promoted, they usually have to be 
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transferred to other more important provinces before being promoted to the Central level. In 
general, Anhui Province seems to be a typical province in China politically, economically, 
and culturally. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages of focusing on one provincial congress. 
Anhui province publishes all of its proposals and government responses for 2013 and 2016, 
while publishing the proposals for all other years between 2012-2017. Because of the 
political sensitivity of publishing these reports, it is almost impossible to obtain similar data 
from the NPC and almost all other provinces. The data from Anhui, therefore, provides a very 
rare opportunity to evaluate the dynamics of responses and distributions of any kind of 
authoritarian legislature with detail. In addition, delegates in the LPCs usually perform more 
pork-barrel politics than delegates in NPC because of the political sensitivity and control of 
the latter, which makes the activities in LPCs more useful in evaluating distributional politics. 
Therefore, I can perform an in-dept analysis with the proposal-response data from Anhui 
province that I cannot perform on any other data. The largest challenge here, however, is 
representativeness. Although current studies demonstrate similarities between NPC and LPC 
in many perspectives, and I can see no reason why Anhui’s People’s Congress would perform 
differently than  NPC and LPCs in other places, I still have to admit that the evidence 
produced with one provincial congress is not representative and can only be generalized with 
caution.  
In sum, provincial People’s Congress is a good option considering the balances between 
representativeness, the depth of analysis, and data quality. It is true that the findings based on 
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this data is not representative, but I believe it can still provide insightful and in-depth 
information on how the distributional politics work in China and other authoritarian 
legislatures.  
3.4.2 Coding Strategies 
The dependent Variable is the level of promises in government responses. I developed a 
four-scale index of promise level. One (1) signifies a clear and direct rejection to the request. 
Two (2) signifies a rejection of the request but a promise to consider it in the future or 
agreement with the proposal but rejection taking action. Three (3) signifies a promise to take 
the actions mentioned in the proposal but not provide the schedule of the actions and/or clear 
measurable target. Four (4) signifies a clear and credible promise to take action with a 
specific schedule and measurable goals. The higher the value is, the stronger the promise is in 
the responses. 
Two independent variables are included. One is the level of universalistic interests made 
in each proposal. It is a three-scale measurement. One (1) represents the geographically 
particularistic interests. Two (2) represents the occupationally particularistic interests, which 
are the interests benefiting the specific occupation that the delegate belongs to. Three (3) 
represents universalistic interests that are about general social welfare and benefit the public 
broadly.  
I divided particularistic interests into two categories for two reasons. First, although 
delegates are found to have parochial behavior for their geographic constituencies (Manion, 
2016a), they also have incentives to fight for particularistic interests for their occupational 
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groups because the delegate selection process also considers the occupation of delegates to 
achieve an accurate representations of the whole society. Therefore, many delegates are 
elected by the party-state because they are representative of their occupational industries. In 
this sense, appeasing their occupational groups is also useful. Second, the delegates of the 
Provincial People’s Congress are elected by the LPC delegates of each municipal region in 
the province. Therefore, their ties with their geographic constituency should still be stronger 
than their tie to the occupational groups because it is their constituency that ultimately elects 
them. Thus, I think the geographical interests should be more particularistic than occupational 
interests. 
The other independent variable is the index of regime allies and regime outsiders. 
Instead of using a binary variable, I developed a seven-scale index to measure the distance of 
a delegate to the regime core based on the delegate’s occupation. One means the closest 
position to the regime core, hence the closest regime allies. Seven represents the furthest 
position to the regime core, so the furthest regime outsiders. The details of this measurement 
are in the appendix.  
The level of promise in government responses and the level of interest in proposals were 
coded by two coders independently. Each coder read each proposal and response and coded 
them according to the standard discussed above. I made the final decision on the items that 
the two coders differed on with each other. This approach helped ensure the objectivity of the 
coding. I also developed a database of all the delegates in Anhui’s 12th Provincial People’s 
Congress, including their constituency, gender, occupation, title, age, CCP membership, 
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education level, and ethnicity. Each proposal was matched with its leading delegate’s 
information in the delegate database.  
The control variables included all demographic information for each proposal’s leading 
delegate. In addition, whether the proposal was co-authored by multiple delegates and 
whether the proposal was directly requesting money was also included as a control variable. 
The fixed effect of each individual delegate and the corresponding government agencies are 
also included.   
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Main Findings 
This analysis used the data from the 3rd Annual Conference (2014) and the 6th Annual 
Conference (2016) of the Anhui Provincial People’s Congress. In the 2014 meeting, 870 
proposals were submitted by 389 delegates out of the total 708.17 Of the total, 856 proposals 
have their corresponding responses available for public, while the others are classified. About 
81.07% of these proposals are submitted by delegates working in government or state-owned 
organizations, i.e. regime allies. Regarding the types of requests, 207 proposals (24.18%) are 
requests for constituency interests, 251 proposals (29.32%) are requests for occupational 
interests, and 398 proposals (46.5%) are about universalistic encompassing interests. In the 
2016 meeting, 910 proposals were made by 369 delegates, while only 879 proposals have 
their responses un-classified. From this meeting, about 79.29% proposals were made by 
 
17 The number of delegates exclude delegates from People’s Liberation Army section, who already do not submit 
proposals. The details of delegate of 12th Anhui Provincial People’s Congress can be seen in appendix. 
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regime allies. For types of requests, 263 proposals (29.92%) are for constituency interests, 
230 proposals (26.17%) are for occupational interests, and 386 proposals (43.91%) are for 
universalistic encompassing interests. These figures indicate that the composition of delegate 
proposals and their characters remains very similar across different years. 
I then used OLS regression to analyze the data in 2014 and 2016 separately. Table 1   
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Table 1 OLS Regression for Regime Distance and Request Interests on 
Responsepresents the regression results for both years. Model 1 and 4 presents the results 
with only independent variables. Model 2 and 5 includes key control variables. Model 3 and 
6 include two additional control variables: the age and education level of delegates.  
  
 72 
Table 1 OLS Regression for Regime Distance and Request Interests on Response 
Year of Meeting 2014 2016 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regime Distance -0.388*** -0.416*** -0.445*** -0.520*** -0.517*** -0.537*** 
 (0.047) (0.060) (0.067) (0.053) (0.085) (0.089) 
Universalistic Interests -0.527*** -0.547*** -0.578*** -0.718*** -0.658*** -0.666*** 
 (0.068) (0.089) (0.101) (0.081) (0.107) (0.121) 
Distance#Interests 0.165*** 0.168*** 0.175*** 0.244*** 0.246*** 0.254*** 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.023) (0.032) (0.037) 
Co-sponsorship  -0.021 0.015  0.011 0.034 
  (0.071) (0.072)  (0.081) (0.089) 
Request for Money  0.081 0.044  0.138 0.166* 
  (0.070) (0.077)  (0.076) (0.079) 
Gender  0.013 0.040  0.020 -0.000 
  (0.071) (0.079)  (0.075) (0.085) 
Ethnicity  0.107 -0.085  0.112 -0.038 
  (0.142) (0.123)  (0.157) (0.191) 
Political Affiliation  -0.040 -0.045  0.054 0.052 
  (0.039) (0.040)  (0.042) (0.048) 
Education Level   0.068   -0.074 
   (0.061)   (0.081) 
Age   -0.008   0.003 
   (0.005)   (0.005) 
Responding Agency  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constituency   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant 4.043*** 4.293*** 4.989*** 4.117*** 3.293*** 3.381*** 
 (0.158) (0.251) (0.442) (0.178) (0.341) (0.489) 
Observations 856 723 618 879.000 786.000 673.000 
R2 0.077 0.208 0.242 0.112 0.261 0.273 
Distance varies from 1-7, in which 1 means closest. Interests varies from 1-3, in which 1 means 
geographic particularistic, 2 means occupational particularistic and 3 means universalistic 
benefits. Political Affiliation varies from 1-3, in which 1 means no affiliation, 2 means 
members of Eight Democratic Parties and 3 means CCP members. Fixed effect of responding 
agencies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The results indicate that the distance to the regime is negatively associated with the level 
of responses when the level of interests is below 3, which indicates particularistic interests. 
However, when the level of interests is 3 or higher (universalistic interests), the distance to 
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the regime becomes significantly positive on response level. This pattern is consistent across 
different models and different years. To get a clear idea of the interaction effect, I show the 
marginal effect of distance to regime on response level for model 2 and 5. Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 present the marginal effect of 2014 and 2016 data, respectively.  
Figure 1 Marginal Effect of Regime Distance (2014 Meeting) 
Figure 2 Marginal Effect of Regime Distance (2016 Meeting) 
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Looking at both regression results and marginal effect, a very consistent story is 
presented. One delegate being further away from regime core reduces the level of responses 
his or her proposals can get from the regime when the proposals are asking particularistic 
benefits. Such negative effects are larger when the request is more particularistic. However, 
when the proposal is about universalistic benefits, being further from regime actually 
increases the level of responses one delegate can receive. Put simply, being closer regime 
allies has a higher response level if the proposal is particularistic, while being further regime 
outsiders receives higher responses for proposals asking universalistic benefits. 
To further demonstrate such effects, I predicted the value of the response level for each 
type of request based on regime distance. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the results. For the 
2014 meeting, the average response level for constituency benefits, the most particularistic 
benefits, drop from about 3.4 when the delegate is a government official to about 2 when the 
delegate is categorized as the furthest regime outsiders. At the same time, the average 
response level for universalistic benefits requests increased from about 2.6 to 3.1. For the 
2016 data, the average response level for constituency benefits drops from slightly above 3 to 
around 1.5, while responses for universalistic benefits increase from about 2.2 to about 3.5. 
Since “2” represents an indirect rejection while 3 represents a promise to deliver without a 
concrete schedule in my coding of response, these changes are substantial and dramatic 
because they indicate a clear change of attitudes from acceptance to rejection for 
particularistic benefits and vice versa for universalistic benefits.  
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Figure 3 Predicted Response level (2014 Meeting) 
 
Figure 4 Predicted Response Level (2016 Meeting) 
In general, the delegate proposals and corresponding government responses in 2014 and 
2016 provide consistent and strong evidence to support my theory. They indicate that being 
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closer to the regime gives one a huge advantage in making particularistic requests, while 
being further away from the regime core is an advantage in asking for universalistic benefits. 
In the other words, the authoritarian government tends to respond to particularistic benefits 
from allies and universalistic benefits from outsiders.18 
3.5.2 Robustness Check 
The first robustness check was to re-evaluate the interaction effect by following the 
suggestions in Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2018). Figure 5 demonstrates the results of 
analysis using the strategies recommended in Hainmueller et al. (2018). The linear estimation 
model and kernel estimation models were used for the 2014 and 2016 meeting data 
separately. The results remained the same: the proposals with universalistic benefits requests 
received stronger response when made by regime outsiders while particularistic interests 
received stronger responses when delegates are closer to the regime. It indicates that the 
findings of this paper are valid even if I relax the linear interaction effect assumption and 
consider the potential “model dependency that stems from excessive extrapolation” 
(Hainmueller et al., 2018). 
 
18 I also conducted ordinal logit regression by treating response level as an ordered variable from lowest and highest. 
The results remain similar, indicating that the findings are consistent across different modeling assumptions. 
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Figure 5 Interaction Estimation following Hainmueller et al. (2018) 
 
Secondly, I would like to explore whether the regime allies and outsiders are making 
similar types of requests. This is an important question because if they are requesting similar 
benefits, the regime can practically meet demands from both sides by only responding to one 
side, since satisfying one side would also satisfy the other. To explore this question, I 
conducted a text analysis of all delegate proposals by using the Structural Topic Model. The 
results are shown in Figure 6. In total, 13 different topics were identified. Regime allies and 
outsiders are focusing on different topics: regime allies focus more on issues related to civil 
services, education, transportation infrastructure, pollution, and transportation management, 
while regime outsiders are more interested in innovation, finance, utility management, 
production quality control and Internet development. Only in healthcare and rural areas do 
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both sides share similar levels of interest. These findings indicate that the regime does need to 
carefully respond to different interest requests, as satisfying one side cannot make the other 
side happy as well. 
Figure 6 Difference of Topic Proportions between Allies and the Public (K=13)  
One major concern is the reliability of coding. Although differences between types of 
interests are distinct and relatively easy to code, the differences between response levels are 
sometime ambiguous, especially when bureaucrats deliberately provide ambiguous 
responses. Therefore, I recoded the level of responses as a 3-scale variable by coding two 
neighbor levels as one and then re-running the OLS regression. Six different models of OLS 
regression with response level recoded were conducted.19 The results, in Table 8 in the 
appendix, remained the same, which indicates that my findings are not subject to coding 
strategies. 
 
19 I ran three models on each year. The first one treats level 3 and 4 in original 4-scale as one level; the second model 
treats level 2 and 3 as one same level; the third model treats level 1 and 2 as one same level. 
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To further test the robustness, I conducted near-neighboring matching for each year. I 
created a binary variable indicating whether one delegate is a regime outsider or not. Distance 
1-4 were regarded as allies, while distance 5-7 were outsiders. The matching was based on 
the following covariates: whether the proposal requests money, whether the proposal is co-
sponsored, the gender of delegate, the political affiliation of delegate, ethnicity of delegate 
and the constituency of delegate. The results are consistent with other findings and are shown 
in Table 9 in the appendix. For two delegates with very similar demographic situations and 
proposal characters, the outsider-delegate receives stronger responses for universalistic 
benefits proposals, while receiving lower responses for particularistic benefits proposals, 
comparing to the allies-delegate. In general, it indicates that the findings are robust regardless 
of model specifications and assumptions. 
Another concern is the potential selection bias. I will address these concerns from two 
perspectives. The first perspective is that delegates may also know the government’s 
preferences and then will only submit proposals that are more likely to be responded to 
strongly. If this were true, we should expect the further away the delegate is from the regime, 
the more “encompassing” the proposals would be. To address this concern, I ran the logit 
regression between the level of interests and the distance to regime of delegates. The 
results in  
 
Table 2 indicate that there is no significant relation between regime distance and 
submitting universalistic proposals. In the other words, allies and outsides are equally likely 




Table 2 Binary Logit Regression of Regime Distance on Proposal Type 
 Universalistic Proposal 
 2013 2016 
Regime Distance -0.014 -0.051 
 (0.074) (0.080) 
Co-Sponsorship 0.008 -0.068 
 (0.222) (0.207) 
Request for Money -0.070 -1.006*** 
 (0.249) (0.205) 
Gender -0.536* -0.561* 
 (0.242) (0.242) 
Ethnicity -0.049 0.458 
 (0.466) (0.352) 
Political Affiliation 0.005 0.063 
 (0.135) (0.147) 
Constituency Yes Yes 
Responding Agency Yes Yes 
Constant 0.751 2.077 
 (0.860) (1.107) 
Observations 675.000 772.000 
pseudo-R2 0.154 0.207 
This is a binary logit regression result table. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is whether a proposal is universalistic or not. Fixed effect of responding agencies and 
local constituencies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Another perspective of selection bias concern is the missing data. Although delegate 
proposals are made available for all years between 2012-2018, the term of the 12th congress, 
the government responses are only fully available in two of the years. Although there is a 
potential bias problem since we do not know the responses for other years, I feel it may not 
be a significant problem because there is no theoretical reason to think 2014 and 2016 are 
two particular years that the government in Anhui should perform differently than other 
years. In addition, as Truex (2016, p. 94) suggested, it is more likely to be laziness that makes 
only a selection of years available. The fact that all proposals and response are just uploaded 
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as a copy-and-pasted single Word File with little organization and editing also implies a lazy 
workstyle. Readers can make their own decisions, but I believe that the selective availability 
of the data is the result of insufficient labor and laziness on behalf of the sources rather than 
potential bias.  
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study provides a theory of authoritarian distribution to both regime allies and 
regime outsiders under resource constrain and they test the theory based on data from China. 
It indicates that autocrats do intend to reward particularistic benefits to regime allies, i.e. their 
core supporters, and reward universalistic benefits to regime outsiders, i.e. the people with 
potentials to be co-opted. By making this strategic distribution, autocrats make sure that the 
distribution to one side would not damage the potentials of distributing to the other side. 
Therefore, autocrats can maintain the loyalty of ruling coalition and the cooperation of 
regime outsiders simultaneously.  
This results may indicate that autocrats do have preferences over types of spoils when 
facing different groups of people. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) suggest the autocrat have no 
preference of giving out private spoils or policy concessions. This study, however, suggest 
that autocrats may prefer to provide policy concessions concerning universalistic benefits and 
public goods when they need to co-opt social elites and other regime outsiders, while keeping 
private rents for regime allies when they need to work for coalition loyalty.  
Current literature has shown that authoritarian regimes rely on representative systems to 
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gather information and to improve the quality of governance (Truex, 2016). Following this 
approach, it is natural to expect that regime provide better response to the content that brings 
good information. This paper, however, indicate that the content is not the only story. Regime 
responses are highly dependent on the identity of the delegate who makes that content. In the 
other words, it is not only what the proposals speak, but also who speaks, that determines the 
response from the government.  
This study also provides insights on understanding the behavior of authoritarian 
legislatures. Numerous studies in China and Vietnam have shown that local delegates work 
very hard to speak for local interests (Malesky & Schuler, 2010; Truex, 2016) and participate 
in the parochial pork-barrel politics for their local constituency (Manion, 2016a). The effects 
of such activities, however, are not studied well. This paper suggests that regime outsiders 
may fight for local benefits tirelessly, but they seem unable to get credible promises from 
regimes for those local benefits. It is in contrast with the logic in democratic pork-barrel 
politics, in which delegates with strong geographical connection get more “pork” than those 
at-large delegates (Lancaster, 1986). Instead, the regime allies in China, who are selected as 
delegate because of their occupational capacities rather than geographical basis, are the ones 
who have advantages in bring “pork” back to local constituencies. These findings also 
provide insights on public good provisions in authoritarian regimes. For encompassing public 
goods, such as social welfare, participations from regime outsiders seem to be effective. For 
local public goods that benefits a specific group of people narrowly, public participation and 
pressures seem to be ineffective, although the public are eager to participate (Malesky & 
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Schuler, 2011; Manion, 2014).  
In conclusion, authoritarian regimes respond to different demands from regime allies 
and the public by offering differentiated distributions of spoils and benefits. It may reduce the 
tensions between two sides, but the fundamental challenge of resource constraints remains. In 
many cases, the particularistic distribution and the universalistic distribution may rely on the 
same group of resources ultimately and, therefore, still pose a critical trade-off to autocrats. 
In other words, this study provides us some idea on who gets what and when, but scholars of 
authoritarian regime still need to ask the “how” question, especially when the demands from 
the public and the regime allies are incompatible. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Private Side Payment of the Public Welfare 
Expansion: Evidence from China’s Anti-
Corruption Campaign 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter three, I demonstrate that the autocrats should take a differentiated distributional 
strategy to offer particularistic benefits to the regime allies and universalistic benefits to the 
public. It can avoid direct conflicts between two distributions. However, as discussed in chapter 
one and two, the public demand for more universalistic benefits is increasing year by year. We 
do see a rapid expansion of public goods and welfare in China in recent decades. Since the total 
resources for distribution are inevitably finite, the conflicts between two types of distributions 
seem unavoidable. How should autocrats maintain the loyalty of regime allies when the 
expansion of universalistic benefits takes resources away for particularistic distribution?  
A vast body of the literature on democracies has already revealed strategies for politicians 
to distribute resources for different kinds of demands and requests. Current studies, however, 
provide relatively little evidence of what authoritarian regimes would do in response to the 
expansion of public welfare and the consequential losses and angers among regime allies. This 
chapter utilizes the rare opportunity provided by the anticorruption campaign in China to 
explore this question. Anticorruption is desired by the public because it provides a clean and 
 85 
transparent environment that the general public can enjoy and may increase the quality and 
efficiency of governance. However, anticorruption will inevitably reduce the spoils that local 
officials can obtain and thus create potential dissatisfaction and anger among bureaucrats, one 
of the regime’s key allies. Therefore, the anticorruption case in China provides a good 
opportunity to explore how autocrats change distributional strategies when the demands from 
the public and regime allies collide.     
This chapter argues that the Chinese regime appeases their allies during the anticorruption 
campaign by creating new private side payments for particularistic distribution. In particular, 
this chapter argues that the Chinese regime distributes more fiscal and political benefits to 
officials through the budgetary process and spend less on social spending, which would 
indicate that while the anticorruption campaign may reduce the spoils officials receive from 
informal means, regimes would compensate them, at least partially, by providing more 
opportunities for benefits from institutionalized channels, e.g., government funding and 
budgets. Thus, the spoils of officials and regime allies during the anticorruption campaign may 
not be reduced as expected to provide incentives for loyalty. 
This research relies on the data from the anticorruption campaign in China launched by 
the Xi Jinping administration in late 2012 to test this theory. Empirically, this research found 
that an increase in the numbers of corruption investigations in any given province is associated 
with a decrease in public spending, an increase in suspicious bureaucratic welfare spending, 
and an increasing level of fiscal help from the central government in financing local budgets, 
while the total expenditure of that province is not affected by the investigation numbers. In 
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short, this finding may provide feasibly strong evidence to suggest that local governments in 
the anticorruption campaign in authoritarian regimes are allowed to save more money from 
public spending to increase the benefits of local officials. This finding also suggests that the 
central government would provide more fiscal and political rewards to local provinces with 
more anticorruption investigations.   
This research seeks to support the theory of this dissertation by revealing the distributional 
strategy of autocrats to address the trade-offs among competing survival needs. Authoritarian 
regimes need to distribute resources to regime allies in exchange for loyalty, but they cannot 
allocate too much to allies because they also need to provide benefits to the public for 
cooptation (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006). This chapter contributes to the body of literature by 
providing a test for the dynamics between the distributions to two sides. In addition, this chapter 
shows that authoritarian regimes may satisfy the public demand for anticorruption but 
simultaneously reduce other types of benefits to the public in response to the internal pressure 
from allies who suffer during the anticorruption campaign.  
In addition, this chapter also provides a possible explanation of how autocrats manage the 
potential cost of anticorruption. Authoritarian regimes need to curb corruption but have to 
ensure that anticorruption would not provoke either officials or allies by excessively reducing 
spoils, because the diminishing expectations of spoils would make the elite allies defect from 
the ruling coalition, and thus pose a significant threat to regime survival (Reuter & Szakonyi, 
2019). This chapter notes that autocrats actually compensate local officials’ losses from 
anticorruption by providing more welfare and rewards, possibly with the money saved from 
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public spending. The approval to divest public spending to enhance bureaucratic welfare and 
reward local officials would significantly reduce the risk of disloyalty during the anticorruption 
campaign. 
In general, this chapter questions the conventional literature regarding the consequences 
of external pressure on the provisions of public goods and provides a new theory of how politics 
affect resource distribution in nondemocratic contexts. Conventional cooptation theory 
suggests that external threats would force autocrats to make policy concessions to the public, 
which usually result in an increase in public goods and social welfare (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi 
& Przeworski, 2006). Many studies on authoritarian regimes have made argument based on 
similar logic: autocrats will constrained themselves and offer more public goods in response to 
public pressure because it helps their survival. However, this chapter indicates that while 
external pressure may increase the public welfare in certain aspects, the overall public welfare 
may not increase because the autocrat might need to create private side payment at the expense 
of public interests to compensate for the loss of regime allies. In short, the increase in public 
goods may not come from the decrease in private spoils to autocrats and ruling coalitions; 
however, it may come from a decrease in other public goods. The finding in this chapter, 
therefore, remind the students of the authoritarian politics the other side of the story regarding 
the expansion in public welfare provisions. The offer of cooptation comes with a price in 
addition to political obedience: the gains in public welfare are, at least partially, at the expense 
of other forms of public welfare.     
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4.2 Conflicting Demands of Corruption and 
Anticorruption 
Authoritarian regimes have incentives to curb corruption. The current literature provides 
numerous answers for why authoritarian regimes curb corruption, such as improving the 
quality of bureaucracy and governance (Bäck & Hadenius, 2008; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 
2016); solving some problems regarding economic development (Quade, 2007); settling power 
struggles and elite competition (Zhu & Zhang, 2017; Zhu et al., 2017); or simply enhancing 
public support for the regime. Although some of the benefits of anticorruption are purely 
political, many of these benefits, such as better public service, more public goods and a fair 
environment, would increase the overall social welfare that is strongly desired by the public. 
Therefore, regimes usually face strong public pressure to reduce corruption. For example, even 
in the early 2000s, studies had already found that rural Chinese citizens would support mass 
mobilization when they are increasingly impatient about the failure to control corruption (Li, 
2001). Thus, the public usually has extensive demands for a less-corrupt environment, and a 
corrupt rule is often one of the main causes of mass revolutions and regime collapse.  
Autocrats, however, also have incentives to tolerate a certain degree of corruption. The 
conventional literature on authoritarian regimes has revealed how autocrats use the distribution 
of spoils to keep the loyalty of regime allies. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that 
private benefits are especially effective for autocrats to keep their ruling coalition loyal and 
stable when the winning coalition size is small. Magaloni (2006) reveals how different 
institutional settings in Mexico’s nondemocratic regimes would help to shape the distribution 
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of spoils among elites to maintain the regime’s survival. Corruption and other types of 
privileges are usually important incentives intentionally allowed by the regime, especially 
when bureaucrats are underpaid (Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Shirk, 1993). Moreover, the 
tolerance of corruption provides autocrats with some flexibility: they do not need to distribute 
all the spoils themselves; rather, they allow allies to obtain private benefits on their own. 
The assumption that corruption can solicit loyalty from regime allies is widely shared by 
many studies on authoritarian regimes. For example, a series of studies argue that personalistic 
dictatorship is more corrupt than other types of nondemocratic regimes because personalistic 
dictators rely on the corrupt distribution of spoils to solicit support (Bratton & Van de Walle, 
1994; Bruce  Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999; Chang & Golden, 2010). 
Apparently, these studies all assume that corruption serves as an effective way of distributing 
spoils in exchange for loyalty.   
If the utility of corruption in soliciting allies’ support is pervasive, then how autocrats can 
manage the potential backlash from their allies and bureaucrats when autocrats begin to enforce 
anticorruption to fulfill the public need? The current literature provides limited evidence to 
answer this question. The one explanation may be the work by scholars such as Svolik (2012) 
and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), who argue that it may be too costly to leave the 
ruling coalition and the sunk cost of investing in the current regime cannot be transferred to 
the new one. Following this argument, we should assume that the cost of exiting the ruling 
coalition is larger than that caused by the anticorruption. However, there are still two possible 
points that this argument cannot fully cover. First, even if officials would not leave the regime, 
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it is likely that they may start an indirect and passive resistance. This resistance would result 
in a low overall performance, which is detrimental to the regime. Second, even if the incumbent 
dictator is powerful enough to repress all potential rebellions, this situation would still be very 
costly and risky, especially when large-scale anticorruption causes a large number of angry 
allies. Therefore, it is still in the interests of the incumbent to establish further strategies to 
appease their allies. In short, autocrats have to create a balance between the public and 
bureaucrats.  
4.3 Private Side Payments for the Anti-Corruption 
This chapter proposes a distributional strategy for autocrats when the demands from the 
public and regime allies collide. The basic assumption is that the autocrat has to maintain a 
strategic balance between two groups to ensure that no group will receive disproportionally 
favorable treatment. First, the autocrat should decide which group to reward. This group will 
be the receiving group, i.e., the group that receives benefits at the expense of the other group 
(the losing group). The autocrat will then distribute the corresponding benefits to the receiving 
group. Simultaneously, the autocrat should reduce the benefits of the receiving group in other 
areas to provide additional benefits to compensate for the losing group when the total resources 
for distribution are limited. In short, the autocrat should provide the desired benefits to the 
receiving group but simultaneously reduce other benefits to compensate the losing group, 
which follows the direct logic of materialistic exchange: when people suffer in one channel, 
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they should be compensated through other channels.20  
To apply this theory in the context of anticorruption in China, we should expect a simple 
response from autocrats to handle the backlash from allies and officials. The regime should 
reduce other benefits that the public is currently enjoying, e.g., public goods and public welfare, 
when they conduct more anticorruption investigations in response to public demands. 
Simultaneously, the regime should increase spending on bureaucratic welfare and provide other 
rewards to local officials to compensate for their losses from anticorruption and appease their 
anger. In summary, the Chinese regime will create a balance between public and local officials 
regarding anticorruption by providing more welfare and rewards to bureaucrats and allowing 
less spending on public welfare in areas with more anticorruption activities.  
One may question the point of anticorruption if the dictator still provides spoils to his or 
her allies. Moreover, it seems meaningless if regimes need to give private benefits to officials 
to prevent them from taking money from their public office. However, there are still three 
advantages that the incumbent dictator can enjoy by using this strategy. First, providing more 
government funds would not affect other purposes of anticorruption. As scholars have noted, 
anticorruption may also serve other political considerations, such as power signaling or elite 
competitions (Manion, 2004; Zhu & Zhang, 2017; Zhu et al., 2017). These purposes should 
hardly have anything to do with money and therefore should still be fulfilled by anticorruption, 
even if the regime needs to provide other benefits to officials. Second, it may be more 
 
20 The officials being punished because of corruption certainly do not get the compensation. The logic here is that the 
officials who remain in office but feel panic and angry about the anti-corruption have to be compensated by the autocrats. 
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controllable from the incumbent’s and the regime’s perspective to allow officials to receive 
private spoils from government funds rather than bribery or other secret forms of activities that 
the regime cannot oversee. If using spoils to incentivize officials is unavoidable, it may be 
better if the regime can have a certain level of control over what and how much spoils the 
officials can receive, rather than having a blind view of the scale of spoils and benefits. Last, 
public preference regarding different issues may not be equal. There may still be a net-gain for 
conducting anticorruption measures and reducing other forms of public welfare simultaneously 
if the public prefers anticorruption to other public goods.  
4.4 Anticorruption Campaign in China 
China has been working on anticorruption for an extended period of time and has set up a 
large system called “the Party Disciplinary Inspection Commission” from the central to the 
local level to curb corruption (Manion, 2004; Wedeman, 2005). However, the effectiveness of 
China’s anticorruption work is severely hindered by several structural, institutional and cultural 
factors (Guo, 2014); thus, corruption has become increasingly significant in China (Zhu, 2018). 
Consequently, the new Xi Jinping administration, starting in late 2012, has launched a massive 
anticorruption campaign that is more intense than previous ones in terms of scope and duration 
(Manion, 2016b). According to the working report of the Central Disciplinary Inspection 
Commission, approximately 72000 officials were disciplined between 2012 and 2017, 
including 440 officials ranked at or above the ministerial level.21 Another report revealed that 
 
21 See: http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-12/13/c_1123850237.htm; the vast majority of officials (63000) were at the 
county-level, and this figure does not differentiate between those in a criminal process and those received party disciplinary 
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approximately 1.34 million officials below county-level were disciplined.22  Compared to 
previous anticorruption measures, the current campaign covers a broad range of officials across 
different levels of governments in all localities and central government agencies. Although 
some studies argue that there are political motives behind this (Zhu & Zhang, 2017), the current 
anticorruption campaign is still widely believed to be a full-scale effort that affects almost all 
officials of the Chinese regime, regardless of rank.  
This large-scale anticorruption campaign caused dissatisfaction in local officials. 
According to Zhu et al. (2017), in several interviews, officials explicitly expressed their 
“unhappiness towards the campaign because some of their basic welfare… were prohibited”. 
The Party’s official newspaper, the People’s Daily, also posted an article indicating that some 
local officials were slack in their work to resist and put pressure on the anticorruption campaign, 
partly because their welfare was damaged.23 This situation precisely reflects the challenge of 
conflicting demands. While anticorruption satisfies the demands of the public and relieves 
external public pressure, the welfare of bureaucrats is reduced and thus makes local officials 
resistant and disloyal. This effect creates strong internal pressure for the Chinese regime. A 
widespread statement precisely describes the dilemma of the regime: “You will lose the party 
if you curb corruption while you will lose the regime if you do not.” Apparently, the Chinese 
regime is challenged with balancing the strong public demand for anticorruption and the 
increasing level of dissatisfaction among bureaucrats.  
 
actions. 
22 http://china.huanqiu.com/article/2017-10/11312177.html?agt=15422  
23 http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0914/c70731-25656069.html 
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4.5 Data and Empirical Strategies 
This chapter evaluates the effect of anticorruption on the distribution of benefits across 
China. To measure the level of anticorruption, this research utilizes a dataset of corruption 
investigations collected by Y. Wang and Dickson (2018) based on an online database provided 
by Tencent.com. This dataset contains detailed information for each investigation from 2011 
to 2016 based on publicly available information from the Central Disciplinary Inspection 
Commission and various levels of the court and prosecution systems. To measure the 
distribution of benefits, this chapter used fiscal data from government budgets, a common 
approach used by the conventional literature for distributional studies. I create a panel of data 
that include the number of corruption-investigations for each province in each year and match 
this with the government budget of each province in each year obtained from the National 
Statistical Bureau and the Annual Statistical Book of the Ministry of Finance.  
4.5.1 China’s Budgetary System 
Budgetary data are widely used in studies of distributive strategies in both democracies 
and authoritarian regimes. This chapter focuses on provincial budgetary data to measure the 
distribution of the benefits to the public and officials. 
China adopted the “Tax Sharing System” in 1994, which had a specific design of a central 
tax and local tax. Adoption of this system was an effort to “recentralize fiscal revenues, as well 
as improve regional revenue mobilization and equalization” (Lü & Landry, 2014). Under this 
system, the central government of China greatly strengthened its tax collection ability, while 
the local government incurred serious fiscal imbalance problems (Bernstein & Lu, 2003).  
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The budgetary system in China is separated into different levels of government. According 
to the information published on the website of the Ministry of Finance, the different levels of 
government in China form their own budgets.24 Local governments, including those at the 
levels of province, municipal, county and township, set their own budgets and decide the 
amount spent on each item in their jurisdictions.  
To address the financial burden of local officials deriving the tax sharing system, the 
central government in China returns a large amount of money to the local governments in the 
form of a central fiscal transfer. Data from the Ministry of Finance in 2012 indicated that 
approximately 43% of local budgetary expenditure was provided by the central fiscal transfer. 
This chapter uses the budgetary data of each province in China to explore the 
distributional strategies for two reasons. First, many spending items, such as healthcare or 
education, are planned and discretionarily decided at the provincial level. The unit for 
calculating and distributing the central fiscal transfers is also provincial. Second, the budgets 
of provinces follow the same accounting principles set by the National Statistical Bureau so 
that similar items of spending across different provinces are comparable. By contrast, 
municipal budgets in different provinces may be incomparable since they follow different 
accounting principles.  
The provincial budgetary data published by the National Statistical Bureau contains 22 
different spending categories, including public safety, education, transportation, etc. In the 
appendix, I list all 22 categories and their definitions. This chapter will select some of those 
 
24 See: http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhuantihuigu/czjbqk2011/cztz2011/201208/t20120831_679747.html 
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categories to measure the distributions of benefits.    
4.5.2 Measurement of Benefits to the Public 
I use budgetary data on public spending to measure public goods and benefits for two 
reasons. First, compared to the actual numbers of public goods (e.g., length of roads or number 
of schools), public spending encompasses a broader range of public goods that cannot be 
directly quantified. The spending on such items, however, can reflect the level of provision. 
Second, the actual level of public goods provision is also dependent on the efficiency of the 
bureaucratic systems. Spending on public issues, however, is a direct reflection of how much 
the government invests in public benefits. In the current literature, using public spending to 
measure the provision of public goods and benefits is common25.  
I identify seven categories of social spending: expenditures on education, healthcare, 
community construction, public house programs, public service, social security and 
unemployment, and environment protection. These seven categories are selected based on the 
definitions provided by the National Statistical Bureau. Categories with definitions too 
ambiguous to determine whether they are related to public welfare only or a mixture of both 
public and private benefits are excluded to ensure that all measurements are clear enough to 
cover only public spending. Because of the large variations across different provinces in terms 
of funding and the fast growth of the economy, I use the per capita figure of each spending to 
reflect the true level of expenditure in each category.  
 
25 For some examples, see: Gandhi (2008); Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002); L. L. Tsai (2007); S. Wang 
and Yao (2007). 
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4.5.3 Measurement of the Particularistic Benefits to Bureaucrats  
The major measurement of benefits distributed to local officials is the fiscal assistance 
provided by the central government to the provincial government in this chapter. I choose this 
measurement for two reasons. First, the central fiscal assistance provided to each province 
comes from taxes and other central income collected nationwide, which is widely regarded in 
the literature as a reward to the specific region that receives the fund.26 Even though the money 
may also be used to finance local public goods and services, the core idea of central fiscal 
assistance still fits with many other types of rewards to bureaucrats and local elites identified 
in the literature, from the classic pork-barrel behavior (Ames, 1995; Evans, 2011; Lancaster & 
Patterson, 1990) to clientelism in elections (Susan C. Stokes et al., 2013). Second, since local 
governments usually face a significant financial burden (Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 2005; Enru 
Wang, 2010), the central assistance is a significant reward to local officials. Fiscally, this helps 
the local government to finance the budget, reduces the burden of revenue collection, and saves 
local revenues over which local officials have strong control to divert to other purposes 
(Stromseth et al., 2017). According to the definition of the Ministry of Finance, a significant 
portion of the central fiscal transfer is “general fiscal transfer,” which does not specify the 
purpose and allows the local government to use such money discretionarily.27 Central money, 
therefore, gives provincial officials a large amount of flexibility and help in financing local 
budgets. Politically, local officials will find it easier to implement policies and avoid potential 
 
26 For instance, a similar example can be seen in Kriner and Reeves (2015) concerning how U.S. federal funds are used 
to target specific states by the president. 
27 For example, see “Notification on the General Fiscal Transfer in 2002, Ministry of Finance, Finance and Budget 
Document No. [2002]616” (财政部关于下达 2002年一般性转移支付数额的通知，财预[2002]616号). 
 98 
social problems if the central government provides more help to finance local expenditures, 
which will translate into political advantages in terms of performance evaluations and career 
advancement. For example, a portion of the central fiscal transfer is used to help local officials 
finance the retirement pensions of workers and deficits in rural village budgets. Since these 
two issues are among the most common reasons for social instability, fiscal assistance from the 
central government seems to also be a political reward that can help local officials to avoid 
potential social protests. Some studies, such as Jiang and Zhang (2015), have utilized the fiscal 
transfer received by the local government as a measurement of the patronage benefits 
distribution. Similarly, I will use the fiscal assistance from the central government as the 
measurement of benefits distributed to local officials.  
Specifically, I use two measurements related to fiscal assistance from the central 
government. One measurement is the net central fiscal transfer, which is equal to the money 
received from the central government minus the money submitted to the central government. 
The total amount of the net central transfer of each province in each year included in this 
analysis is used. The second measurement is the percentage of central assistance in local 
expenditure. Compared to the absolute value of the central transfer, the percentage reflects the 
relative level of assistance provided by the central government to local officials, controlling 
the needs of expenditure by local officials. As previous studies in China’s budgetary system 
indicate, the higher the percentage of central funds in financing local budgets, the stronger the 
support from the central government. To address the heteroskedasticity problem, the figures in 
the analysis are used in the natural log format.   
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Another possible measurement is “other expenditure.” Although the government does not 
explain what qualifies as “other expenditure,” there are some hints indicating that officials 
usually put expenditures they do not want the public to know about under “other expenditure” 
so that they do not need to share those details. Many of these “secret expenditure” items include 
welfare, luxury eating and drinking, tourist-like “official visit” and expenditures “not suitable 
for the public.” In addition, since there is no category on the budget sheet representing the 
salaries and other benefits of bureaucratic systems, it is highly possible that those expenditures, 
which are directly related to the private benefits of local officials, are categorized as “other 
expenditure.”28 This is not a perfect measurement of the complete private benefits obtained by 
local officials, but given that measuring the direct private benefits of bureaucrats in 
authoritarian systems is nearly impossible in China, this may still indicate the level of private 
spoils. Since this is also a government spending, I use the per capita amount for analysis. 
4.5.4 Investigation of Corruption 
The dataset is from an investigation from 2011 to 2016. Since Tencent stopped 
collecting new cases in the middle of 2016, the data for 2016 are incomplete and therefore 
excluded. Although this database is far from complete, it covers cases with a certain level of 
severity since these cases are all published on the websites of enforcement agencies. 
According to Y. Wang and Dickson (2018), this is the most comprehensive publicly available 
dataset of corruption investigations, they performed an independent internet search to verify 
 
28 For example, see the article published by Xinhua News Agency in 2011 on how local officials use “other 
expenditure” to hide their unsuitable expenses from government auditing: 
http://news.sohu.com/20110411/n280212883.shtml. This article also indicates that salaries of civil services and 
“administrative expenditure” are usually included in the “other expenditure”. 
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all the cases. Therefore, although I acknowledge the potential weakness of this dataset, it is 
still the best one available for measuring the intensity of corruption investigations. A 
summary of the investigation numbers for each province in each year is shown in Table 3.  
Table 3 Investigation Numbers 
Province 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Tibet 0 0 0 26 18 2 47 
Tianjin 0 0 5 35 60 1 104 
Qinghai 0 0 6 45 53 5 124 
Beijing 0 6 16 41 64 5 141 
Ningxia 0 0 8 36 85 4 156 
Shanghai 0 4 25 66 40 2 160 
Chongqing 0 1 17 37 112 11 180 
Jilin 0 2 27 50 82 0 185 
Xinjiang 0 1 13 70 120 11 239 
Liaoning 0 1 43 108 89 2 266 
Neimenggu 0 1 39 84 137 11 303 
Heilongjiang 1 1 38 109 124 1 320 
Hainan 0 0 6 109 226 8 349 
Gansu 0 1 25 148 160 8 360 
Shaanxi 0 1 14 125 237 35 434 
Hebei 0 1 21 203 266 2 546 
Jiangxi 0 4 31 229 302 16 637 
Hunan 0 6 86 233 353 38 716 
Fujian 0 6 41 211 409 5 721 
Guizhou 0 1 17 230 426 75 784 
Shanxi 3 9 79 228 409 2 836 
Yunnan 0 0 24 227 459 81 896 
Anhui 0 10 67 335 400 14 916 
Zhejiang 1 8 148 267 420 6 984 
Guangxi 0 1 47 287 576 76 1,004 
Hubei 1 6 51 299 632 26 1,028 
Shandong 2 5 171 374 408 15 1,148 
Jiangsu 0 12 130 439 570 31 1,259 
Henan 3 11 120 385 527 18 1,270 
Guangdong 2 12 136 482 670 72 1,395 
Sichuan 0 2 77 524 742 53 1,439 
Total 13 113 1528 6042 9176 636 18947 




I use the time-series regression model with both random effects and fixed effects on the 
panel data. The random effect model emphasizes cross-province comparisons, and the fixed 
effect model emphasizes within-province comparisons. Both models include the year fixed 
effect, and the fixed effect model also includes the province fixed effect. The dependent 
variables are social spending, other expenditure, amount of central fiscal transfer and 
percentage of central transfer in local expenditure. The main independent variable is the 
number of corruption investigations in the previous year (one-year lagged). The control 
variables include the geographic area of each province, the population, the GDP and the 
urbanization rate of each province in each year29. In the robustness check, I also add other 
control variables, including the total expenditure, the FDI, the percent of state-owned 
enterprises of the total GDP and the political rank of the provincial party secretary, to address 
























Table 4 Summary Statistics of Main Variables on Budget and Investigation 
  mean sd min max 
Education 1933.18 749.87 1142.28 5162.65 
Healthcare 843.21 314.66 436.66 2113.90 
Community 1318.95 1262.87 253.00 7339.82 
Public House 488.08 352.42 67.80 2216.67 
Public Service 1151.08 904.26 636.60 6889.12 
Social Security 1469.01 781.37 547.71 6298.19 
Environment 363.31 280.40 116.36 1754.01 
Other Expenditure 301.48 501.76 11.51 4021.65 
Net Central Transfer  1671.60 818.21 369.78 4029.6 
Investigation (1-Year Lagged) 108.85 164.66 0 742 
Observations 155 
All spending data are per capita basis in Yuan (CNY); Central Transfer data is in 100 Million 
Yuan; The unit is one province in one year.  
 
4.6 Results 
 Figure 7 and  
Figure 8 present the effects of corruption investigations on the effects of per capita 
social spending in all seven categories under the random effect model and fixed effect model. 
Although a few of them do not pass the conventional significance level, all of them 
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demonstrate a consistently negative effect on per capita spending. The more investigations of 
corruption one province had in the previous year, the less the province would spend on social 
welfare issues in the current year. The decrease per investigation varies from 0.25 RMB to 
2.78 RMB under the random effect model and 0.14 RMB to 2.26 RMB under the fixed effect 
model. Given that there are hundreds of officials investigated each year in the dataset, the 
decrease is substantial. Table 5 demonstrates the average decrease of per capita social 
spending based on the estimated effect, the average number of investigations, and the average 
per capita spending in each category. This finding indicates a decrease from approximately 
3% to 22.5% in various types of per capita social spending.  
Figure 7 Effect of Investigation on Public Spending (Random Effect Model) 
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Figure 8 Effect of Investigation on Public Spending (Fixed Effect Model) 
It is noteworthy, however, that the per capita spending for each public goods category is 
increasing yearly, which is consistent with the trend that the Chinese regime is increasing 
spending on social welfare. Therefore, regarding this finding, it can be interpreted that despite 
the pressure of the regime to increase social welfare, spending on various social issues does 
not increase as expected. Corruption investigations, because of the internal pressure to 
maintain the loyalty of regime allies, actually slow the increase of benefits distributed to the 
public rather than enhancing it.  
Table 5 The Average Negative Effect of Investigation on Social Spending 
  
Random Effect Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient Change Coefficient Change 
Education -0.51 -2.87% -0.69 -3.89% 
Healthcare -0.31 -4.00% -0.32 -4.13% 
Community -2.73 -22.53% -2.26 -18.65% 
Public House -0.25 -5.58% -0.14 -3.12% 
Public Service -0.43 -4.07% -0.63 -5.96% 
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Social Security -1.53 -11.34% -1.49 -11.04% 
Environment -0.48 -14.38% -0.42 -12.58% 
All spending data are per capita basis in Yuan (CNY). The effect of the change is estimated 
based on the average number of investigation cases. 
 
Next, I present the regression results of corruption investigations into central fiscal 
assistance. Figure 9 presents the effect of the number of investigations on the net central 
fiscal transfer, with both the random and fixed effect model controlling for either GDP or 
GDP per capita. The estimation is that one additional investigation can bring approximately 
20 to 80 million more RMB in central transfers, depending on which statistical model is used. 
Figure 10 presents the effect of the number of investigations of the percentage of central 
fiscal assistance of total local budgets. Similarly, this finding indicates that the more 
investigations are conducted, the higher the percentage of central fiscal assistance in local 
expenditure, which means the central government is taking more responsibilities for 
financing the local province’s budget. This finding fits my theory and indicates that when 
there are more investigations, the central government tends to distribute more benefits to 
local officials to reward them. 
Figure 9 Effect of Investigation on New Central Transfer 
 106 
 
Figure 10 Effect of Investigation on the Percentage of Central Fiscal Assistance  
I then present the regression results of the corruption investigations on “other 
expenditure” in Figure 11. In both the random effect model and the fixed effect model, a 
positive association between the number of investigations and per capita other expenditures is 



















Random Effect, GDP Fixed Effect, GDP
Random Effect, GDP per Capita Fixed Effect, GDP per Capita
90% CI;Two models control GDP and two models control GDP per capita
Effect of Investigation Numbers on Central Fiscal Transfer
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level. For example, one additional investigation seems to lead to an increase of approximately 
0.5 RMB in per capita “other expenditure.” It is particularly noteworthy that other 
expenditure per capita is one of the very few categories in provincial budgets that does not 
monotonically increase across the time frame of this analysis. Other expenditure dropped in 
almost all provinces when the anticorruption campaigns started, which indicates that the other 
expenditure category does include some expenditures targeted by the anticorruption 
campaign. Nevertheless, even if I admit that this is weak support for a positive relationship 
between other expenditure and the investigation, the fact that the increase in anticorruption 
investigation cannot reduce the level of the highly suspicious other expenditure at any 
statistically significant level is still surprising. This result may further suggest that the 
government may distribute more particularistic benefits to officials via institutionalized 
channels such as salaries and welfares.   
Last, I test the robustness of the results by dropping potential outliers. One possible 
outlier is the year 2011. The investigation data from Y. Wang and Dickson (2018) contain the 
year 2011, the year before the anticorruption campaign began, and it is possible that the 
media report, on which the dataset is based, was still restricted in reporting corruption cases 
in 2011. If this is the case, the number of investigations in 2011 would not be comparable 
with other years. Another possible outlier is Tibet. Since Tibet has a much lower population 
compared to other provincial regions, the per capita spending figure in Tibet is usually higher 
than in other provinces. The tables in the appendix present the regression results of the 
number of investigations on social spending by dropping the data from 2011 and dropping the 
 108 
data from Tibet, respectively. The results remain similar and are reported in the appendix. 
Figure 11 Effect of Investigations on “Other Expenditure” 
 
In general, this chapter reveals that the increasing intensity of anticorruption makes the 
provincial government in China spend less on public welfare, more on other expenditures 
suspiciously related to the personal perks of officials and receive more fiscal help from the 
central government. This finding demonstrates that the authoritarian regime in China is 
creating a strategic balance between the public and bureaucrats: the regime performs more 
anticorruption investigations in response to public demands while reducing public benefits to 
particularly reward bureaucrats. Consequently, the loyalty of both sides remains intact.  
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4.7 Extended Analysis 
4.7.1 Difference-in-Difference Test 
To further test the causal mechanism, I adopt a difference-in-difference (DiD) test to 
evaluate the effect of anticorruption on the distribution of resources. Rather than using the 
numbers of investigations, I use investigations of senior officials as the “treatment” in the DiD 
design. I define senior officials as one of the three categories: 1) ministerial level and above; 
or 2) vice-ministerial level with positions in a provincial government and/or a provincial party 
standing committee; or 3) alternative member of the CCP Central Committee and above. The 
idea is that investigations of high-level officials are a unique feature of the current 
anticorruption campaign in China that is different from previous ones. In the past, officials with 
a rank of ministerial level or above were rarely investigated. Officials ranked at vice-ministerial 
levels were also rarely investigated, and most of those being investigated were in less powerful 
institutions, such as local people’s congresses. Therefore, investigating senior officials who 
used to be almost immune from anticorruption should be a very strong signal to local officials 
that the current anticorruption campaign is different and threatens their privileges and spoils.  
To set up the DiD analysis, I use the year of 2012 as the starting point of the treatment 
period. All provinces with at least one senior official being investigated between 2012 and 
2016 are included in the “treatment group,” while other provinces are placed in the control 
group. I then include the budgetary data from 2008 to 2016, four years before and after the 
starting year. GDP, geographic area, population and urbanization rate are still included as 
covariates.  
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The results of the DiD analysis largely coincide with the main results and are shown in 
Figure 12  
 
Figure 13. Compared to provinces without any senior officials being investigated, 
provinces with such investigations spend less on public welfare and public issues and receive 
more net central transfers to finance local budgets. Specifically, provinces with senior 
officials being arrested would spend approximately 200 to 600 RMB less in various per 
capita public spending items and receive approximately 20 billion RMB more in central fiscal 
transfers compared with provinces without senior official investigations. This finding reflects 
that in provinces with severe threats to bureaucratic benefits, the Chinese regime usually 
needs to offer more rewards to local officials by reducing public spending in that province. 
Figure 12 Effect of Senior Official Arrest on public spending (DiD Test) 
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Figure 13 Effect of Senior Official Arrest on Bureaucratic Rewards (DiD Test) 
 
It is noteworthy that the treatment effect of senior arrests on other expenditure is not 
significant. One possible reason for this result is that even for provinces with no senior officials 
being arrested, the expenditure on bureaucratic welfare still needs to be increased because low-
level officials may still need to be appeased. It is possible that senior officials obtain most of 
their benefits from sources other than government budgeting; thus, whether senior officials are 
arrested would not greatly affect other expenditure because the compensation for senior 
officials will not be included in other expenditure. However, further data are needed to explore 
the mechanism of anticorruption activities and the effect on other expenditure.  
4.7.2 Alternative Explanations 
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explanations and concerns. 
The first possible alternative explanation is that an investigation conducted in one 
province would affect other actors in determining social spending. For example, state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) and foreign investors are regarded as two important players other than the 
government in social spending (Hong, 2018). It is possible that corruption investigations would 
cause foreign investors to worry about political instabilities and thus reduce their willingness 
to invest. Since foreign investors usually have strong demands for better social services for 
labor efficiency, a reduction in foreign investment may reduce the pressure for providing social 
spending. Similarly, SOEs usually contribute to local social programs. Since many leaders in 
SOEs are also targeted in the anticorruption campaign, SOEs may also be affected in terms of 
local social spending provisions. To address this alternative explanation, I add the FDI figure 
and the percent of SOEs in provincial GDP as control variables. The results presented in the 
appendix indicate that neither the FDI or SOE scales can alter the results between the 
investigation numbers of social spending. The major conclusion still holds. 
The second possible explanation is the political career of local cadres. Studies have shown 
that the provision of resources is shaped by the patronage relationships between leaders and 
their followers (Jiang & Zhang, 2015). For example, it is possible for a province with a 
powerful provincial party secretary to obtain more resources so that more can be spent on social 
issues. It is also possible that a powerful party secretary would be able to protect his or her 
followers in his or her province to have fewer corruption investigations. If so, then the negative 
relationships observed between the investigation and social spending may only reflect the 
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political nature of provincial leaders. To address this potential explanation, I include the rank 
of provincial secretary for each province in each year and whether the provincial secretary was 
promoted in the 2018 Party Congress as control variables to measure the powerfulness of 
provincial leaders. The results indicate that neither the political rank of provincial party 
secretary nor the promotion status of party secretaries in the 2018 Party Congress changed the 
negative associations between investigations and per capita social spending. 
The last possible explanation is the chilling effect of the corruption investigation. As 
studies have shown, local officials may be fearful of the anticorruption campaign (Anechiarico 
& Jacobs, 1998; Flinders, 2011; Erik Wang, 2019). Thus, they may become extremely cautious 
in their daily work and reduce the public goods and services that the government can provide. 
Although this problem may be partially addressed by including GDP as a control variable 
because the ineffectiveness of bureaucracy would inevitably affect GDP, I offer discussions 
here to address this alternative explanation further. Theoretically, measuring the output of 
social welfare by social spending should avoid this problem much better than measuring it by 
an actual number of public goods provisions, because the budget of social spending for one 
year is usually determined before bureaucrats perform their work in that year. The budget is 
usually determined by a government plan at the beginning of the fiscal year rather than how 
bureaucrats carry them out. Therefore, it is unlikely that the budget is affected by the 
ineffectiveness of bureaucrats due to the fear of anticorruption. Since the per capita figure of 
social spending is still increasing the strong demand from the central government on local 
government is improving the social welfare and public goods provision and indicates that local 
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officials may still need to increase their expenditure and services to provide social benefits to 
the public. Empirically, I conduct two additional analyses to address this problem. First, I 
replace GDP with total expenditure in the control variable to control for the potential fear effect 
in the overall expenditure level. The result shown in Appendix indicates that this replacement 
does not alter the negative relationship between the investigation and per capita social spending. 
Second, I run the same regression between the number of investigations and total expenditure 
to determine whether provinces are spending less because of the corruption investigations, 
controlling for their sizes, GDP and population. The results presented in appendix indicate that 
the number of investigations has no significant effect on expenditure. Again, this result 
indicates that the decrease in social spending may not be the consequence of the fear effect on 
overall government spending. Last, it is noteworthy that other expenditure, which should be 
the most sensitive category to the fear effect of anticorruption, is not negatively affected by the 
number of anticorruption investigations. This finding may indicate that the fear effect may not 
have the same direct impact on budgeting that it has on bureaucratic behavior and performance. 
However, I do not argue that the fear effect does not exist. It is very likely that 
anticorruption has a chilling effect on local officials so that they would not perform at their 
usual efficiency. What I am arguing here is that the chilling effect may not affect how much 
money government plans to spend, but only affect how efficient the bureaucrats perform with 
the given amount of money, i.e., how many public goods provided with the given budgets. 
Moreover, the concerns and worries among local officials may actually be one of the reasons 
why Chinese regimes need to allow the removal of social spending from the budget to 
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compensate bureaucrats because the regime has the incentive to appease local officials, relieve 
their anxieties and motivate them to have a better working performance to ensure the quality 
of governance. This is exactly the theory of this chapter: the regime has to provide other types 
of benefits to maintain the loyalty and cooperation of local officials when they are deprived of 
the perks from corruption.  
4.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter tries to explain how autocrats maintain the loyalty of regime allies and local 
officials when their demands for benefits collide. This chapter, with evidence from China, 
argues that autocrats can maintain a strategic balance between two sides and compensate for 
the loss of one side by other forms of benefits by removing some benefits from the other side. 
In China’s anticorruption cases in which the public interest of clean governance is hurting the 
private welfare of bureaucrats, the Chinese regime would allow local officials to spend less on 
public issues while providing more money to local government. In addition, this chapter also 
found that the strength of corruption has a positive effect on spending under the “other 
expenditure” category, a highly suspicious category that is related to the provision of benefits 
and welfare to bureaucrats. These result may suggest that the Chinese regime is providing more 
materialistic and political benefits and rewards to local officials to appease their anger, which 
is derived from the anticorruption campaign, with funds saved from reductions in public 
spending and obtained from central fiscal assistance. 
This chapter does not deny the effect of the anticorruption campaign in China. Moreover, 
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scholars have shown that the anticorruption campaign reduces the corruption in land 
transactions and the patronage between the central and the provincial leaders (T. Chen & Kung, 
2018), which should be an effective response to the strong public demand for clean government. 
However, this chapter reminds people to be cautious in claiming the effectiveness of 
anticorruption in improving social welfare. A decrease in some types of private spoils gained 
by bureaucrats, which is what the anticorruption campaign is supposed to do, does not 
necessarily mean an increase in social spending that can improve the overall social welfare and 
public goods provision. The overall effect of anticorruption on improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public goods and services may not be as large as it first appears.  
Regarding the distributional strategies for authoritarian survival, this chapter address a 
crucial trade-off between coopting the public and rewarding the regime allies for autocrats in 
benefits distribution. Current literature agrees that autocrats need to use spoils-sharing to solicit 
supports from both regime allies and the public, while it provides little answers to how 
autocrats can balance the demands of spoils from different side. This chapter shows that the 
survival strategies may compete with each other and the autocrats have to make balance 
between them. It indicates that the abilities for autocrats to distribute benefits for regime 
stability may not be as large and effective as many conventional literature assumes. A 
concession to the public may be effective in reducing the external threats of uprising, but it 
may also make the regime allies disgruntled, and thus leads to an unclear overall effect on 
regime survival.  
Similarly, this chapter also demonstrates that the provision of public goods and services 
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is also subject to autocrats’ need for internal stability within the ruling coalition. It is widely 
discussed by scholars that the provision of public goods is subject to the external pressures 
placed on autocrats, such as elections (Luo et al., 2007), informal institutions (L. L. Tsai, 2007), 
or external threats and needs for external cooperation (Gandhi, 2008). This chapter, however, 
suggests a dynamic process of distributing resources for providing public welfare and private 
spoils. External pressure and subsequent policy concessions may result in an increase in some 
public welfare, but it usually comes with losses in some other areas of public interest. Autocrats 
need to allocate more resources to allies even though the external demand for public goods and 
services are strong because of the pressure from the internal coalition. This finding, therefore, 
suggests a complicated dynamic process of the strategic distribution of resources to balance 
the interests of the public and allies. In short, external pressure may lead to the increasing 
provision of public goods and services, but this usually comes at the expense of other public 
benefits provided those extra public goods are hurting the regime allies’ private interests. Any 
policy that is designed to increase the provision of public goods must consider its consequences 
on the bureaucratic systems, and a careful balance of benefits between the public and 
bureaucrats is necessary.  
To the chapter of Chinese politics, this chapter also reveals the complicated dynamics of 
regime survival, especially during the era of the economic slowdown in China. Most literature 
has argued that the Chinese regime needs to offer more public goods, such as the rule of law 
(Y. Wang, 2015), and be more responsive to the public demands (J. Chen et al., 2016; Su & 
Meng, 2016; Truex, 2016) in order to sustain economic growth and maintain good governance. 
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It is more crucial during the period of economic slowdown because the regime may also need 
to appease the public to maintain its performance legitimacy formula. However, such measures 
would inevitably constrain the ability of the Chinese regime in distributing benefits to regime 
allies, and the slow economic growth further restricts the total resources available for 
distribution. It posts a fundamental dilemma for regime survival and stability in China. 
Moreover, if we follow the current literature and assume that the Chinese regime has to 
continue being responsive to the public demands and offering more public goods and welfare, 
it will become a fundamental challenge for CCP to find a new way to solicit the loyalty and 
solidarity of the regime allies and the ruling coalition. It might not be a very severe challenge 
in the past because the economy had grown so rapidly that everyone’s share of the pie is 
increasing. However, the pie cannot increase indefinitely, and the new way to satisfy the regime 
allies while not depriving the public too much will become a crucial challenge to China sooner 
or later. After all, such trade-off is a fundamental challenge that China, and perhaps all 
authoritarian regimes that rely on performance legitimacy and cooptation to solicit public 





5 New Incentives: How Does CCP Keep 
Membership Valuable? 
5.1 Introduction 
How can the Chinese regime recruit new members from the elites to the ruling coalition 
under the new socioeconomic era when many old privileges are no longer exclusive or 
attractive? This chapter addresses this question by reviewing the development and evolution 
of China’s strategies for offering exclusive benefits to regime allies and discuss how some 
new types of incentives are created in the new era.  
Regime allies need to be satisfied with various kinds of benefits; this is to provide them 
enough incentives to remain in the ruling coalition. In Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), 
the very bold logic of materialistic calculation is presented to explain the choice of regime 
allies: they choose not to defect from the incumbent regime because what they can gain from 
incumbent regime is larger than what they may get from the potential challengers. It implies a 
very direct requirement for any autocrat to maintain the loyalty of regime allies. Authoritarian 
regimes must keep an advantage of benefits offering against their major challengers; 
otherwise, their allies would shift the challengers’ coalition and try to crack down on the 
incumbent regime. This is actually not confined to only authoritarian politics. Studies have 
consistently revealed the strong need for particularism for politicians to disproportionally 
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provide benefits to small groups of recipients to maintain their power base in U.S. electoral 
politics.30 Therefore, it seems safe to say that distributions of benefits are the core for 
political alliance and coalitions across different political systems.  
China is no exception from this, as the privilege has existed in a long time in CCP’s 
history. However, as the theory of this dissertation and the previous two chapters suggested, 
there is an increasingly significant challenge to maintain the advantage of benefits offered to 
China’s regime allies. The expansion of universalistic welfare, both as the results of China’s 
rapid economic development and the responses to the increasing demands from the public, 
not only takes away the resources for particularistic spoils reserved for regime allies but also 
makes many of those spoils non-exclusive and valueless. The increasing public awareness of 
such privileges, partly thanks to the development of new technologies that expose many of 
those cases to the public eye, also leads to more and more severe public infuriation towards 
those particularistic benefits, which creates even more pressures for the Chinese regime to 
offer them. As a consequence, it seems reasonable to question the value of being regime allies 
if it is indifferent from being outsiders regarding benefits received. Why should elites choose 
to join the CCP, and broadly, the Chinese regime’s ruling coalition? 
In this chapter, I argue that the strategies for CCP to offer the particularistic incentives 
for attracting elites evolve and adaptive to the changes in socioeconomic conditions. The 
Chinese regime has adopted new strategies for maintaining its attractiveness: 1) enhancing 
the institutionalized material benefits to increase the credibility and certainty of particularistic 
 
30 For example, see an summary by M. Golden and Min (2013); also see Kriner and Reeves (2015) 
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distribution; 2) to create new incentives by reviving and expanding the non-materialistic 
rewards; 3) to reduce the costs associated with the membership. All these measures can 
increase the value of particularistic benefits reserved for the regime allies while minimizing 
the additional resources invested.  
This chapter is organized as the following. The second section outlines the research 
strategy I adopt to explore this question. The third section demonstrates the evolution of 
particularistic benefits for regime allies alongside the history of CCP and the Chinese regime. 
The fourth section provides the theoretical framework to understand the new incentives for 
the Chinese regime to recruit regime allies and then support the argument by empirical 
evidence. The last section provides discussions and conclusions that address some alternative 
framework and some potential implications in the future development of the Chinese regime. 
5.2 Research Strategy 
5.2.1 Whom Does the Chinese Regime Recruit? 
As discussed in the previous chapter, regime allies consist of various kinds of elites 
across different occupations, political affiliations and backgrounds. Although the strategies 
for recruiting them into the ruling coalition may share some common cores, they are certainly 
different in many perspectives. For example, one important mechanism for recruiting social 
elites into the ruling coalition is through the United Front, while party institutions, such as the 
organization department, play a critical role in recruiting and managing new political elites.  
This chapter will focus on the membership of the Chinese Communist Party. As the 
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ruling party of the Chinese regime, the CCP certainly has strong needs to keep recruiting the 
most promising political and social elites. The party membership structure and institutions, as 
Svolik (2012) argues, provide a very effective mechanism to keep the incentives for key 
regime allies and followers. Absorbing new members into the party, therefore, is critical to 
keep the loyalty of those elites. The CCP also cannot maintain its survival and functioning 
without the continuous recruitment of new members. All these, as discussed in the theory of 
this dissertation, require the adequate provision of benefits. 
As a party with almost 90 million members, however, it is certainly unreasonable to 
expect a one-size-fit-all strategy for providing benefits to attract members. CCP members 
have a quite diverse background and, thus, may be applicable for different kinds of strategies. 
Therefore, this study argues that at any given time, there will be a set of strategies for keeping 
the loyalty of party members.  
One point to note is that, for the sake of analysis, this chapter treats the memberships of 
the eight Democratic Parties as an extension of CCP membership for some analysis. There 
are three main reasons to believe this. First, although technically being different parties, those 
eight democratic parties in China fully support the ideology, agenda and policies of CCP, and 
therefore, are widely regarded as a part of the establishment in China (C. Zhang, 2018). 
Second, the party activities, including the recruitment of new members, of these democratic 
parties are under the guidance and supervision of the United Front Department of CCP.31 
Third, these eight democratic parties are regarded as important partners of the CCP and a part 
 
31 For example, see: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64171/65717/65718/4455937.html  
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of the ruling regime. Their members usually have reserved seats in the People’s Congresses, 
the Political Consultative Conferences, and the government. In fact, many of the members of 
the democratic parties are also CCP members.32 Therefore, it seems appropriate to view them 
as key parts of regime allies in some contexts. 
5.2.2 Empirical Strategy 
This chapter deals with the new incentive hypothesis proposed in Chapter 2 and 
demonstrates how CCP creates new values for the benefits distributed to the regime allies in 
the new era. There are two major questions that this chapter aims to explore. First, how do the 
benefits offered to the CCP members evolve and what are the challenges in the new era? 
Second, how does the CCP maintain the attractiveness of the benefits to recruit new members 
and maintain the loyalty of existing members?  
This chapter relies primarily on qualitative materials to explore the research questions 
proposed. The main sources of materials will be historical documents, official documents, 
Chinese scholarly articles regarding the welfare of party officials, interviews, and fieldwork. 
The documents involved in this study are collected from the University Service Center for 
China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The interviews are conducted 
between August to December 2019 in Xi’an, Beijing, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong.  
The interviewees are recruited via personal connection, but I try to have a diverse pool 
of interviewees consists of both elderly CCP members and young CCP members. The idea is 
 
32 A webpage from the United Front Department of CCP clearly explained under what conditions such “dual-
membership” is allowed: http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/wxwb/201801/08f3592d6b844f40a3e993e0e62174c5.shtml   
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that I can compare the experiences of CCP members in different generations to track the 
developments and changes of the perks provided by their party membership. While the young 
members recently recruited into the party are the most relevant group to study the new 
incentives in the current era, elderly party members, who are usually holding senior positions, 
can also provide insights on the membership recruitment process from another perspective. In 
addition, elderly party members usually have wide connections with other party members so 
that they can share stories and experiences from other party members. However, in order to 
ensure the accuracy of the materials, only the experiences from the direct relatives are 
included.  
5.3 The Evolution and the Challenge of CCP Membership 
Perks 
5.3.1 Membership Benefits in Pre-Reform era 
In the early period, membership perks for CCP members are quite similar to what has 
been found by scholars in many other authoritarian systems. In many cases, party 
membership in an authoritarian regime is usually associated with various kinds of benefits, 
from career advantages to the exclusive access to education and healthcare resources 
(Voslenskiĭ, 1984; Walder, 1995). This is the same case in China before the Reform Era. 
Generally speaking, the perks associated with party membership can be categorized as 
material and non-material benefits. 
Material Benefits 
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Material benefits usually involved various kinds of exclusive access to resources, many 
of which were in scarcity in the pre-reform era of China. Before economic reform in 1978, 
China had a strict planning economy, and many resources were rationed or were in short 
supply. In this situation, the exclusive access to those resources seemed to be a very valuable 
perk for regime allies.  
The scarce resources exclusively offered to CCP members have very broad coverage, 
but they are usually confidential since CCP does not want to reveal the information to the 
public (W.-H. Tsai, 2016). Some of these material benefits, however, were widely provided so 
that they were relatively easier to identify and observe than other benefits. This chapter will 
demonstrate the exclusive access provided to CCP members by those types of privileges that 
are open for the public to examine.  
The special Provision of Food, or so-called Tegong in Chinese, is perhaps one of the 
most well-known privileges that CCP members enjoy.33 In the pre-reform period, when food 
supply was in shortage, the special provision of food was very critical for the survival of the 
members themselves and their families. According to a report submitted by Qi Yanming, the 
vice minister of the Ministry of Culture in 1960, and approved by the CCP Central 
leadership, senior officials in Beijing could get from half to one kilogram of white sugar each 
month.34 White sugar, however, was so scarce in the 1960s that most ordinary people could 
 
33 See W.-H. Tsai (2016) for a comprehensive review of the development of the special provision of food to CCP 
members. 
34 Central Party Literature Office, “The Selection of Important Documents after the Establishment of PRC (Jianguo 
Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian, 《建国以来重要文献选编》)” (in Chinese), Vol. 13, pp. 683-686, First Edition, May 
1996, Beijing: Central Larty Literature Press 
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not even have it; instead, ordinary people used Saccharin, a cheap alternative product with no 
nutritional value and suspicious association with bladder cancer. Similarly, the report also 
indicated a two-to-six-kilogram egg supply per month, which is even higher than the average 
egg consumption of Chinese in 2016.35 Apparently, this kind of food supply was abundant 
for daily consumption for elite CCP members and thus kept them healthy, especially during 
the great famine in China in the early 1960s. 
In addition to food, there were many other examples of exclusive material benefits. For 
example, senior CCP members and officials were entitled to free housing or housing with 
relatively low rent. Even Deng Xiaoping himself criticized the construction of houses for 
Mao Zedong and other party leaders since 1958.36 The elite party members were also entitled 
to specially reserved healthcare facilities, as shown in the opening case of this dissertation.  
It was noted, however, that these benefits were never directly associated with party 
membership. It is understandable because CCP keep claiming itself as a party serving the 
ordinary Chinese people, and having privileges tied with party membership would certainly 
damage their legitimacy as a party serving and representing the interests of normal people in 
China. Instead, the material benefits were tied with certain occupations. For example, W.-H. 
Tsai (2016) identified that cadres with certain administrative ranks and personnel carrying 
important tasks (e.g., athletes or missile scientists) were among the major groups who can 
receive the special provision of food. However, since most of the occupations require CCP 
 
35 In 2016, the average egg consumption of individual Chinese is 17kg per year, or roughly 1.4kg per month, according 
to the China Meat Association (http://www.chinameat.org/index.php?a=detail&id=1455, accessed at January 19, 2020)  
36 “Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol 2 (in Chinese)” (Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, 邓小平文选, 第二卷), p.330, 
People’s Publishing House, 1994  
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membership, the benefits were de facto associated with party membership.  
Furthermore, although most available evidence points to senior members who enjoyed 
the benefits, it was actually not that selective. One interviewee, whose parents were a middle-
level cadre in a local state-owned factory, once described her personal experiences in the 
teenage period to me. Although she did not admit the existence of any exclusive access to 
resources, she described a personal experience of attending a good high school without 
exams and seldom worrying about hunger, both of which are very different from the 
depiction of ordinary Chinese life in the 1970s.37 It reflects that mid-to-low level CCP 
members also enjoyed a certain degree of material benefits, although being less than what 
senior officials enjoyed. This reflection is consistent with the finding that the material 
benefits within CCP are associated with rank in the nomenklatura system (W.-H. Tsai, 2016). 
It also reflects the idea proposed by Svolik (2012) that an authoritarian party should delay the 
significant portion of benefits to the senior stage of membership to keep the incentives for 
staying in the regime coalition.  
Non-Material Benefits 
Unlike material benefits, non-material benefits do not take lots of actual resources in 
many cases and thus can be widely provided. Therefore, unlike materials benefits that were 
selective in distribution, non-material benefits were broadly enjoyed by almost all members 
of CCP.  
Most of the non-materials benefits associated with party membership were non-tangible 
 
37 Interview with a retired cadre from Shenzhen, December 9, 2019 (Interview 191209A) 
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values. One of the most significant benefits associated with party membership was its 
reputation. Because of the heavily ideological propaganda, being a party member was very 
glorious. One interviewee, who worked in a factory during the cultural revolution before 
attending college in 1979, explained: 
“I felt very glorious comparing to my fellow co-workers because I join the party. In fact, 
I feel I may even have advantages in marriage [because of my party membership].”38 
 Another interviewee also provided similar reflection: 
“I believe at that time [the 1970s] we joined the party purely because it was a glorious 
thing. We were not looking for any actual benefits [for being party member].”39      
Career advantage was certainly another big non-material advantage, given most senior 
positions were either in government or state-affiliated organizations. However, it seems a 
little difficult to say whether the party membership created such advantages. In many cases, 
one should be good enough to be approved as a party member, and such good performance 
may also qualify him or her for being promoted. According to the description of interviewees, 
party membership is more like a necessary condition and qualification for career 
advancement, while the political beliefs and work performances were still the determining 
factors for both career advancement and party membership.40 
The non-material benefits were critical for maintaining CCP’s attractiveness to the elites 
because they did not require lots of resources invested. In the pre-reform era, when China had 
 
38 Ibid 
39 Interview with a retired cadre from Shenzhen, December 9, 2019 (Interview 191209B) 
40 Interview 191209A and 191209B 
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a severe problem of resource shortages, it would be impossible to provide abundant material 
benefits to all political and social elites the regime hopes to recruit into the ruling coalition. 
The non-material benefits, therefore, serve as an effective alternative to keep the loyalty of 
regime allies.  
Membership: A positional Good 
Based on the analysis above, I argue that CCP membership can be regarded as a 
positional good, whose value is only determined by how it is distributed among the 
population. Originally as a concept proposed by Hirsch (2005), positional good rests on a 
core idea of scarcity. Its value would be lower to the owners when there are more 
consumptions of it from other people (Vatiero, 2011). The non-material benefits clearly fit 
into this definition because those values are associated with a status symbol that is only 
prestigious when not many other people have it.41 However, even the material benefits fit the 
definition of positional goods. Although the material resources, such as eggs, sugars and 
houses, have absolute value themselves, the reason they are so valuable to party members is 
that other people cannot get them. If everyone can get eggs, it makes no additional values to 
eggs received as CCP members, even though eggs still provide nutritional value Therefore, 
scarcity is at the core of party benefits – either because the total supply of resources is limited 
or because the resources, although not in short supply, are exclusively distributed to some 
people but not others.  
 
41 This is in no difference with luxury goods or prestige club membership which can charge very high price simply 
because the ownership of those demonstrate elite social status.  
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As a consequence, I would argue that the key to maintaining the attractiveness of 
membership is to maintain scarcity so that membership keeps being a positional good. The 
next section will explain the challenge of membership values in the reform era based on this 
argument.  
5.3.2 Evolution and Challenges in Reform Era  
The economic reform since 1978 has brought significant socioeconomic changes to 
Chinese society. In terms of particularistic benefits associated with party membership, 
China’s rapid economic development has undermined the values of CCP membership in three 
major perspectives. 
First, the economic growth of China led to a dramatic increase in all sorts of resources, 
which broke the scarcity that the value of CCP membership relies on. The abundant supplies 
of daily necessities make many of the exclusive access to resources no longer meaningful. 
For example, China officially canceled its rationing system for food in the early 1990s when 
the food supply was not in shortage. As a result, having exclusive access to some foods was 
no longer meaningful as a benefit. A similar situation happens to many types of benefits from 
housing to healthcare. Although the privileges are still there to some extent, they are far less 
significant than they used to be in the pre-reform era.  
More importantly, market reform and the commercialization of many products 
fundamentally change the mechanism of distribution. Ordinary people can also have full 
access to many products in a market economy if they have money. For example, good 
education and decent housing are not reserved for a small group of political elites; they are 
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widely commercialized so that any people with an adequate amount of money can get them. 
Such market reforms significantly alter the foundation of CCP membership as a positional 
good: since more and more people have access to those benefits, the values of CCP 
membership and the benefits tied with membership status inevitably decrease.42 
Second, the non-material values associated with the CCP membership also declined. 
Since communist ideology is no longer dominant in Chinese society, being a party member 
became less valuable than it used to be. As one interviewee described, 
“I feel the new party members nowadays are not as pure as we were in the past. We 
believed in communism and felt glorious for being party members, but new members 
nowadays seem not.”43      
Apparently, the emphasis on economic development shifted how society views glory. 
The famous slogan of “being rich is glorious” clearly marked such shifts and indicated that 
there might be many other ways to gain reputations than joining the party. For example, one 
would understandably expect a rich person to be at a more advantageous position in the 
marriage market compared to a party member with an ordinary amount of wealth, which is 
totally different from the situation described by one interviewee previously. In addition, party 
membership seems to be less selective than it used to be. One interviewee expressed his 
dissatisfaction towards this: 
“I think we recruit new members too easily. I understand that grassroots party units 
 
42 This is independent from the effect of increasing supply. Even if the supply of a given product is not in significant 
shortage, it still adds values to the CCP membership if such product is exclusively accessible to only party member. 
However, since most products are open for the public in market economy, such prestige no longer exists.  
43 Interview 191209A 
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have to fulfill their tasks of party development by recruiting a certain number of new 
members, but I disagree with their unscrutinized approach.”44 
Apparently, this may further defame party membership in general society, especially 
when membership is not selective and not regarded as an honor. One interviewee described 
what she observed for the young colleagues in her workplace before she retired: 
“Many of them do not bother to join the party because they do not feel it brings anything 
valuable. I think they feel it (party membership) causes more burdens because they have to 
attend lots of party activities if they were party members.”45 
Even the career advantages of being a party member are undermined. The market reform 
and privatization created a large non-state sector that does not care much about party 
membership. Unlike the situation in the pre-reform era when almost all career options were 
state or state-affiliated, young people in the reform era have lots of non-state career options 
and do not need to become a party member to gain career advancement. In fact, there has 
been a long time that no party unit exists in those new sectors, such as private firms and 
foreign firms. As my interviewee admits: 
“They (young people) only gain advantages in career development if they want to be 
officials; otherwise, party membership does not help them at all.”46  
The diverse socioeconomic situation and career options, again, changed the situation of 
scarcity and the distribution of those non-material benefits. Since more and more people can 
 
44 Interview 191209B 
45 Interview 191209A 
46 Ibid 
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get similar non-material benefits via a different path, the value of party membership, as the 
positional goods, is diminishing because what it can offer is no longer exclusive. For many 
people, especially young people with good education, wealth, and social status, who should 
have been the key target of party recruitment, joining in CCP does not make a big difference 
in further escalating their social status, networks, reputations, and career perspective. It 
certainly reduces the incentives of being a part of the party. 
At last, economic development inevitably led to the social and political change that 
requires more modernized governance. Such changes have two significant consequences on 
the distributions of spoils to regime allies. First, it requires huge investments in public 
welfare to satisfy public demands in exchange for their cooperation. For example, the 
national educational expenses in 2017 were more than 3.4 trillion, almost 14 times more than 
that in 1998. The number of beds in general hospitals in 2017 was more than triple of that in 
1998.47 All these improvements have dramatically increased the living quality of the general 
public, but it inevitably takes lots of resources away from regime allies. For example, Figure 
14 demonstrates the changes in percentages of military, healthcare and community service 
spending on total annual budgets from 2007 to 2018. Here I follow the approach of Gandhi 
(2008) to use military spending as a proxy to the spoils distributed to the regime allies. The 
other two items are spending on public welfare. We can see a clear trend in the last decade. 
The spending on particularistic spoils is declining percentage-wise, while the spending for 
universalistic public welfare is increasing. Apparently, the increasing need for universalistic 
 
47 Date source: National Statistical Bureau (For the education and hospital numbers) 
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welfare is inevitably eroding the abilities to distribute to the regime allies. 
Second, the public is increasingly sensitive about the privileges that CCP members and 
other political elites enjoy. It usually becomes a huge public relation crisis when some of 
such privilege is exposed to the public. The Chinese government has repeatedly denied the 
existence of many privileges despite evidence that shows otherwise.48 The increasing level 
of public participation and the requirement for information disclosure also make it easier for 
the public to monitor privileges. Some political campaigns, such as the anti-corruption 
campaign discussed in chapter 4, also reduces the likelihood for regime allies to obtain lots of 
spoils. All these measures to accommodate public demands further constrain the benefits 
provided to the CCP members and other political elites.  
Figure 14 Percentage Change of Military, Healthcare and Community Spending 
Therefore, there is a clear challenge for the CCP to maintain its attractiveness to elites 
by offering benefits associated with its membership. As Nee (1989) argues, the reform after 
1978 has made the privileged class no longer better than ordinary citizens. However, as many 
 
48 For some example of denial, see: http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2011/07-04/3154301.shtml (Access on January 20, 
2020) 
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other scholars point out, the needs for survival requires the regime to keep the superior status 
for political elites even in the reform era (Bian & Logan, 1996). The example of the special 
provision of food in contemporary China revealed by W.-H. Tsai (2016) is just one example 
of how CCP tries to maintain the privileges, but it certainly meets more and more 
challenges.49 
5.4 New Incentives for the Membership: A Theoretical 
Perspective 
The challenges CCP faces are significant regarding maintaining the value of its 
incentives for elites, so how would CCP react? This section will provide some theoretical 
discussions on how to address those challenges. The key to all strategies is that the party has 
to address the problem with a minimum level of additional resources invested under the 
resource constraints.  
5.4.1 Enhanced and Institutionalized Material Benefits  
One of the most obvious ways to create new incentives for membership is to increase 
material benefits. Generous monetary rewards and welfare are usually very attractive to 
elites. Many other authoritarian regimes adopt similar strategies to maintain the incentives of 
their regime allies. For example, the Singaporean government has provided a generous 
package of rewards and welfare for political elites who wants to join the ruling party and the 
 
49 For example, the value of the special provision of foods, according to W.-H. Tsai (2016), is heavily dependent on the 
fact that China has food safety problem. Such problem creates a new scarcity – the scarcity of safe food (instead of food in 
general) – to keep the value of membership as a positional good. However, such scarcity cannot persist forever; the huge 
public pressure would force Chinese government to improve the food safety. When most ordinary people can consume foods 
as safe and high-quality as those in the special provision systems, the value of such privilege is inevitably diminished.  
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government. Ministerial positions in Singapore have an annual salary of at least 700,000 
USD dollars, almost 1.5 times the annual salary of the U.S. president. The First Prime 
Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, openly claimed that they should offer salaries as 
similar to what top executives in multinational firms earn to attract the best elites to the 
government and ruling party.50 This is certainly a very effective and direct solution. 
However, as repeatedly discussed above, the resource constraints and the bad public 
reaction, from time to time, prevent an authoritarian regime from offering a very high level of 
rewards to its regime allies. One solution to this, I argue, is to increase the credibility of such 
rewards by institutionalizing them. Note that when uncertainty is brought into the calculation 
of benefits received, what is actually used is the mathematical expectation of benefits, not the 
absolute value of those benefits.51 Increasing the credibility would, therefore, increase the 
expected value of benefits even if the absolute amount of benefits are increased in a limited 
manner.  
As the existing literature suggests, institutionalization is one crucial way of ensuring 
credibility, because the informally-distributed spoils can be taken away discretionarily 
(Magaloni, 2008). Institutionalized benefits can also protect regime allies from public 
pressure. Take the anti-corruption cases in chapter 4 as an example. If most CCP members are 
underpaid but allowed a certain level of corruption as a part of their spoils (Shirk, 1993), it 
 
50 See a news article on Lee’s Speech in Singaporean Parliament, published in November 1, 1994 by the Straits Times: 
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/in-his-own-words-higher-pay-will-attract-most-talented-team-so-country-can-
prosper (Access on January 20, 2020) 
51 For example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) explicitly calculate the total benefits received by individual 
Selectorate based on the level of uncertainty and the absolute amount of benefits offered by the dictator, i.e. the expected 
value of benefits. 
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creates an unstable situation because those benefits can be taken away by the anti-corruption 
campaign as a response to strong public pressures. The elites themselves may be put in jail 
because of corruption. The institutionalized benefits, however, will be legal and thus much 
safer and more difficult to be taken away. As a result, the total expected value of benefits 
received by the party members is increased even though the absolute resources invested are 
not.  
5.4.2 The Expansions of Non-Material Benefits 
The non-material benefits are associated more with non-tangible and symbolic values. 
Recall that the main reasons for the devaluation of party membership in China are the 
ideological shifts and the diversified sources of reputations. To respond to these challenges 
specifically, two possible strategies can be adopted. 
First, CCP can adjust its “brand image” to cope with social values. It can try to re-brand 
itself to better reflect social values or what the general public admires. It can also utilize 
propaganda machine to re-educate the general public to re-establish the brand reputation of 
the party. I expect a mix of both strategies in re-establishing the reputable image of the party. 
Second, CCP may try to expand its influence to other sectors which used to care less 
about party membership. By expanding to other sectors, CCP actually reduces the number of 
sources for reputation and social status, and thus recreates the scarcity required to maintain its 
membership values. As discussed in the previous section, the privatization and market reform 
create a lot of new social sectors with less party influence. By the expansion into these 
sectors, CCP can create advantages for its members in these sectors, in both career and 
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reputational perspective. It will certainly create new incentives for social elites in these new 
sectors to join and remain in the party. 
5.4.3 Reduced Cost 
The last strategy CCP can use is to reduce the cost associated with party membership. 
There are two types of costs commonly associated with party members. First, transaction 
costs for party development as an institution. As a party with strong political disciplinary 
regulations and control, CCP has invested lots of resources for building a cohesive and 
institutionally strong internal party system. Many of these tasks require conferences, learning 
activities, group discussions and other types of extra works. As some of my interviewees say, 
the additional workload as a party member is an important reason why young people are 
hesitant to join the party.52  
Second type of cost is associated with advancement within the party. As Svolik (2012) 
explains, authoritarian parties usually delay the benefits to the later stage of membership 
period to create incentives for members to stay in the party. The nomenclature system of CCP 
also indicates that one can get more benefits when one advances to the senior level within the 
party. Therefore, this creates a huge incentive yet keen competition for advancement. Such 
competition usually requires lots of additional resources and energies from party members 
invested in joining, maintaining, and connecting with the patronage network, including but 
not limited to the resources spent for connecting to the upper-level leaders and expanding 
their own patronal network and power base. It may also deter some elites from joining the 
 
52 Interview 191209A 
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party.  
In general, any reduction in these two types of costs may be useful in increasing the net 
value of party membership. I do not try to argue that the cost is the major reason for the 
diminishing of membership value; however, when the Chinese regime has struggled in 
creating additional benefits for party members under resource constraints, reducing the costs 
may also provide additional points for maintaining the attractiveness. I would still expect to 
observe relevant strategies adopted by CCP. 
 
In general, this section provides some theoretical discussion on how CCP may address 
the challenges to maintain the incentives for recruiting and keeping party members in the 
ruling coalition. The next section, therefore, will provide some empirical evidence to explain 
how such strategies are adopted by CCP in contemporary Chinese society, especially in the 
new Xi era.  
5.5 New Incentives for the Membership: An Empirical 
Perspective 
5.5.1 Salary and Welfare Increase 
The CCP members in the government and state-affiliated organizations have been 
underpaid for a long time. As discussed in chapter 4, many of them rely on corruption and 
other types of informal income distributed or tolerated by the regime to gain an adequate 
level of benefits for them to stay in the regime coalition. The anti-corruption campaign, as 
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well as the increasing public demands for transparency and good governance, has made it 
more and more challenging to sustain a satisfactory level of particularistic benefits to those 
regime allies and party members via informal channels. 
In addition to the measures revealed in chapter 4, CCP has adopted a series of policy 
changes to increase the welfare within the legal institutions. For example, the general office 
of the Central Committee of CCP issued an official document to the whole party titled “The 
Opinion on Further Motivate Cadres in New Era” on May 20, 2018.53 In the document, there 
is a clear and specific requirement on “enhancing the cadre’s incentive system, improving the 
mechanism for salary adjustments and implementing the subsidies and bonus system.” It also 
promises to establish medical examinations, paid holidays for cadres, and legal welfare. A 
commentary made by the People’s Daily on this document argues that the party should help 
in taking care of children and elders in the cadres’ family so that the cadres can fully devote 
to their work.54  
In fact, the increase in salary and welfare started even before the issuance of this 
document. A reported pay-rise for cadres has been implemented since 2014 with a 60%-to-
100% increase in basic salary.55 The reform also starts to provide monetary subsidies instead 
of actual welfare to cadres. For example, instead of providing apartments or cars, cadres are 
giving a housing allowance and transportation subsidies. It again makes the welfare more 
 
53 See: http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-05/20/c_1122859959.htm (关于进一步激励广大干部新时代新担当新作为
的意见, access at January 21, 2020) 
54 “Let the cadre work happily and safely” (Rang Ganbu Gande Kaixin Pinde Anxin,让干部干的开心拼的安心), Fifth 
Page, May 31, 2018, the People’s Daily: http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0531/c1003-30024330.html (Access on 
January 21, 2020) 
55 See: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2015/01/150119_analysis_china_public_servants_payrise (Access 
on January 21, 2020) 
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institutionalized and formal, because the monetary subsidies come with clear guidance and 
regulation, so it is more credible compared to the actual welfare provided by the government 
discretionarily.  
At the same time, the reforms also tighten the regulation of welfare facilities to ensure 
better service to the cadres. For example, a retired cadre in Shenzhen said that the Retired 
Cadre Recreational Center of their work unit, once had a large scale of services open to the 
general public, now has reserved more programs and resources for cadres. She can now enjoy 
very cheap courses on singing, painting and dancing and take recreational activities every 
week at the center.56 Many such welfare facilities used to run a large scale for-profit program 
for the general public to finance themselves, inevitably reducing their resources to invest in 
serving the cadres. The new regulations and reforms gradually stop such practices and make 
those welfare facilities more like a social club only for the club members – the cadres and 
party members with certain administrative ranks. 
Similarly, as the pre-reform era, the material benefits are not directly linked with party 
membership but with the administrative level within the civil service system. However, since 
it is almost necessary for one to have CCP membership or, at least, democratic parties’ 
membership to be promoted to a certain level to be eligible for those benefits, these perks are, 
again, de facto associated with the membership. However, the enhanced and institutionalized 
salary and welfare do provide more credible benefits with the higher expected value to the 
party members. With this, the party aims to make the cadres “do not dare to, unable to, and 
 
56 Interview 191209A 
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unwilling to” corrupt.57 Although the official frame is still emphasizing on the “education” 
party to make cadres unwilling to corrupt, it also admits that providing adequate benefits is 
important.58 Since the Chinese regime may not be able to invest lots more resources for such 
increases, the institutionalization to increase the credibility and expected value seem to be a 
good solution.       
5.5.2 Party Education, Political Loyalty, and Expansion to Private Sectors 
CCP has adopted various ways to enhance the non-material benefits it can offer to its 
members. In general, three approaches are identified empirically: the adjustment of the party 
to the social value, the new importance of political loyalty in Chinese society, and the 
expansion of influence to non-state sectors. 
The Adjustment of Party 
The Party has certainly made adaptive changes to its self-positioning in society and cope 
with the gradual changes in social values and ideology. In the early 2000s, the “Three 
Representative” principle proposed by Jiang Zemin indicated the change of the party from a 
pure revolutionary party representing certain ideological groups to a more governmental 
party representing social elites. Such change is explicitly discussed by scholars within 
China.59 In recent years, in response to the China dream proposed by Xi Jinping, the 
propaganda machine deliberately brands CCP as the pioneer of the Chinese rejuvenation.60 
 
57 See: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-11/22/c_1125261634.htm (Access on January 21, 2020) 
58 http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0911/c78779-25643594.html (Access on January 21, 2020) 
59 For example, see: 
http://www.cssn.cn/zzx/xsxx_zzx/wxl/201511/t20151112_2577853.shtml?COLLCC=4032954933& (Access on January 21, 
2020) 
60 See one article from Qiushi, the Official Publication of CCP Central Committee: 
http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2018-09/01/c_1123362680.htm (Access on January 21, 2020) 
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All these efforts seem to try to link the CCP member to the most elite, successful, or morally-
admirable people among Chinese society. For example, when Jack Ma, one of the most 
successful businessmen in China who founded the e-commerce giant Alibaba, was reported 
as a CCP member, the Global Times, China’s most famous nationalist tabloid, published an 
article deliberately claiming that “the best people in most of China’s social sectors are CCP 
members” because “ CCP is the core of China’s development.” It further argues that “it is 
undoubtful that Chinese society is giving very positive evaluation on CCP members.”61 It 
seems a little weird for a communist party to link itself with wealthy businessmen 
deliberately, but such linkage is certainly creating an image of CCP members valued in 
contemporary Chinese society with great emphasis on wealth accumulation.  
At the same time, the party does not give up its traditional approach of promoting the 
CCP members as the most advanced elite in society. A large propaganda campaign, called 
“Pioneers in Our Era” (Shidai Xianfeng, 时代先锋), was launched in recent years to promote 
the stories of pioneers in different sectors who are also CCP members. According to the 
website of this campaign, the core is about their selfless contributions and sacrifice as the 
pioneer in their occupations.62 All these propaganda seem to create a very positive image of 
CCP members. Although there is still no quantitative survey evidence, it seems reasonable to 
expect the reputational values of being CCP members should increase because of the 
propaganda. CCP members are not glorious because they are the most ideologically advanced 
 
61 “Jack Ma is not the only private businessmen to be CCP members” (中国民营企业家，岂止马云是党员), Global 
Times, November 28, 2018: https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKfl9v (Access on January 21, 2020) 
62 http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64104/213676/213768/index.html (Access on January 21, 2020) 
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revolutionary soldiers as they used to be branded in the pre-reform era; instead, they are 
glorious because they are simply the best, most elite and most morally admirable pioneers 
who are leading China’s rejuvenation. Such branding seems to be consistent with the 
increasing nationalist rhetoric in China. 
Political Loyalty 
China is never a totally free society, and political loyalty is always important in China. 
The old practice, however, is more like a bottom-line approach: people will be fine if they are 
not directly and explicitly anti-regime. However, such situations seem to change gradually. 
Just avoiding confrontation with the regime is not enough; there is an increasing pressure to 
demonstrating political loyalty to the Chinese regime by explicitly showing one’s support to 
the regime and disagreement with other politically incorrect groups, such as “foreign 
countries that hope to undermine China” and “some public intellectuals who hate the 
communist party.” Even celebrities in the entertainment industry will suffer in a huge blow to 
their career if they are accused of being “unpatriotic.”63 One interviewee working in the 
entertainment industry in Beijing told me:  
“The best way for many fans to crack down on the the competitors of their idols is to 
report the competitors’ unpatriotic behavior to media or expose that behavior on social 
media. Regardless of whether it is true or not, it will bring lots of troubles to the 
competitors.”64 
 
63 See: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-49008166 (Access on January 21, 2020) 
64 Interview with an employee of a entertainment company in Beijing, August 8, 2019 (Interview 190808) 
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Such a harsh political atmosphere might be a problem for many people, but it, although 
perhaps being unintentional to some extent, creates an additional advantage of being a CCP 
member, especially for those people who have studied or worked outside China, usually are 
also relatively elite in society. For example, a late-20s new party member, who got his 
bachelor’s degree in Hong Kong and is now working for the Hong Kong branch of a state-
owned financial institution, chose to join the CCP via the party organization in the Shenzhen 
Branch of his company and explained his reasons to me.65  
“It’s about political correctness and loyalty! If I want to come back to work for State-
Owned Enterprises or government agencies after several years, how can I make my leader 
trust me that I am not anti-regime and sympathetic to Hong Kong Independence? If I am a 
party member, then they know they can trust me for sure.”66 
The same viewpoint is collaborated by my interviewee in Shenzhen and her story of her 
only daughter. Her daughter graduated from Columbia University and now works in 
government. Her son-in-law also got a degree from a U.S. university and now works for an 
SOE in Shenzhen, but has to go to Hong Kong for work from time to time. My interviewee 
explained: 
“She [the daughter] does not want to join the CCP, but the leader is very difficult to 
trust her because of her U.S. degree and her husband’s connections with Hong Kong. So I 
told her to join one democratic party.”67 
 
65 CCP do not have party activities in Hong Kong, so the interviewee has to apply for party membership via Shenzhen 
branch. 
66 Interview with an employee and party member of a SOE in Hong Kong, December 5, 2019 (Interview 191205) 
67 Interview 191209A 
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As discussed previously, the membership of democratic parties is, on many occasions, 
the light version of CCP membership. My interviewee, based on her experiences in China’s 
bureaucratic system, clearly hopes to find a way for her daughter to gain trust from leaders. 
The strategy pays off: her daughter was one of the 30 young cadres being promoted in her 
work unit in 2018 and the only one without CCP memberships. 
The CCP membership, in all these cases, provides a robust advantage of demonstrating 
political loyalty. The increasing nationalist propaganda, although maybe unintentionally, 
creates stronger demands of political loyalties and thus creates the scarcity of things that can 
demonstrate such loyalty. CCP membership is one of them, which give the membership a 
new benefit that many people may want. Given the fact that there are more and more young 
Chinese studying abroad or working outside China, there seems to be an increasing level of 
demand, and thus an increasing level of scarcity. It is certainly something people in the past 
two decades of reform era did not care much about, but it seems to have become important 
now. Interestingly, this is a little similar to what party membership could offer in the cultural 
revolution period when the family background of one person could largely determine one’s 
fate. Those who had a “bad family background,” e.g., capitalist, landlord, etc., usually tried 
very hard to become a party member to “clean their name.” However, it is still different, and 
perhaps also ironic: people in the pre-reform era had to demonstrate their loyalty before they 
were allowed to join the party, but people in contemporary China seem to join the party first 
for demonstrating their loyalty. Nevertheless, the non-material premium of CCP membership 
is significant in both settings. 
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The Expansions to Non-State Sector 
CCP also has made a gradual but steady expansion to many non-state sectors in recent 
years. One phenomenal example is the establishment of grassroots party organizations in 
private firms, which used to have almost no party organization.68 It marks a significant 
expansion of party into non-state sectors, as CCP becomes much more important even if the 
sector has little connection with the state. Jack Ma’s party membership is another obvious 
example. Although Alibaba is a private company with its largest shareholder being Japan’s 
Softbank and conducting a business that largely relies on ordinary consumers rather than 
government money, Jack Ma still chooses a very close position with the CCP by becoming a 
party member and establishes the party organization in Alibaba as early as 2000. It even has 
open recruitment for conducting party activities within the group and having a liaison with 
upper-level party organization.69  
Such expansion to private sectors indeed reduces non-party sources for young elites to 
gain social status, which creates scarcity for party membership. This chapter draws evidence 
mainly for career perspectives. One interviewee, who is not a party member and is looking 
for jobs in the financial industry, described one of his group interview experiences for a 
position of traders in an investment bank in Beijing as follows. 
“Their party secretary was sitting there during our group interview. After all the 
questions, he [the party secretary] jumped in and asked who were CCP members. Two of us 
 
68 For example, see: https://www.guancha.cn/politics/2017_10_23_431863.shtml (Access on January, 21, 2020) 
69 The job advertisement can be seen at: https://job.alibaba.com/zhaopin/PositionDetail.htm?positionId=76080; The 
author saved the webpage for check after the recruitment expires and webpage becomes unavailable. Note that the position 
requires a party membership because it is a position within the party organization of Alibaba. 
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were. The secretary then asked those two whether they agreed to work for the party 
organization for two years before being transferred to the trader position. One male 
interviewee simply replied that he would follow the party’s instruction. The party secretary 
smiled after listening to this answer, and everyone else in the recruitment team smiled, too. I 
immediately sense that this man is hired.”70 
The interviewee’s experience coincides with widely spread stories that mainland 
financial institutions imposed upon CCP members who are willing to perform party jobs after 
being hired. Since the financial industry is a very internationalized industry with lots of 
people getting their bachelor’s or master’s degree overseas, CCP membership used to be a 
less important factor in the industry, unless one is working for the senior leadership position 
for those large state-owned banks. For the first-line position as a trader, a degree from an elite 
university used to be far more important than political affiliation.71 However, in the story of 
my interviewee, the male CCP member got the job, even though his degree does not come 
from the “targeted schools” and the job market in financial institutions in 2019 is terribly 
disastrous due to the economic slowdown in China. 
This is now just for investment banks. Large private companies are increasingly seen to 
prioritize party membership for recruitment and promotion. For example, Country Garden, 
one of China’s largest real estate companies, openly claim to promote party members first if 
 
70 Interview with a Master of Finance Degree (from a highly ranked foreign university) holder who is looking for 
financial job, Hong Kong, December 23, 2019. Interview 191223  
71 The widely believed rumor is that large investment banks in China, like their counterparts in Wall Street, have their 
lists of target schools for recruitment, including only top five universities in China and ivy-league and similar level 
universities in U.S. and U.K (i.e. Stanford, MIT, Oxford, Cambridge etc…). Even UCL and Imperial College London, 
according to my interviewee, is less qualified, as one managing director told him.   
 149 
everything else being equal despite being a private company.72 In Chizhou, Anhui, the local 
government deliberately encourages local non-state companies to hire party members first to 
meet the needs of establishing party organizations in private companies.73 The priority of 
CCP members in career advancement in private companies is, in fact, openly encouraged and 
acknowledged by CCP officials.74 All these efforts expand the career advantages of CCP 
members to private sectors, which used to be the areas that party membership brought no 
significant advantages. As discussed previously, such efforts would inevitably reduce the 
likelihood for ordinary people to advance their career and social status from non-party 
sources, and thus create the scarcity and value for party membership.                
5.5.3 Lessen the Burden 
Although CCP has worked to enhance the material and non-material benefits for 
members, it also seems helpful in reducing the costs associated with party membership. 
During my fieldwork, I see two types of evidence for lessening the burden of party members. 
First, the party is emphasizing the reduction of unnecessary party activities, including 
learning activities, conferences, forms to fills, and administrative checks. The official 
documents issued by the General Office of the Central Committee of CCP on March 11, 
2019, titled “the Notice to solve the problem of Symbolism and reduce the grassroots’ 
burden,” explicitly make requirements to all local governments to lessen the burden at the 
 
72 See: https://finance.sina.com.cn/manage/magazine/2019-07-17/doc-ihytcitm2615654.shtml (Access on January 21, 
2020) 
73 See: http://news.12371.cn/2017/05/26/ARTI1495781408312103.shtml (Access on January 21, 2020) 
74 See an article written by the Head of Party Organization Department in Haining City, Zhejiang: 
http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0529/c117092-31109114.html (Access on January 21, 2020) 
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local level.75 My interviewee compared what she observed currently and what she 
experienced in the past and claimed that the conferences seemed to be much less than what 
she used to have in the past.76 Although this is not a big improvement, it does reduce the 
burden of being a CCP member. 
More importantly, a series of anti-corruption campaigns also reduces the burden of 
relatively lower level CCP members for their patronal network. They currently have much 
less need to network with their leaders, to eat and drink with other officials to develop their 
patronal network, and to send gifts to others. One interviewee described his happiness about 
the changes: 
“We no longer need to gather with others for eating and drinking because all are 
banned. It is true that I no longer have free dinners when I visit other cities for official 
business, but it is very nice that I do not need to attend those boring dinners when officials 
from other cities come to us. I personally feel it is much easier and relaxed to do the job in 
this way. Nobody really wants to attend those dinners every day and maintain those personal 
networks tirelessly!”77 
Although my interviewee here may not represent all party members since many of them 
do feel angry about being unable to eat and drink at government expense (Zhu et al., 2017), 
he certainly can represent part of them. For some of the young party members, they have to 
wait until being promoted to a higher position to enjoy many of the perks and benefits 
 
75 《关于结局形式主义突出问题为基层减负的通知》, March 11, 2019. Url: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-
03/11/content_5372964.htm (Access on January 21, 2020) 
76 Interview 191209A 
77 Interview 191209B 
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associated with party membership. All costs associated with a promotion is actually an 
investment with the expectation of getting returns upon reaching a higher level. Of course, 
the reduction of investment required for getting a certain amount of return yields to a better 
Return on Investment rate, which indeed increases the attractiveness of a given asset, i.e., 
CCP membership in our case.  
 
In general, this section tries to demonstrate empirical evidence to explain how CCP 
maintains the attractiveness to new members and elites by enhancing and institutionalizing 
material benefits, creating new non-material benefits and lessening the burden associated 
with membership. The core of these strategies, again, is to create scarcity by offering 
something uniquely tied with CCP and reducing other sources that can offer similar 
alternatives. In these ways, CCP keeps maintaining its values for new social elites and 
continuously recruits them into the ruling coalition of the Chinese regime. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter intends to offer some preliminary analysis of how CCP maintains 
attractiveness to new party members in the new era. It, however, have some limitations. One 
limitation is the target of this study. The theory of this dissertation implies that the target of 
this study should be regime allies. As Chapter 3, regime allies are broader than CCP 
members. This chapter, however, focuses on a subset of regime allies for two reasons. 
Theoretically speaking, CCP member is the core of the regime allies, including almost all 
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officials at the middle level and above in both government and important social 
organizations. CCP members also play a leading role in SOEs, which controls the critical 
sectors of the Chinese Economy. As the ruling party, CCP relies on its grassroots party 
mechanism to control society, which relies on appropriate party members for functioning. 
Therefore, the party member is arguably the most important part of the ruling coalition. 
Practically, regime allies are a useful analytical concept, but there is no concrete organization 
or group in China called the ruling coalition. Party membership is the most clearly defined 
sub-group of regime allies. It is difficult to see why someone joins the ruling coalition as the 
ruling coalition is a conceptual thing, but it is practically feasible to explore why someone is 
joining the party. Therefore, this study chooses to focus on CCP membership. However, I 
admit that the discussion in chapter 3 is still valid here, and there are limitations to this 
choice. The Chinese regime may have a different set of strategies for recruiting and 
maintaining those regime allies who are not CCP members. Some CCP members also may 
not be important enough for the party to take special measures to maintain. In fact, many of 
the strategies identified in this chapter are not applicable to all party members; they are 
usually specific to certain conditions and thus are applicable only to a portion of CCP 
membership. Therefore, this chapter should read more like an illustrative starting point rather 
than conclusive findings, and further studies should be conducted. 
Another limitation is that I have very little evidence to measure the effectiveness of 
these strategies in a large-scale quantitative way. It is true that the effectiveness of these 
strategies is collaborated by the evidence collected from interviews, official documents and 
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fieldwork, but, to my knowledge, there is no systematic data to evaluate the effects on a large 
group of CCP members or potential CCP members. I have tried to diversify the sources of 
evidence to avoid potential bias, but the readers are still reminded that the findings in this 
chapter are exploratory, and any further generalization should be performed with caution.  
The last limitation is that I cannot completely rule out an alternative explanation. The 
CCP may simply attract new members by ideological appealing. The nationalist rhetoric of 
the party may be well suited to hardline nationalists who expect a strong and powerful China. 
It is, at least, the official explanation of why CCP remains popular among Chinese people. 
This study has no evidence to refute this explanation, and, in fact, I have no intention to 
refute it, either. Instead, this study simply argues that ideological appealing cannot solve the 
attractiveness problem alone. Any successful autocrats, like the Chinese Communist Party, 
would probably adopt both ideological appealing and benefit distributions to recruit political 
elites. This chapter, as well as this dissertation, focuses on the distributional perspective; the 
readers, however, are reminded that the ideological perspective of CCP’s strategy should 
always be considered when evaluating its survival and stability.         
Nevertheless, this chapter has demonstrated that the CCP is trying to create new 
particularistic benefits as incentives to keep the loyalty of the party members. Since the 
expansion of universalistic benefits to the general public is unlikely to reverse, it seems to be 
critical for CCP’s future. The question, however, is whether such strategies can be successful 
in the long run. Although I currently do not have enough scholarly evidence to make a 
conclusive argument, I am cautiously pessimistic about its long-run effect. Since the core of 
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such strategies is to create scarcity by either making uniquely new benefits that the public 
cannot enjoy or reducing the alternative sources for the public to get similar benefits, such 
strategies seem to have no big difference from what I described in chapter 4. The Chinese 
authoritarian regime is still taking away some of the benefits, which the public should have 
enjoyed, to compensate the regime allies for their losses because of the expansion of the 
universalistic benefits. Such strategies might be effective in the near future, but they do not 
solve the fundamental dilemma of distributions between the public and the regime allies, 
which lies in the dual roles of autocrats as the leaders of the ruling coalition and the leader of 
the nation that are institutionally incompatible. China, and perhaps many other authoritarian 
regimes, still need to find a long-term solution to it.       
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6 Conclusion   
This dissertation studies the distribution of resources in authoritarian regimes with 
empirical evidence from China. It explores a fundamental dilemma in authoritarian politics: 
the incompatible need to both coopt the public and maintain cohesion among regime allies. 
Under resource constraints, the distribution of resources to one group inevitably harms the 
ability to offer benefits to the other. Since the cooperation of the public and the loyalty of 
regime allies are both crucial to the survival of authoritarian regimes and autocrats 
themselves, all autocrats have to address this dilemma carefully by striking a delicate and 
strategic balance. 
This problem is deeply rooted in the strategies of authoritarian survival revealed by the 
existing literature. Conventional arguments on authoritarian survival emphasize the 
importance of cohesion in the ruling coalition—that is, the loyalty and support of a small 
group of key political elites. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that divisions within 
authoritarian regimes can instigate regime transition. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) 
directly explain how the distribution of resources can maintain the cohesion of the ruling 
coalition and ensure the survival of autocrats. Arguments on authoritarian resilience, 
however, emphasize the role of benefits distributed to the public to satisfy the needs of 
cooptation (Gandhi, 2008), responsiveness (Distelhorst & Hou, 2016), or accountability 
(Stromseth et al., 2017). These two strands of literature are summarized in the two challenges 
faced by authoritarian regimes discussed in Svolik (2012). 
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The dilemma of authoritarian distributional politics, in fact, reflects the incompatibility 
of these two challenges. It is almost impossible for the interests of the ruling coalition in an 
authoritarian regime to be completely aligned with the interests of the general public, which 
is why the ruling elites choose a dictatorial approach to governance. There are many 
occasions when the interests of regime allies and the public are different. Since such 
differences are impossible to avoid in an authoritarian system, the dilemma will always exist 
in authoritarian distributional politics; the trade-offs and balances in terms of “who gets what, 
when and how” will always be a question for autocrats. 
This dissertation, therefore, provides a theory of authoritarian distributional strategies to 
address this dilemma. It argues that the autocrats adopt a differentiated strategy of 
distribution to balance the needs and demands of the public and regime allies. Specifically, 
this dissertation argues that authoritarian regimes distribute universal benefits to the public 
and particularistic benefits to regime allies. Furthermore, this dissertation argues, in Chapter 
4, that the expansion of universal benefits, including public goods and welfare, inevitably 
leads to the creation and increase of particularistic side payments to regime allies at the 
expense of the public interest. In this way, authoritarian regimes balance two crucial priorities 
and ensure that the loss suffered by regime allies due to the increased provision of public 
goods and welfare is compensated. To further address problems of morale and loyalty among 
regime allies, new and innovative incentives are created to recruit new elites into the 
coalition. In the empirical evidence from China examined in Chapter 5, this dissertation 
demonstrates that the CCP creates new value for its membership by institutionalizing material 
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benefits, creating nonmaterial benefits through expansion into the private sector and reducing 
the costs associated with membership. The general strategy identified in this dissertation is to 
reduce other sources of benefits, whether material or nonmaterial, so that ruling coalition 
membership becomes much scarcer and more valuable than it used to be for elites who hope 
to obtain those benefits. In this way, the Chinese regime ensures that the regime’s ruling 
coalition is still attractive to elites even when many of their privileges and benefits have 
become publicly available. 
This dissertation aims to answer the question of how autocrats address competing 
strategies for regime survival from a distributional perspective. However, there is no doubt 
that authoritarian regimes rely on many survival strategies other than the distribution of spoils 
and benefits. For some authoritarian regimes, cohesive repression, ideological control and 
information censorship may be more frequently used than the distribution of spoils to 
maintain regime survival, and thus, the dilemma of distribution may not be as urgent as it is 
in some other authoritarian regimes that rely heavily on spoils for survival. This dissertation 
does not argue that the distribution of benefits is the only important strategy for authoritarian 
survival. It also does not argue that the failure to address the dilemma of authoritarian 
distribution effectively will definitely result in the failure of the regime. It simply argues that 
the challenge of balancing the demands of regime allies and the public is always there in 
authoritarian distributional politics and that all autocrats who design distributional strategies 
in authoritarian regimes have to think about this dilemma to achieve effectiveness and 
efficiency in distribution. 
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In general, this dissertation theorizes one solution to the dilemma of authoritarian 
distributional politics. By differentiating what to distribute and creating new particularistic 
benefits, autocrats manage to maintain a balance between demands of the public and regime 
allies and, in particular, address the challenge of maintaining the loyalty of the latter when 
their previous privileges are eroded by the expansion of public welfare and government 
accountability. My theory offers a solution from a distributional perspective to the question of 
how authoritarian regimes reconcile two contradictory yet crucial survival strategies. 
This dissertation, therefore, engages with the literature on authoritarian survival from the 
perspective of distributional politics. It bridges two major lines of argument, namely, how the 
distribution of benefits can maintain the cohesion of the ruling coalition (Blaydes, 2010; 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Magaloni, 2008) and how it can elicit cooperation and 
support from the general public (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006). The findings of 
this dissertation indicate that the strategy of distributing benefits is dependent not only on the 
situation and demands of the intended recipients (the public or allies) but also on the 
considerations of other distributional objectives. The results demonstrate that distributional 
politics in authoritarian regimes are almost always a three-actor process; any interaction 
between the regime and one actor must also consider how it may affect the interactions 
between the regime and the other actor. 
This dissertation may also have implications for the discussion of the provision of public 
goods in authoritarian regimes. Various arguments have been made explaining the provision 
of public goods under such regimes. A central theme of those arguments is that the provision 
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of public goods is a kind of response through cooptation (Gandhi, 2008) to public pressure 
exerted through formal institutions (Lizzeri & Persico, 2001; Luo et al., 2007; X. Zhang, Fan, 
Zhang, & Huang, 2004), informal institutions, and cultural norms (L. L. Tsai, 2007), as well 
as a reaction to the need for human capital in economic development (Hong, 2018). The core 
idea is that the more constraints and pressures put onto autocrats, the more public goods 
authoritarian regimes offer. This dissertation agrees with these arguments but further argues 
that such an expansion of public goods comes with the creation of private side payments to 
regime allies at the expense of the public interest. We may observe an increase in certain 
kinds of public goods, but there are probably some decreases in other kinds of public goods 
to save resources for side payments to regime allies. The overall level of public goods and 
welfare, therefore, may not increase because of external pressure and constraints, and the 
effect of such pressure and constraints on overall public welfare in authoritarian regimes may 
need further examination. 
Limitation 
The empirical evidence of this dissertation is exclusively on China, which offers some 
advantages as discussed above but also generates several limitations for this study. First, the 
limitation of the data may still affect the validity and generalizability of the findings. 
Although China has made available many types of data of good quality, this study may still 
suffer from the data limitation problem given the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime. 
For example, the distributional vehicle hypothesis can only be tested quantitatively in the 
People’s Congress in one province because Anhui Province is the only province that 
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publishes a full register of all delegate proposals and government responses. As noted in 
Chapter 3, the fact that Anhui is the only province to do so may indicate that Anhui is unique, 
thus making the finding based on evidence from Anhui Province less generalizable. A similar 
situation applies to Chapter 5: The findings based on an interview and documentation may 
have potential biases because the interviewee and document access are obtained based on 
personal connections and a snow-balling method rather than on probability sampling. The 
findings may not reflect the whole picture of the Chinese regime’s conduct. 
This dissertation takes two approaches to addressing the data limitation problem. First, I 
fully acknowledge the existence of the data problem and admit that caution is needed for 
generalizing the findings. However, this dissertation argues that the finding may still be 
insightful for understanding the distributional strategy of the Chinese regime, especially 
because there seems to be no theoretical reason to believe that other parts of the regime 
behave very differently from the part I observed in this study and tested with empirical 
evidence. Second, this dissertation generates three different testable hypotheses and tests the 
theory in three different research settings. All tests, despite their different approaches and 
basis on different sets of empirical evidence, provide similar results that support the general 
theory. That the evidence collected with several different approaches all points to the same 
conclusion allows for greater confidence in my theory, even though the data are not perfect. 
Another limitation is that this dissertation only focuses on limited types of benefits 
distributed in China. Authoritarian regimes can offer various kinds of benefits, and it is 
impossible for any single study to examine all of them. This study examines several common 
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types of benefits that can be found in many other studies. Chapter 3 examines policy 
concessions and responses to the public and regime allies, and Chapter 4 focuses on monetary 
resource allocations. These are very similar to how Gandhi (2008) conceptualizes benefits in 
authoritarian distributional politics. In Chapter 5, I try to evaluate several material and 
nonmaterial benefits associated with membership of the ruling coalition, which is commonly 
seen and discussed in Chinese society. Although the benefits and allocations discussed in this 
dissertation are far from complete, there seem to be no theoretical reasons to suspect a 
different pattern for the distribution of other benefits that are not covered. However, further 
research on other types of benefit distribution would be helpful. 
This dissertation also assumes rational thinking on the part of autocrats in formulating 
distributional strategies. In other words, I assume that authoritarian regimes engage in cost-
benefit analysis and intentionally design distributional strategies to maximize their returns. 
Although this assumption largely holds, it is also possible that some patterns of distribution 
are simply the unintentional results of path dependence, interactions between politicians and 
bureaucratic systems, and the bounded rationality of some or all actors in the distributional 
process. It may be the case that some practices of distributions are not in the best interest of 
regime survival or that they are but are not intentionally designed by autocrats. Additional 
studies may be done to address those unintentional aspects of the formation of distributional 
strategies in authoritarian regimes. 
The last limitation is the uniqueness of the Chinese system. This dissertation aims to 
develop a general theory of authoritarian distribution based on empirical evidence from 
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China. Although China is an authoritarian regime, it may have some unique features that 
many other authoritarian regimes do not have. This uniqueness may affect how applicable the 
findings of this dissertation are to other authoritarian regimes. For example, China has a very 
strong and institutionalized party system that reaches the very grassroots level of society. 
Although the literature on decentralization in China has found that party organizations at the 
grassroots level of Chinese society have been weakened (Landry, 2008), the CCP remains a 
comparatively effective institution. This characteristic may have different effects on the 
objectives and dilemmas of distribution. On the one hand, the strong party institution and 
network may make China much more effective in distributing benefits than many other 
authoritarian regimes. This may change the cost-benefit calculation underpinning the 
distributional strategies that the theory of this dissertation elaborates upon. On the other hand, 
China may rely less on benefit distribution for regime survival than many other authoritarian 
regimes because the effective party organization can ensure strong control over the public 
and political elites. For example, China has established a very comprehensive system to 
maintain social stability and repress collective action, censor information, and monitor public 
opinion.78 China certainly faces less pressure to distribute benefits if its regime survival can 
be ensured by those repressive and monitoring mechanisms. Therefore, strategies for 
distribution in China may be different in some respects from those in other authoritarian 
regimes. 
 
78 Some examples can be seen on Cai (2008); Cai and Zhu (2013); King, Pan, and Roberts (2013); and Xu 
(Forthcoming). 
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While fully acknowledging the uniqueness of China, this dissertation still tries to 
provide a generalized theory of authoritarian distribution. How could this theory be 
applicable to other authoritarian regimes with different conditions? I argue that the theory 
elaborated in this dissertation can be regarded as a general framework for understanding the 
strategic calculation behind distribution in authoritarian regimes. The logical foundation of 
authoritarian distribution theory relies on two key assumptions: 1) autocrats face a significant 
problem of resource limitations, so that trade-offs in distribution are necessary, and 2) 
authoritarian regimes rely heavily on the distribution of benefits for survival. Distributional 
politics in any authoritarian regime for which these two assumptions do not hold may not be 
explicable by the theory proposed in this dissertation. For example, if an authoritarian regime 
has relatively abundant resources for distribution, the dilemma of authoritarian distribution 
may be less severe because the regime can appropriately satisfy demands from both sides. 
This may imply that for natural resource-rich countries, autocrats may easily distribute 
appropriate benefits to both regime allies and the public without the need to make trade-offs. 
Similarly, if an authoritarian regime can control the public without offering benefits, the 
dilemma of distribution may also not exist. For example, an authoritarian regime can control 
the public by adopting heavy ideological and/or religious doctrines or by imposing strict and 
massive systems of repressive social control. All these factors may make it unnecessary for 
autocrats to offer a large number of benefits to the public and address trade-offs. Since this 
dissertation develops and tests the theory based on evidence from China, it is expected that 
the theory of authoritarian distribution should be applicable to any authoritarian regime with 
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an equal or lower amount of resources for distribution than China and with equal or less 
ideological indoctrination or social control than China. Since China has the largest economy 
among all authoritarian regimes and ranks almost at the bottom among all countries in its 
level of freedom, it seems that the theory proposed in this dissertation may be applied to quite 
a large number of authoritarian regimes.79 They may have different political and social 
conditions from China, but they are likely to also formulate their strategies of distribution 
based on the same mechanism laid out in the theory of authoritarian distribution proposed in 
this dissertation. 
The Long-term Perspective 
The findings of this dissertation may highlight the long-term sustainability of 
authoritarian regimes. The increasing body of literature on authoritarian resilience has 
pointed out that the long-term survival of authoritarian regimes depends on continuous 
economic development (Zhao, 2009), increasing levels of the rule of law and other forms of 
accountability to the public (Y. Wang, 2015; Whiting, 2017), increasing public participation 
(Liu, 2019a; Stromseth et al., 2017; Teets, 2014), and a significant level of government 
responsiveness (Distelhorst & Hou, 2016; Jiang, Meng, et al., 2019; Meng et al., 2017; Su & 
Meng, 2016). All of these, however, inevitably diversify the sources of benefits and privilege 
and break the monopoly of the small group of political elites over those material and 
nonmaterial rewards. As noted in Chapter 5, all of these commitments to the public are 
fundamentally contradictory to the logic of authoritarian regimes, which put the interests of a 
 
79 Data source: Freedom House 2019 (https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-world-freedom-2019). 
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small circle of political elites (i.e., the ruling coalition) before the interest of the general 
public. 
This dissertation theorizes one short-term solution to this dilemma in the distribution of 
benefits, but the long-term solution is still unclear. Autocrats cannot create new incentives 
and side payments unlimitedly; there must be a point in the future when the loss of regime 
allies due to the expansion of public welfare can no longer be compensated by provision of 
additional incentives and benefits to the detriment of the public interest. Will regime allies 
remain loyal to the regime and the autocrats at that time? Furthermore, the findings of this 
dissertation imply that autocrats may only selectively meet the demands of the public and 
remove some resources from the public to compensate regime allies for expansions of public 
welfare. Will the general public be happy with such selective responsiveness and the give-
and-take-away game? 
As noted previously, autocrats usually hope to address problems of distributional 
conflict by increasing the total resources for distribution. Robust economic development may 
temporarily ease parts of this problem since everyone’s share of benefits increases under 
rapid economic development. In other words, to make the pie larger is one solution to solve 
conflicts over how to divide the pie. The problem, however, is that the pie cannot increase 
forever; nor can total resources and the economy. Distributional conflicts will become severe 
again when growth slows down or halts. Furthermore, the dynamic model of authoritarian 
distribution may even indicate that such a solution is still problematic. Relative devaluation 
always exists even when both sides gain. Autocrats must continuously look for new 
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incentives to address relative losses and devaluation. The ultimate question, however, is 
whether this approach can last in the long term. After all, since the conflict of interests 
between regime allies and the public seems to be very unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable 







A1 Appendix for Chapter 3 
Table 6 Delegates and Constituencies 
 Constituency Number Percentage 
Tongling 19 2.68% 
Chizhou 23 3.25% 
Huangshan 23 3.25% 
Ma'anshan 29 4.10% 
Huaibei 31 4.38% 
Xuancheng 33 4.66% 
Huainan 36 5.08% 
Wuhu 41 5.79% 
Bengbu 41 5.79% 
Chuzhou 48 6.78% 
Bozhou 53 7.49% 
Suzhou 58 8.19% 
Anqing 59 8.33% 
Lu'an 62 8.76% 
Hefei 70 9.89% 
Fuyang 82 11.58% 




Table 7 Ordinal Logit Regression for Regime Distance and Request on Response 
Year of Meeting 2014 2016 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regime Distance -1.115*** -1.260*** -1.385*** -1.210*** -1.356*** -1.434*** 
 (0.136) (0.188) (0.215) (0.125) (0.234) (0.261) 
       
Universal Interests -1.542*** -1.707*** -1.859*** -1.671*** -1.724*** -1.833*** 
 (0.195) (0.276) (0.321) (0.183) (0.282) (0.335) 
       
Distance#Interests 0.471*** 0.511*** 0.547*** 0.556*** 0.629*** 0.671*** 
 (0.057) (0.080) (0.091) (0.054) (0.090) (0.107) 
       
Co-sponsorship  0.179 0.098  0.327 0.388* 
  (0.188) (0.212)  (0.170) (0.183) 
       
Request for Money  -0.029 0.055  -0.013 0.048 
  (0.199) (0.213)  (0.185) (0.212) 
       
Gender  0.012 0.085  0.091 0.028 
  (0.195) (0.228)  (0.165) (0.196) 
       
Ethnicity  0.346 -0.227  0.244 -0.091 
  (0.414) (0.366)  (0.362) (0.470) 
       
Political Affiliation  -0.104 -0.117  0.103 0.102 
  (0.107) (0.114)  (0.091) (0.110) 
       
Education Level   0.181   -0.125 
   (0.169)   (0.180) 
       
Age   -0.025   0.011 
   (0.013)   (0.011) 
       
Responding Agency  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constituency  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
cut1       
Constant -6.992*** -8.211*** -10.68*** -5.544*** -4.470*** -4.508*** 
 (0.513) (0.814) (1.410) (0.439) (0.896) (1.212) 
cut2       
Constant -4.460*** -5.387*** -7.875*** -3.953*** -2.691** -2.726* 
 (0.472) (0.766) (1.362) (0.421) (0.846) (1.187) 
cut3       
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Constant -1.916*** -2.621*** -4.946*** -1.906*** -0.424 -0.359 
 (0.448) (0.743) (1.323) (0.402) (0.819) (1.173) 
Observations 856 723 618 879 786 673 
R2 0.039 0.112 0.133 0.050 0.124 0.132 
Dependent Variable is the level of response, ordered 1-4, in which 4 is the highest order of 
response that represents the most credible promises. Distance varies from 1-7, in which 1 
means closest. Interests varies from 1-3, in which 1 means geographic particularistic, 2 means 
occupational particularistic and 3 means universal benefits. Political Affiliation varies from 1-
3, in which 1 means no affiliation, 2 means members of Eight Democratic Parties and 3 means 
CCP members. Fixed effect of responding agencies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 8 Regime Distance and Request on Response (Recoding Response Level) 
Year of Meeting 2014 2016 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regime Distance -0.230*** -0.186*** -0.416*** -0.346*** -0.170*** -0.517*** 
 (0.044) (0.030) (0.060) (0.061) (0.035) (0.085) 
       
Universal Interests -0.285*** -0.263*** -0.547*** -0.413*** -0.245*** -0.658*** 
 (0.061) (0.045) (0.089) (0.078) (0.047) (0.107) 
       
Distance#Interests 0.096*** 0.072*** 0.168*** 0.166*** 0.080*** 0.246*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.026) (0.024) (0.014) (0.032) 
       
Co-sponsorship 0.059 0.022 0.081 0.071 0.067 0.138 
 (0.051) (0.037) (0.070) (0.059) (0.034) (0.076) 
       
Request for Money 0.020 -0.042 -0.021 0.030 -0.019 0.011 
 (0.055) (0.032) (0.071) (0.061) (0.036) (0.081) 
       
Gender 0.037 -0.023 0.013 0.053 -0.034 0.020 
 (0.054) (0.032) (0.071) (0.058) (0.033) (0.075) 
       
Political Affiliation -0.035 -0.005 -0.040 0.028 0.026 0.054 
 (0.030) (0.017) (0.039) (0.032) (0.018) (0.042) 
       
Ethnicity 0.025 0.082 0.107 0.080 0.032 0.112 
 (0.102) (0.069) (0.142) (0.109) (0.077) (0.157) 
       
Constituency  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Responding Agency  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant 3.633*** 1.660*** 4.293*** 2.658*** 1.635*** 3.293*** 
 (0.179) (0.125) (0.251) (0.245) (0.153) (0.341) 
Observations 723 723 723 786 786 786 
R2 0.181 0.211 0.208 0.234 0.192 0.261 
This is OLS regression results with response level being coded as 3-scale. Model 1 and 4 treats 
level 3 and 4 (in original 4-scale coding) as one level. Model 2and 5 treat level 2 and 3 as one 
level. Model 3 and 6 treat level 1 and 2 as one level. Distance varies from 1-7, in which 1 
means closest. Interests varies from 1-3, in which 1 means geographic particularistic, 2 means 
occupational particularistic and 3 means universal benefits. Political Affiliation varies from 1-
3, in which 1 means no affiliation, 2 means members of Eight Democratic Parties and 3 means 
CCP members. Fixed effect of responding agencies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 9 Near-Neighbor Matching 
2014 Meeting M=1 M=2 M=4 M=8 
Particularistic      
Outsider -0.76*** -0.71*** -0.66*** -0.64*** 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Observations 403 403 403 403 
Universal     
Outsider 0.31** 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.47*** 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Observations 320 320 320 320 
2016 Meeting     
Particularistic      
Outsider -0.52*** -0.50*** -0.46*** -0.48*** 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) 
Observations 458 458 458 458 
Universal     
Outsider 0.49*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.52*** 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
Observations 328 328 328 328 
This table presents the results from matching methods. Each coefficient represents the average 
treatment effect on the population (ATE) of being regime outsiders. The matching is based on 
the following covariates: whether the proposal requests money, whether the proposal is co-
sponsored, the gender of delegate, the political affiliation of delegate, ethnicity of delegate and 
the constituency of delegate. In columns (1)–(4), non-exact matching methods of specified 
number of matches for each treated unit (M) are used. The upper section shows the matching 
results of 2014 meeting, while the lower section of the table reflects the matching results of 




A2 Appendix for Chapter 4 
Table 10 Regression Results of Investigation on Public Spending (Random Effect) 






Investigation (1-year lagged) -0.51* -0.31** -2.73*** -0.25 -0.43 -1.53** -0.48** 
  (0.31) (0.13) (0.96) (0.22) (0.30) (0.65) (0.22) 
Geographic Area 6.34 1.21 -1.43 2.22** 10.46 4.91 1.12 
  (4.24) (1.45) (3.85) (1.08) (8.26) (4.11) (1.50) 
GDP 0.02*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Population -0.21*** -0.08*** -0.50*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.09*** 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.15) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
Urbanization Rate 14.80*** 0.97 7.91 -14.47*** -1.39 7.24 -3 
  (5.49) (2.96) (16.00) (3.91) (6.04) (6.34) (2.28) 
Year  Baseline 
2013 -9.21 70.70*** 94.33** -18.34 94.02*** 110.29*** 15.38 
  (43.70) (8.03) (41.01) (25.05) (34.54) (23.43) (16.29) 
2014 81.82 223.54*** 233.35*** 49.69 41.37 274.15*** 52.20*** 
  (75.12) (16.29) (68.63) (45.32) (39.25) (53.50) (17.63) 
2015 361.69*** 409.44*** 840.35*** 121.53** 159.68 746.02*** 227.51*** 
  (130.05) (39.12) (223.49) (53.97) (114.98) (124.67) (68.54) 
2016 466.26*** 516.46*** 1265.78*** 216.62** 290.15* 1173.50*** 236.59*** 
  (155.31) (53.36) (343.43) (94.70) (159.07) (279.11) (77.13) 
Constant 1287.85*** 758.99*** 1359.3 1458.62*** 1200.17*** 1132.27** 614.66*** 
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  (345.40) (173.65) (998.83) (267.06) (452.94) (468.56) (187.81) 
N 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 





Table 11 Regression Results of Investigation on Public Spending (Fixed Effect) 






Investigation (1-year lagged) -0.69 -0.32* -2.26** -0.14 -0.63 -1.49 -0.42* 
  (0.43) (0.17) (0.87) (0.21) (0.44) (0.90) (0.22) 
GDP 0.02** 0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01* 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) 
Population 0.09 -0.03 0.15 -0.07 0.07 -0.33 -0.14 
  (0.61) (0.35) (1.50) (0.42) (0.46) (0.67) (0.37) 
Urbanization Rate 51.75 3.03 -165.48 -43.47* 46.8 7.9 -11.39 
  (53.39) (18.64) (110.06) (23.84) (45.14) (84.58) (28.31) 
Year (2012) Baseline 
2013 -54.4 68.51*** 268.95** 13.27 37.88 109.98 27.15 
  (68.07) (23.34) (127.20) (31.96) (35.01) (95.19) (36.83) 
2014 -4.13 219.25*** 575.86** 110.16* -66.3 272.23 73.62 
  (100.84) (42.97) (253.32) (63.11) (90.11) (162.14) (62.92) 
2015 252.41* 403.68*** 1296.56*** 198.32** 20.89 739.72*** 252.19** 
  (137.32) (57.15) (404.10) (90.66) (83.40) (165.89) (108.53) 
2016 320.75* 508.82*** 1879.34*** 319.08** 104.69 1163.73*** 268.96* 
  (180.49) (78.66) (566.68) (145.95) (104.59) (210.26) (153.39) 
Constant -1792.81 468.16 7915.08 2825.07 -1904.88 1930.49 1329.21 
  (3646.91) (1872.88) (9035.10) (1944.87) (2863.01) (5227.56) (1692.48) 
N 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 




Table 12 Regression Results of Investigation on Central Fiscal Transfer 
  Random Effect Fixed Effect 
Investigation (1-year lagged) 0.78*** 0.36** 0.45** 0.25 
  (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Geographic Area 7.05*** 3.39   
  (1.41) (2.48)   
GDP -0.04***  -0.02***  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  
GDP per Capita  -0.02***  -0.01*** 
   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Population 0.36***  0.06  
  (0.04)  (0.51)  
Urbanization Rate 1.3 12.42 49.58*** 41.95** 
  (3.82) (8.97) (11.83) (16.42) 
Year     
2012 Baseline 
2013 114.39*** 118.61*** 40.55* 69.13** 
  (24.35) (24.79) (23.49) (31.01) 
2014 230.55*** 252.82*** 97.00** 159.46*** 
  (37.25) (41.63) (38.80) (55.15) 
2015 309.00*** 387.77*** 156.76*** 267.49*** 
  (45.92) (57.00) (53.10) (76.12) 
2016 439.44*** 557.92*** 238.42*** 395.66*** 
  (59.49) (83.13) (75.55) (108.13) 
Constant 282.28 1492.51*** -1111.48 -194.06 
  (321.12) (521.82) (2314.69) (960.44) 
N 155 155 155 155 
Note: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01; Dependent Variable is the total central fiscal transfer 





Table 13 Regression Results of Investigation on the Percentage of Central Assistance 
  Random Effect Fixed Effect 
Investigation (1-year lagged, log) 0.03** 0.02** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Geographic Area (log) 0.19***  
  (0.04)  
GDP (log) -0.90*** -0.75*** 
  (0.15) (0.14) 
Population (log) 0.70*** -2.45 
  (0.13) (1.56) 
Urbanization Rate 0 0.02* 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Year   
2012 Baseline 
2013 -0.09** -0.11*** 
  (0.04) (0.03) 
2014 -0.12* -0.14*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) 
2015 -0.18** -0.19*** 
  (0.08) (0.06) 
2016 -0.1 -0.13* 
  (0.08) (0.06) 
Constant 4.31*** 29.87** 
  (0.83) (12.53) 
N 124 124 
Note: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01; The dependent Variable is the percentage (logged) of 





Table 14 Regression Results of Investigation on Other expenditure 
  Random Fixed 
Investigation (1-year lagged) 0.38+ 0.65 
  -0.23 -0.41 
Geographic Area 2.69  
  -1.8  
GDP 0 -0.02 
  -0.01 -0.02 
Population -0.03 0.33 
  -0.06 -0.51 
Urbanization Rate 20.51 -15.5 
  -13.88 -18.07 
Year (2012) Baseline 
2013 28.08 85.43* 
  -23.37 -47.77 
2014 20.84 123.23 
  -24.61 -74.03 
2015 -27.41 85.38 
  -42.98 -94.56 
2016 -292.56** -144.24* 
  -129.35 -76.32 
Constant -673.51 50.29 
  -794.41 -1888.51 
N 155 155 




Table 15 Regression results of Investigation on Public Spending (with SOE percent) 
  Education Healthcare Community House Public Service Social Security Environment 
Investigation (1-year lagged) -0.5 -0.31** -2.73*** -0.24 -0.43 -1.55** -0.48** 
  (0.31) (0.13) (0.97) (0.23) (0.30) (0.65) (0.22) 
Geographic Area 6.7 1.21 -1.3 2.32* 10.57 4.3 0.91 
  (4.56) (1.50) (4.17) (1.24) (8.31) (4.20) (1.67) 
GDP 0.02*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Population -0.23*** -0.08*** -0.51*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.15** -0.09*** 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.16) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
Urbanization Rate 13.53** 1.02 6 -14.77*** -1.53 8.06 -2.65 
  (6.03) (3.16) (15.23) (3.86) (5.99) (6.31) (2.43) 
SOE in GDP -5.66 0.1 -4.14 -1.55 -1.3 7.63* 2.67 
  (6.62) (2.84) (14.02) (3.59) (5.79) (4.21) (3.29) 
Year (2012) Baseline 
2013 -18.87 70.87*** 86.93* -20.91 91.70** 122.66*** 19.78 
  (43.63) (9.86) (44.98) (22.85) (37.81) (25.13) (17.81) 
2014 67.63 223.78*** 222.93*** 45.87 37.88 292.56*** 58.74** 
  (67.59) (19.35) (79.53) (41.27) (45.56) (59.53) (23.19) 
2015 340.62*** 409.79*** 826.29*** 115.66** 154.45 774.68*** 237.59*** 
  (120.94) (43.62) (249.93) (56.18) (121.49) (136.25) (74.69) 
2016 441.82*** 516.85*** 1249.91*** 209.75** 284.00* 1206.93*** 248.36*** 
  (144.97) (58.08) (370.66) (101.05) (165.80) (289.73) (86.92) 
Constant 1644.82*** 751.52*** 1682.02 1553.42*** 1273.01** 708.13 461.95** 
  (524.06) (249.43) (1154.52) (334.08) (569.03) (556.46) (218.97) 
N 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 
Note: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01; Per capita data for all public spending; Random Effect Model; SOE in GDP is calculated as the percent of 
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Table 16 Regression results of Investigation on Public Spending (with FDI) 
  Education Healthcare Community House Public Service Social Security Environment 
Investigation (1-year lagged) -0.53* -0.32** -2.68*** -0.15 -0.5 -1.47** -0.42** 
  (0.29) (0.13) (0.90) (0.21) (0.31) (0.68) (0.19) 
Geographic Area 6.15 1.13 -1.23 2.67** 9.6 5.17 1.4 
  (4.21) (1.40) (3.70) (1.08) (7.91) (4.09) (1.49) 
GDP 0.02*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01 0.01** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Population -0.22*** -0.08*** -0.49*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.08*** 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.16) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
Urbanization Rate 13.84** 0.7 7.96 -13.53*** -5 7.68 -2.47 
  (6.11) (3.07) (16.74) (3.50) (5.81) (6.50) (2.37) 
FDI 0 0 -0.02 -0.03* 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Year (2012) Baseline 
2013 -10.83 69.11*** 101.65* -3.92 85.25** 118.87*** 24.12 
  (50.48) (10.64) (58.11) (26.33) (37.02) (21.78) (17.55) 
2014 79.38 220.83*** 246.32** 74.48 26.99 289.05*** 67.34** 
  (91.00) (21.87) (114.41) (49.58) (45.75) (45.56) (28.52) 
2015 360.11** 406.70*** 854.80*** 147.25** 146.45 761.90*** 243.48*** 
  (147.37) (44.13) (272.51) (57.44) (119.26) (116.87) (79.35) 
2016 467.89*** 516.36*** 1268.61*** 220.70** 296.55* 1176.44*** 239.06*** 
  (158.71) (53.71) (350.69) (94.57) (161.30) (279.20) (80.41) 
Constant 1345.57*** 773.25*** 1372.34 1429.19*** 1406.40*** 1122.18** 599.37*** 
  (358.68) (169.78) (1021.55) (248.88) (442.64) (472.69) (186.76) 
 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 
Note: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01; Per capita data for all public spending; Random Effect Model; Time-Series Cross-Sectional OLS is used. 
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Table 17 Regression results of Investigation on Public Spending (with Total Budget) 
  Education Healthcare Community House Public Service Social Security Environment 
Investigation (1-year lagged) -0.57** -0.33*** -3.09*** -0.36 -0.45 -1.73*** -0.49* 
  (0.28) (0.12) (0.87) (0.24) (0.28) (0.63) (0.26) 
Geographic Area 6.38 1.2 -2.51 1.76 10.97 4.17 1.06 
  (4.61) (1.54) (4.11) (1.30) (8.77) (4.17) (1.70) 
Total Budget Expenditure 0.12*** 0.04** 0.50*** 0.12*** 0.04 0.13*** 0.06 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.17) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Population -0.19*** -0.08*** -0.45*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.20*** -0.08** 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Urbanization Rate 19.49*** 2.25 17.51 -13.79*** 3.27 5.19 -1.04 
  (5.36) (2.57) (16.55) (4.34) (6.64) (5.47) (2.69) 
Year (2012) Baseline 
2013 -25.93 63.97*** 15.8 -39.68 86.80** 81.04*** 8.36 
  (48.04) (9.69) (56.12) (26.85) (38.06) (26.12) (22.26) 
2014 57.13 213.73*** 122.04 20.14 29.18 234.27*** 42.05** 
  (81.71) (18.45) (86.75) (46.84) (44.32) (58.14) (20.56) 
2015 282.51** 382.09*** 518.69*** 43.99 126.07 663.51*** 189.63*** 
  (141.66) (44.11) (187.22) (45.99) (125.65) (127.92) (63.42) 
2016 384.10** 488.16*** 937.92*** 138.70* 252.88 1091.77*** 197.71*** 
  (167.33) (57.05) (299.77) (72.43) (168.40) (273.41) (63.26) 
Constant 886.16** 644.03*** 304.06 1302.05*** 874.71* 1144.53*** 434.90** 
  (346.49) (150.14) (795.38) (280.90) (498.06) (391.48) (189.60) 
N 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 
Note: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01; per capita data for all public spending; Random Effect Model 
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Table 18 Regression Results of Investigation on Total Budget Expenditure 
 Total Budget Expenditure 
  Random Fixed 
Investigation (1-year lagged) 0.96 0.39 
  (0.61) (0.39) 
Geographic Area 2.9  
  (3.20)  
GDP 0.12*** 0.12*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) 
Population 0.01 4.48** 
  (0.16) (1.66) 
Urbanization Rate -11.04 -148.49*** 
  (16.44) (49.68) 
Year (2012) Baseline 
2013 180.93*** 224.44*** 
  (42.54) (55.92) 
2014 254.17*** 375.87*** 
  (78.48) (106.21) 
2015 653.54*** 890.82*** 
  (124.52) (183.62) 
2016 662.80*** 1000.01*** 
  (181.64) (214.07) 
Constant 1601.44 -1.00E+04 
  (1071.95) (6702.16) 
N 155 155 




Table 19 Regression Results of Investigation on Public Spending (Political Rank) 
  Education Healthcare Community House Public Service Social Security Environment 
Investigation (1-year lagged) -0.55* -0.31** -2.72*** -0.24 -0.43 -1.53** -0.48** 
  (0.31) (0.13) (0.97) (0.23) (0.30) (0.66) (0.23) 
Geographic Area 4.87 0.96 -0.89 2.47** 10.52 4.7 0.76 
  (4.19) (1.47) (4.74) (1.26) (8.12) (3.85) (1.66) 
GDP 0.02*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.02** 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Population -0.22*** -0.08*** -0.50*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.09*** 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.15) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
Urbanization Rate 6.13 -0.52 11.05 -13.00** -1.06 6.03 -5.11* 
  (5.84) (3.04) (29.83) (5.16) (6.48) (6.80) (3.07) 
Political Rank 355.31*** 66.71 -145.96 -66.13 -32.56 50.7 89.39 
  (132.06) (49.94) (651.06) (174.82) (87.15) (187.62) (104.51) 
Year               
2012 Baseline 
2013 -2.07 72.03*** 91.36** -19.62 93.53*** 111.23*** 17.11 
  (44.07) (7.42) (39.44) (25.44) (35.18) (23.63) (15.87) 
2014 98.61 226.61*** 226.61*** 46.7 40.3 276.34*** 56.25*** 
  (77.12) (16.11) (72.07) (46.28) (40.60) (56.13) (20.11) 
2015 391.94*** 414.89*** 828.66*** 116.18** 157.86 749.92*** 234.78*** 
  (134.68) (39.93) (242.26) (55.74) (118.16) (131.48) (73.11) 
2016 520.21*** 526.26*** 1244.68*** 206.97** 286.54* 1180.60*** 249.68*** 
  (162.27) (55.55) (374.27) (99.61) (164.65) (291.04) (88.58) 
Constant 1375.91*** 767.31*** 1350.07 1451.14*** 1222.20*** 1143.14** 632.11*** 
  (332.60) (173.19) (1068.23) (265.29) (453.27) (461.34) (197.68) 
N 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 
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Note: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01; per capital spending on each public spending item; Political Rank measures whether a provincial party 
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